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as also to what is contained in paragraph 13 of that judgment, which reads as follows:-

13. We are, therefore, of the view that an appointment of a teacher either in the primary school, secondary school, junior college, etc. is required to be approved by the Education Officer and the Education Officer while discharging this duty performs an implied statutory function under the provisions of the M.E.P.S. Rules.

Thus, the Division Bench in Shailaja Walse's case has held that though there is no specific provision either in the Act, the Rules framed thereunder or the Secondary Schools Code, it is implicit in the scheme of the Act, Rules and Secondary Schools Code that appointment of a teacher made in a private school is required to be approved by an officer of the Education Department. This obviously is an approval after the appointment is made and not previous approval, though the Division Bench in Shailaja's case was considering the case of appointments of teachers in primary schools who do not hold requisite training qualification and therefore their appoints would have required previous approval. In this background, now e have to see another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe v. The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal and Ors., of the judgment the Division Bench has observed thus:-

11. It was urged before us that the judgment of the Division Bench holding that approval to the appointment of an employee in a private school by authorities of the Education Department is necessary does not lay down good law. It was urged that whenever the legislature finds it necessary to provide for approval of an outside authority, it made provisions for such an approval and in each case it was previous approval which was contemplated. It was submitted that even the terms on which the grant-in-aid is given to the private school by the State Government also do not contemplate the management obtaining post-facto approval to all the appointments that it makes, and therefore, according to the learned Counsel appearing for the employee the Division Bench is not right in laying down that in each case of appointment in a private school an approval of the authorities of the Education Department is necessary. It is submitted that such a decision would be contrary to the scheme of the Act and the Rules. It was submitted that the Division Bench has held that such an approval is necessary after finding that the Act, the Rules and the Secondary Schools Code do not have an express provision requiring such an approval. It was submitted that by inference such a requirement cannot be read, especially when according to the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court absence of approval to an appointment deprives the employee concerned of a remedy of filing an appeal under Section 9. We find considerable force in this submission. As observed above, the Division Bench, which has decided Shailaja Walse's case referred to above, noted that the Second Schools Code, Act and the Rules do not specifically provide for appointment of an employee in a private school being approved by the authorities of the Education Department. But the Division Bench held that even though there is no specific provision in the scheme of the Act and the Code such an approval is implicit. Similar situation appears to have been considered by the Supreme court in its judgment in Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar and Anr. v. Management of Vishwa Bharata Seva Samiti and Anr., . In that case two persons were appointed as teachers in a private Government aided school recognised by the Government of Karnataka on probation. After some time they were prevented from working by the management. They filed in appeal before the Tribunal. The stand of the management before the Tribunal was that the teachers were appointed on probation subject to the condition that their appointment would be approved by the authorities of the Education Department and as the approval was not granted, they ceased to be in employment. The stand of the teachers was that there is no provision either under the Act or the Rules for obtaining approval of appointment as Asst.teacher and therefore preventing them from working on the ground that their appointments were not approved is not proper. The Supreme Court after going through the provisions of the Act, the Rules and Grant-in-Aid Code found that there is no express provision made obliging the management to obtain any approval for appointment of the teachers. Therefore, in paragraph 9 the Supreme Court observes thus:-

Perusal of the observations of the Supreme Court in above paragraph (4) shows that because in terms of the provisions of the Co. operative Societies Act, the rules and bye-laws, the State Government exercises all pervasive control over the bank and its employees and the service conditions of such employees are governed by statutory rules. The Supreme Court has held that the Co. operative society is an instrumentality of the State, and therefore, an employee whose services are terminated by such Co. operative society in breach of the provisions of the statutory rules governing the condition of service can institute a suit for a decree of reinstatement in service. If we look at the provisions of the Act, the rules framed thereunder and the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code which have been held to have statutory force by the Supreme Court by its judgment in Pandke's case, the authorities of the State Government exercise all pervasive control over the management. The condition of services of the employees of the private school are governed by the Act and the Rules. The Act and the Rules make elaborate provisions in regard to initiation of disciplinary proceedings etc. In our opinion, therefore, in the face of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sahan Rai's case referred to above, an employee of the private school now may be entitled to institute a suit in a civil court seeking to institute a suit in a civil court seeking a decree of reinstatement in service. It thus appears that one of the consideration that weighed with the learned Single Judge in Stayawadi's case may not now be relevant in view of the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court.