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5. Section 9 of the MEPS Act provides for a remedy of an appeal to a tribunal constituted under the Act which is called a "school tribunal" to an employee of a private school who feels aggrieved by an order passed by the Management either dismissing him from services or removing him from services or reducing him in rank or terminating his services as well as when the Management supersedes the employee. The question that arises for consideration is whether because of the enactment of Section 9 the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for a decree or declaration that the order passed by the Management either of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, termination or an order of promotion which results in supersession of the employee concerned is illegal and inoperative and for other consequential reliefs for reinstatement of the employee concerned is barred by necessary implications. It appears that this question was considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Janata Janardan Shikshan Sanstha and Anr. v. Dr. Vasant P. Satpute, 1986 MLJ, 260, and it was held that because of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit against the order which can be subjected to challenge in an appeal filed under Section 9 is neither expressly barred nor is barred by necessary implication. Another learned Single Judge of this Court considering the same question in a judgment in the case of Rasta Peth Education Society, Pune v. Pethkar Udhao Bhimashankar, 1994 M.L.J. page 725 and came to the same conclusion. It further appears that the same question came up for consideration before another learned Single Judge of this Court in a review petition in the case of Satyawadi Ganpatrao Pimple and Ors. v. Aruna Ganpatrao Narwade and Anr., 2000 (2) Mh.L.J. page 322 and the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that so far as members of teaching staff of private school are concerned the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit against the order passed by the Management which can be subjected to challenge in an appeal filed under Section 9 is barred. The learned Single Judge also declared that the case of Rasta Peth Education Society has not been correctly decided and that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Rasta Peth Education Society is not good law. It appears from the order of the learned Single Judge passed in this Second appeal dated 26-9-2001 that the present reference has arisen because of these three judgments of the learned Single Judges of this Court. It may be pointed out here that in the reference the provisions of Rule 12 framed under the Act have been referred to. Reference has arisen because Rule 12 provides for preparation of seniority list of the employees working in a private school. In terms of the provisions of that rules after the seniority list is prepared by the management is circulated amongst the employees, the employees are entitled to raise objections and disputes, the management has to refer those disputes to the Education Officer for decision and thereafter the disputes about seniority are to be decided by the Education Officer. It appears from the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Satyawadi Ganpatrao Pimple, referred to above, that the learned Single Judge has held that the decision of the Education Officer under Rule 12 regarding seniority becomes final and therefore the civil court cannot go into the validity or otherwise of that decision. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit in relation to the finalisation of the seniority list of employees in the private school is also barred. It may be pointed out here that so far as the aspect of Rule 12 is concerned, it did not arise for consideration before the learned Single Judge, who decided the case of Rasta Peth Education Society. It appears that the learned Single Judge, who decided the case of Janata Janardan Shikshan Sanstha, referred to above, also did not consider this question. But the provisions of Rule 12 appear to have been considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in his judgment in the case of Burondi K. Lodghar v. Vilasrao M. Desai, 1994 (4) Bom. C.R. 294. It was held that once the question of seniority of an employee is decided by the Education Officer that question cannot be reopened before the School Tribunal in an appeal against the order of supersession filed under Section 9 of the Act. That judgment appears to have been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Umesh Balkrishna Vispute v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., and the Division Bench has held that the law laid down by the learned Single Judge by his judgment in Burondi K. Lodghar's case cannot be said to be good law and the despite decision of the Education Officer the question of seniority can be reopened before the School Tribunal in an appeal filed under Section 9 of the Act and the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide that question being an incidental question.

The second judgment is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Rasta Peth Education Society's case. Perusal of paragraph 6 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Rasta Peth Education Society's case specifically refers to the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., and the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, , as also the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India, and the learned Single Judge in paragraph 7 has observed thus:

Thereafter, the learned Single Judge examined the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and in paragraph 11 has observed thus:-
11. A detail examination of the scheme of the M.E.P.S. Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as has been summarised hereinabove would indicate that sufficient provisions have been made to deal with the grievances relating to the service matters of the employees in the private schools whether aided or unaided and the remedy so provided is, undoubtedly efficacious as well as complete. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Shri Panch Nagar (supra) and Dhulabhai (supra) when the provisions of a special stature do not specifically bar maintainability of a suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary to examine the provisions of such special stature to find out whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court is impliedly barred and if regards be had to the provisions of the M.E.P.S. Act and the Rules framed thereunder, undoubtedly, the orders passed by the tribunal under Section 9 as well as orders passed by the Education Officer, under Rule 12 of the M.E.P.S. Rules, are final in nature and there is a forum provided to deal with almost every grievance relating to service matters of the employees in the private schools. In a Civil suit filed under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court cannot go beyond giving a declaration or granting relief as may be provided under the Specific Reliefs Act. As against this, the powers given to the tribunal under sections 11 and 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act are by way of a full, complete and speedy remedy, inasmuch as, the tribunal is empowered to substitute the punishment or modify the punishment order and grant relief, including reinstatement in service with or without back wages or part of back wages or compensation. Undoubtedly, such a relief cannot be granted by the civil court while decreeing a suit for declaration etc. It would not be in the interest of employees in the private schools to hold that the remedy of filing a civil suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not barred under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. The employees in private schools may consist of teaching and non-teaching and so far as non-teaching employees are concerned, they may have a remedy of a dual nature inasmuch as to approach the School Tribunal under section 9 in respect of the matters provided thereunder or to the Education Officer in respect of the matters provided thereunder or to the Education Officer in respect of the matters provided thereunder or to the Education Officer in respect of the matters regarding seniority or any other grievance and alternatively, to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Court, under the provisions of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. However, so far as the teaching staff is concerned, they have the remedy only under the M.E.P.S. Act and the Rules framed thereunder in respect of the service matters and for both, the teaching as well as non-teaching staff, the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the matters set out in section 9 of the Act and Rule 12 of the M.E.P.S. Rules is impliedly barred. In view of this enunciations of the Apex Court, as referred to hereinabove. It is, therefore, clear that the law laid down by this Court in the case of Rasta Peth Education Society (supra)can no more be held to be a good law. The view taken by me while disposing the Civil Revision Application No. 930/1999 that a civil suit challenging the order of the reversal, was not maintainable- is correct and the review application, therefore, stands rejected.

15. It is further to be seen here that the Act does not provide any effective remedy for breach of all the rights that have been created by the Act. An appeal under Section 9 is provided only against the order of termination of services, of dismissal, of reduction in rank and an order of supersession. The Rules make elaborate provisions regarding transfer of an employee, but there is no effective remedy provided by the Act if an employee is transferred in breach of the provisions of the Rules. The Act and the Rules make elaborate provisions regarding the procedure to be followed by the management in making appointment. But if an appointment is made by the management in breach of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, then there is no remedy provided by the Act and the Rules. Several such examples can be given. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Act provides effective remedy for enforcement of all the rights that are created by the Act. The provisions in relation to appointment, holding of departmental inquiry, termination of services were all made in the Secondary Schools code and as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pandke's case the Secondary Schools Code has statutory force, and therefore, it cannot be said that by the act any new rights have been created, which were not previously in existence. One more aspect to which we have referred to above, which is relevant and which has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in Satyawadi's case is that the Act while making provision for transfer of matters which matters which were pending on the date of commencement of the Act before the authorities of the Education Department to the tribunal did not make similar provision in relation to the matters which were pending before the civil court on the date of commencement of the Act. Perusal of paragraph (11) of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Satyawadi's case shows that the judgment of the another learned Single Judge in Rasta Peth's case has been held to (sic) not laying down good law, only because the learned Single Judge who decided Rasta Peth's case did not consider the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Panch Nagar Parakh Mandasur's case referred to above.