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"Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person. - Eighth Exception. It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject of accusation."

9. It would now be useful to refer to certain decisions on this aspect. Considering this Exception, a Five-Judge Full Bench of this Court in Tiruvenkada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal, AIR 1926 Mad 906 : (1926 (27) Cri LJ 1026) held that no absolute privilege attaches to averments in a criminal complaint made in court but that the privilege is qualified in the sense, that the defamatory statement must have been made in good faith. In the case before the Full Bench, Tiruvengada Mudali had filed a private complaint against three persons for different offences, in which he described the first of them as being a paramour of the second-Thirupurasundari Ammal. This led to a complaint by Tirupurasundari Ammal against Tiruvengada Mudali for an offence u/S. 500, IPC. A reference was made by the Division Bench to the Full Bench, as to whether the privilege to the statement made in the complaint, was absolute or qualified. The Full Bench made it clear that u/S. 499, IPC, which alone would have to be looked into, without importing into it common law principles proof of good faith, being one of the ingredients of Exception 8, the privilege is not absolute but only qualified.

11. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon a decision in Bhagat Singh v. Zindalal AIR 1966 J & K 106 : (1966 Cri LJ 909) wherein also, the decision in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal, AIR 1926 Mad 906 : (1926 (27) Cri LJ 1026) has been followed to hold, that the privilege is not absolute but only qualified and proof of good faith is necessary.

12. A learned Judge of this court in Thangavelu v. Ponnammal , confirmed the conviction of the accused for the offence u/S. 500, IPC relating to a defamatory statement made in his plaint in Small Cause No. 349/93 on the file of the District Munsif, Tirunelveli, wherein the plaintiff had described one Ponnammal, as concubine of Namasivaya Udayar. Ponnammal had filed the criminal complaint for defamation. The trial Court, as well as the appellate Court, had held that there was absence of good faith and since the findings were concurrent, this Court in the revision, declined to interfere with the conviction.

13. These decisions would show that averments made in the plaint, if they are defamatory, can form the subject matter of a criminal prosecution and the privilege is only a qualified one.

14. The next contention of Dr. J. Sundershan is that, the present prosecution is premature and the respondent would have to wait till the civil suit is ultimately disposed of and in the event of the suit being dismissed, the petitioner could be subjected to any criminal prosecution. This contention is totally untenable. The allegation in the plaint is that the agents, servants and workmen of the defendants entered the office of the petitioner on several occasions, threatened to dispossess him and to cause injury, damage, alienate and remove valuable property, including important case documents. Nothing more is averred in the plaint. In this context reliance is placed by the petitioner on the decision in Ram Kumar Pori v. State of U.P. to contend that when the civil suit is pending, a parallel prosecution for defamation, could not be proceeded with. Such a proposition of law cannot be deduced from the above decision. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, when a civil court is seized of the question of disputed possession between rival parties, parallel proceedings by the Executive Magistrate u/S. 145, Cr.P.C. also to decide possession ought not to be proceeded with. This has no bearing on the case before us. The offending passage is per se defamatory and it is open to the respondent to choose to prosecute the petitioner, irrespective of the pendency or the result of the civil litigation. The Civil Court would confine its decision to the trespass, threat of injury and damage by the servants, agents and workmen of the various defendants and the entitlement of token damages by the respondent, while the criminal Court, the passage being per se defamatory, would proceed to find out whether any one of the 10 Exceptions to S. 499, I.P.C. would apply. The scope of the two proceedings is entirely different. They are not parallel.