Delhi High Court
Surender Prasad vs Central Public Works Department (Cpwd) on 6 September, 2023
Author: Satish Chandra Sharma
Bench: Chief Justice, Sanjeev Narula
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Date of Decision: 06.09.2023
% LPA 139/2023 & CM APPL. 9138/2023, CM APPL. 9140/2023
SURENDER PRASAD ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Ms. Shreya
Kukreti, Advocates.
versus
CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT (CPWD)
..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Jaswinder Singh, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ. (ORAL)
1. The present LPA arises out of a judgment dated 16.11.2022 passed by
the Ld. Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 7487/2005 titled „CPWD Vs. Presiding
Officer &Ors.' (the "Impugned Judgement").
2. The facts of the case reveal that the Appellant was appointed as a
muster roll employee i.e., Muster Roll Assistant Wireman on 27.01.1983 by
the Respondent. On 04.05.1989, a First Information Report bearing No. 82
of 1989 came to be registered against the Appellant in relation to an offence
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
("IPC") (the "FIR"). Thereafter, on 05.05.1989, the Appellant was
allegedly illegally arrested by Delhi Police and subsequently, produced
before the Magistrate on 12.05.1989. In May 1989, the Respondent learnt
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about the Appellant‟s arrest through a newspaper report which was
confirmed vide a letter dated 31.05.1989 issued to the Respondent by Police
Station ("PS") Inder Puri, Delhi.
3. In this context, on 21.06.1989 the Appellant‟s services were stated to
have been terminated by the Respondent retrospectively with effect from
05.05.1989. On 10.08.1990, the Appellant was released on parole by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi and thereafter, vide a
letter dated 29.08.1990, the Appellant informed the Respondent about inter
aliahis alleged illegal arrest by the Delhi Police; and his dire need for
money. Accordingly, the Appellant requested the Respondent to release all
arrears. On 26.02.1992, the Appellant was released on regular bail by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi.
4. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to note that the Respondent vide
a letter dated 27.05.1991 formulated a policy qua inter alia muster roll
employees / casual labor embroiled in serious criminal cases, whereunder
muster roll employees / casual labor could be terminated without notice on
account of being embroiled in a serious criminal case and consequently
remaining incarcerated beyond 48 (forty-eight) hours (the "Policy").
5. The Appellant, vide a letter dated 28.05.1992 issued through his legal
counsel to the Respondent, sought reinstatement of his service with the
Respondent. In furtherance of the same, the Appellant even visited the
office(s) of the Respondent however, he was not reinstated by the
Respondent.
6. On 26.07.1995, the Appellant was acquitted by the Additional
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Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi. The Appellant vide a letter dated
11.08.1994 issued to the Respondent, reiterated his demand for
reinstatement of his service with the Respondent under the Policy.
7. Accordingly, vide a letter dated 31.08.1994, the Executive Engineer,
Central Public Works Department ("CPWD") requested the Superintendent
Engineer, CPWD to inter alia regularize the services of the Appellant in
accordance with law. Subsequently, additional letter(s) dated 08.09.1994;
and 10.10.1994 were issued by the Appellant to the Respondent, seeking
reinstatement of his service under the Policy. However, the Respondent did
not reinstate the services of the Appellant.
8. Aggrieved, the Appellant sought recourse under the provisions of the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (the "ID Act"). The relevant proceedings
instituted by the Appellant before the Conciliation Officer ("CO") did not
materialize due to the alleged non-cooperative nature of the Respondent.
Thereafter, a reference was made by the appropriate government seeking the
resolution of the dispute before the Ld. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal (the "CGIT"). The CGIT vide an award dated 21.03.2002in
Industrial Dispute ("ID") No. 101/1996 held (i) that the termination of
services of the Appellant by the Respondent was illegal; (ii) directed the
reinstatement of the Appellant with full back-wages with effect from
05.05.1989 (the "Award 1").
9. Aggrieved by the Award 1, the Respondent challenged the same
before this Hon‟ble Court by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 401 of 2003.
This Court, vide an order dated 18.03.2004 remanded the matter back to the
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CGIT to decide the matter afresh observing that the Respondent was not
given an opportunity to argue the matter before the CGIT. Thereafter, the
CGIT vide an award dated 30.08.2004 in ID No. 101 / 1996 held (i) that the
termination of services of the Appellant by the Respondent was illegal; (ii)
directed the reinstatement of the Appellant (the "Award 2").
10. Aggrieved by Award 2, the Respondent challenged the same before
this Hon‟ble Court by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7487 of 2005. The
Ld. Single Judge vide an order dated 29.08.2005, was pleased to stay Award
2 subject to certain conditions. Subsequently, an application under Section
17-B of the ID Act, came to be preferred by the Appellant which was
allowed vide an order dated 07.01.2008 by the Ld. Single Judge wherein the
Appellant was granted wages under Section 17-B of the ID Act with effect
from 30.08.2004. Thereafter, vide a judgement dated 16.11.2022 in Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 7487 of 2005, the Ld. Single Judge held that the
termination of services of the Appellant was legal and accordingly, set aside
the Award 2 (the "Impugned Judgement").
11. Aggrieved by the Impugned Judgement, the Appellant has preferred
this present Letters Patent Appeal ("LPA").
12. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has vehemently argued before this
Court that the Impugned Judgment suffers from errors apparent on the face
of record as the Ld. Single Judge has erred in law and in fact. It is his
contention that the Ld. Single Judge could not have come to a finding that
the Respondent was justified in terminating the services of the Appellant on
account of unauthorized absence from duty as per the CPWD Manual
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Volume III (the "CPWD Manual"). It is his submission that the Appellant
was arrested on 05.05.1989, and that the Appellant‟s absence from duty
must solely be attributed to the Appellant‟s arrest, therefore no case of
„willful unauthorized absence‟ could have been made out qua the Appellant.
Reliance in this regard has been placed on decision(s) of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India (the "Supreme Court") in Krushnakant B. Parmar
Vs. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178; and D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A.
Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259.
13. It has been submitted that no departmental enquiry was conducted by
the Respondent against the Appellant; and no „call-back notice‟ was issued
to the Appellant in contravention of principles of natural justice. In this
context, it was submitted that the law is well settled to the extent that
principles of natural justice must extend to „muster roll employees‟ as no
distinction could be made in this regard between regular employees and
temporary employees. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme
Court in M.C.D. Vs. Praveen Kumar Jain, (1998) 9 SCC 468; and
decision(s) of this Hon‟ble Court in Haryana Roadways, Delhi Vs. Thana
Ram, MANU/DE/4375/2012, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Asha
Ram, 2005 (80) DRJ 750.
14. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the Ld. Single
Judge failed to appreciate the true scope of Section 25J of the ID Act which
would have an overriding effect over any other law or standing order (as the
case may be) in relation to industrial disputes. Thus, it is his contention that
the safeguards enshrined under Section 25F of the ID Act have been
disregarded by the Respondent whilst terminating the Appellant‟s services.
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Accordingly, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant submits that the actions of
the Respondent are void-ab-initio under Section 25F of the ID Act. In this
regard, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in
Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer Public Heath, (2010) 5 SCC 497.
15. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has stressed before this Court that
(i) the Appellant was honorably acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Tis Hazari Court, Delhi from the proceedings emanating out of the FIR; and
(ii) no departmental enquiry was conducted by the Respondent qua the
Appellant. Therefore, it is his contention that the Appellant‟s services could
not have been terminated by the Respondent; and neither could the
Appellant‟s absence from duty be termed to be willful misconduct. Reliance
in this regard has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Nar
Singh Pal Vs. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 588; a decision of the Hon‟ble
High Court of Orissa in Md. Mazim Vs. District Transport Manager
(Admn.) Orissa State Transport Services and Ors., MANU/OR/0124/1974;
and a decision of the Hon‟ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in H.P. &
Ors. Vs. Dr. Parvesh Thakur, 2020 SCC OnLine HP 3474.
16. Lastly, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the
Award 2 passed by the Ld. CGIT did not suffer from any perversity that
warranted interference by the Ld. Single Judge exercising his writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this
regard has been placed on Asha Ram (Supra).
17. The Ld. Counsel for the Respondent has re-iterated the stand taken
before the Ld. Single Judge in the Writ Petition and accordingly, submits
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that the Impugned Judgement suffers from no infirmity.
18. Heard the Ld. Counsels for the parties at length and perused the
record. The present matter is being disposed of at the motion hearing stage
itself with the consent of the parties.
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the Appellant was engaged as
a Muster Roll Assistant Wireman by the Respondent with effect from
27.01.1983. Subsequently, the Appellant‟s services are stated to have been
terminated with effect from 05.05.1989 by the Respondent on account of
inter alia willful unauthorized absence; and on account of the Appellant
being arraigned as an accused in the FIR and consequently arrested by Delhi
Police. Undisputedly, the Appellant was acquitted by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vide judgment of acquittal dated
26.07.1994. Thereafter, the Respondent did not reinstate the services of the
Appellant. Aggrieved, the Appellant instituted an ID which culminated into
Award 1. Aggrieved by Award 1, the Respondent herein challenged the
same before this Hon‟ble Court by way of a W.P. (C) 401 of 2003. This
Hon‟ble Court vide an order dated 18.03.2004 was pleased to remand the
matter back to Ld. CGIT with a direction to consider the matter afresh. The
Ld. CGIT on a consideration of the matter afresh came to pass Award 2.
Aggrieved by Award 2, the Respondent herein challenged the same by way
of the underlying writ petition before this Hon‟ble Court. This Hon‟ble
Court was pleased to set aside Award 2 by way of the Impugned Judgment.
20. This Court has carefully considered the Impugned Judgement. In this
Court‟s considered opinion, the Ld. Single Judge has carefully examined the
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Policy issued by the Respondent.The Ld. Single Judge has come to a
conclusion that the Respondent was justified in terminating the Appellant‟s
service as a muster roll employee in light of the Appellant‟s continued
incarceration in the custody of Delhi Police exceeding over 48 (forty-eight)
hours.
21. In this context, it would be relevant to consider the Policy. The same
is reproduced as under:
"1.That the matter was discussed with the representatives of the
Union. The procedures adopted in CWPD is that whenever
muster roll workers/causal labour is arrested on several
criminal charges like murder, theft, rape, etc. and is detained
by the police in its custody for more than 48 hours, the token
ofsuch worker is taken by the Executive Engineer and he is not
allowed to work till he is clearly exonerated by the Court.
2. Except where notice is necessary under any statutory
obligation no notice is required for termination of services of
the muster roll worker/causal labour. Their services will be
deemed to have been terminated when they absent themselves
on the close of the day. The existing practice should continue
till some alternative is decided upon. "
22. Under the terms of the Policy the Respondent could validly terminate
the services of the inter alia a muster roll employee in the event of an arrest
and continued incarceration exceeding 48 (forty-eight) hours of such
employee in the event such arrest and incarceration relates to serious
criminal charges such as murder. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity
with the findings of the Ld. Single Judge in relation to the ability of the
Respondent to take appropriate action against the Appellant.
23. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has also advanced an argument vis-à-
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vis (i) the non-satisfaction of condition precedents under Section 25F of the
ID Act; and (ii) consequently a violation of Section 25J of the ID Act. This
Court is of the considered opinion that the reliance placed by the Appellant
on provisions of the ID Act is erroneous. Under Section 2(oo) of the ID Act
the term „retrenchment‟ has been defined. The same is reproduced as under:
"Section 2 Definitions
.........
(oo) retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the
service of a workman for any any reason whatsoever, otherwise
than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but
does not include--
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
superannuation if the contract of employment between the
employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in
that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the
non-renewal of the contract contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of
such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that
behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of
continued ill-health;
............"
24. The Appellant‟s absence from duty led to his name being struck off
the Respondent‟s muster roll of employees. Undisputedly, the Appellant
could not be reinstated up until his acquittal from the proceedings emanating
out of the FIR as per the Respondent‟s Policy outlined above in Paragraph
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21 of this Judgement. Thereafter, the Appellant was acquitted by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi. However, as rightly
observed by the Ld. Single Judge, the Policy enacted by the Respondent did
not contemplate any automatic reinstatement of an employee solely on the
ground that he / she has been acquitted from the underlying criminal
proceedings. In this context, the striking-off of the name of the Appellant
from the Respondent‟s muster roll of employees on account of his willful
absence would not attract the rigors of Section 25F and Section 25J of the
ID Act. Accordingly, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the
reliance placed on Anoop Sharma (Supra) is misdirected.
25. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on Krushnakant B.
Parmar (Supra) on the ground that the Appellant‟s absence from service
was on account of extenuating circumstances i.e., his arrest in relation to the
FIR and accordingly, his absence could not be held to be willful. Pertinently,
the Appellant reported on duty last on 04.05.1989 and thereafter was
arrested and produced before the Magistrate on 12.05.1989. On perusal of
the record, this Court finds that the Appellant failed to establish any
extenuating circumstances justifying his willful unauthorized absence from
duty. All that was presented before the Ld. Single Judge were bald
averments and unsubstantiated submissions qua an allegedly illegal arrest.
Accordingly, the reliance placed on Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra) is
erroneous.
26. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has also placed reliance upon D.K.
Yadav (Supra) alleging contravention of „principles of natural justice and
fair play' by the Respondent qua the Appellant. In D.K. Yadav (Supra) the
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muster roll employee was deemed „willfully absent‟ and subsequently
terminated. On a perusal of the facts of the case it emerges that the appellant
therein was restrained and not permitted to sign the attendance register
which led to him being deemed „willfully absent‟. Therefore, D.K. Yadav
(Supra) is distinguishable on facts. It would be important to underscore that
the Supreme Court in D.K. Yadav (Supra) also carves out an exception to
the applicability of „principles of natural justice and fair play', which has
been stated as under:
"7. The principal question is whether the impugned action is
violative of principles of natural justice. In A.K. Kraipak v.
Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] a Constitution Bench of this
Court held that the distinction between quasi-judicial and
administrative order has gradually become thin. Now it is
totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of the rule of natural
justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent
miscarriage of justice. These rules operate in the area not
covered by law validly made or expressly excluded as held in
Col. J.N. Sinha v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1
SCR 791] . It is settled law that certified standing orders have
statutory force which do not expressly exclude the application
of the principles of natural justice. Conversely the Act made
exceptions for the application of principles of natural justice by
necessary implication from specific provisions in the Act like
Sections 25-F; 25-FF; 25-FFF etc. The need for temporary
hands to cope with sudden and temporary spurt of work
demands appointment temporarily to a service of such
temporary workmen to meet such exigencies and as soon as the
work or service is completed, the need to dispense with the
services may arise. In that situation, on compliance with the
provisions of Section 25-F resort could be had to retrench the
employees in conformity therewith. Particular statute or
statutory rules or orders having statutory flavour may also
exclude the application of the principles of natural justice
expressly or by necessary implication. In other respects the
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principles of natural justice would apply unless the employer
should justify its exclusion on given special and exceptional
exigencies." (emphasis supplied)
27. Furthermore, it would be pertinent to mention the decision of the
Supreme Court in Vijay S. Sathaye v. Indian Airlines Ltd., (2013) 10 SCC
253 wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:
"12. It is a settled law that an employee cannot be termed as a
slave, he has a right to abandon the service any time
voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively, not
joining the duty and remaining absent for long. Absence from
duty in the beginning may be a misconduct but when absence is
for a very long period, it may amount to voluntary
abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of
service come to an end automatically without requiring any
order to be passed by the employer.
13. In Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1961 SC 1567]
this Court held as under : (AIR p. 1570, para 6)
"6. ... there would be the class of cases where long
unauthorised absence may reasonably give rise to
an inference that such service is intended to be
abandoned by the employee."
(See also Shahoodul Haque v. Registrar, Coop.
Societies [(1975) 3 SCC 108 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 498 : AIR 1974
SC 1896] .)
14. For the purpose of termination, there has to be positive
action on the part of the employer while abandonment of
service is a consequence of unilateral action on behalf of the
employee and the employer has no role in it. Such an act cannot
be termed as "retrenchment" from service. (See State of
Haryana v. Om Parkash [(1998) 8 SCC 733 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
262] .)
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15. In Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah [AIR
1964 SC 1272] , while dealing with a similar case, this Court
observed : (AIR p. 1275, para 5)
"5. ... Abandonment or relinquishment of service
is always a question of intention, and, normally,
such an intention cannot be attributed to an
employee without adequate evidence in that
behalf."
A similar view has been reiterated in G.T. Lad v. Chemical and
Fibres of India Ltd. [(1979) 1 SCC 590 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 76 :
AIR 1979 SC 582]
16. In Syndicate Bank v. Staff Assn. [(2000) 5 SCC 65 : 2000
SCC (L&S) 601] and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali
Khan [(2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 965 : AIR 2000 SC
2783] this Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the
prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted,
he should be treated to have resigned and ceases to be in
service. In such a case, there is no need to hold an enquiry or to
give any notice as it would amount to useless formalities. A
similar view has been reiterated in Banaras Hindu
University v. Shrikant [(2006) 11 SCC 42 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 327] , Chief Engineer (Construction) v. Keshava
Rao [(2005) 11 SCC 229 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 872] and Bank of
Baroda v. Anita Nandrajog [(2009) 9 SCC 462 : (2009) 2 SCC
(L&S) 689] "
28. As observed by the Supreme Court in D.K. Yadav (Supra), the
„principles of natural justice‟ may be excluded in given special and
exceptional exigencies. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
„principles of natural justice‟ were dispensed with herein in a special and
exceptional circumstance i.e., on account of resignation by the employee and
/ or prolonged incarceration as a result of involvement in a serious criminal
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case. Therefore relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay S.
Sathaye (Supra), this Court is of the opinion that the reliance placed on
D.K. Yadav (Supra) is misguided.
29. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on Praveen
Kumar Jain (Supra). In said case, the Supreme Court observed that the
termination order for services of a muster roll employee on account of
misconduct was bad in law as it did not originate from any departmental
enquiry. Similarly, reliance has been placed on a decision of this Hon‟ble
Court in Haryana Roadways, Delhi (Supra) wherein a daily wage
sweeper‟s services were terminated on account of misconduct due to
unauthorised absence from duty for a period of 4 (four) days. In the
considered opinion of this Court, the Appellant‟s reliance on Praveen
Kumar Jain (Supra) and Haryana Roadways, Delhi (Supra) is wholly
misconstrued and distinguishable entirely on facts. The Appellant herein
was not terminated on account of misconduct and in fact, willfully remained
unauthorizedly absent from service; and thereafter was found embroiled in a
serious criminal case which prohibited the Respondent from re-engaging his
services up until he was finally acquitted.
30. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on Nar Singh
Pal (Supra) wherein the Supreme Court has observed that inter alia the
involvement in a criminal cannot be made the basis for termination of
services of a temporary employee. Accordingly, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the said case is distinguishable on facts as the
Appellant herein willfully remained unauthorizedly absent from service; and
thereafter was incarcerated on account of a serious criminal case. The case
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herein cannot be construed to be one wherein an employee was terminated
solely on account of involvement in a criminal case and accordingly, the
principle evolved in Nar Singh Pal (Supra) is inapplicable herein.
31. The attention of this Court was also drawn to Md. Mazim (Supra) and
Dr. Parvesh Thakur (Supra). This Court has perused the aforementioned
judgements and is of the considered opinion that the same have no bearing
on the present L.P.A as neither is the Appellant a permanent employee of the
Respondent who was suspended on account of involvement in a criminal
case nor was the Appellant‟s service terminated solely on the basis of
involvement and incarceration in relation to a criminal case. As has been
observed repeatedly, the Appellant willfully remained unauthorizedly absent
from service in addition to him being named in the FIR and subsequently
incarcerated. Accordingly, neither Md. Mazim (Supra) nor Dr. Parvesh
Thakur (Supra) are applicable to the facts of the present case.
32. Relying on Asha Ram (Supra), the Appellant contended before this
Court that the scope of interference by a court exercising its writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited. While this Court
does not disagree with the aforesaid contention, it is well settled that a
supervisory court may interfere with the findings of a fact-finding forum in
the event such findings are perverse. Thus, relying on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Puri Investments v. Young Friends & Co., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 283 this Court is of the opinion that the Ld. Single Judge rightly
interfered with the decision of the Ld. CGIT as the underlying award was
perverse on account of conclusions contrary to the evidence i.e., the Ld.
CGIT observed that reinstatement of the Appellant was mandatory on
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account of the Policy whereas the Policy does not envisage any mandatory
reinstatement.
33. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon a judgment
delivered in the case of H.D. Singh (Supra), and it has been argued that
striking off the name of an employee from the muster rolls amounted to
termination and accordingly invited the rigors of Section 25F of the ID Act.
In the considered opinion of this Court the aforementioned decision does not
apply to the facts of the present case wherein the Appellant has willfully
remained absent from service and thereafter could not be reinstated on
account of his involvement in a serious criminal case as encapsulated more
particularly above.
34. Lastly, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on a
decision of the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh v. CPWD, (1986) 1 SCC
639; and a decision of this Hon‟ble High Court in Director General of
Works v. Regional Labour Commissioner, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1410
contending that Appellant herein ought to have been paid wages equal to
that of a regular employee. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said
reliance is misconstrued. This Hon‟ble Court in Director General of Works
(Supra) itself observed that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work had
evolved beyond Surinder Singh (Supra) and clarified that the decision in
Director General of Works (Supra) was rendered on account of the
„principle of finality‟. Accordingly, the reliance placed by the Appellant on
the aforementioned judgments is wholly erroneous.
35. This Court is cognizant of the role of a court exercising writ
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jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India vis-à-vis a fact-
finding forum such as the Ld. CGIT as expounded in Puri Investments
(Supra). Accordingly, this Court has perused the record and is of the
considered opinion that the case herein was a fit case for the Ld. Single
Judge to disturb the observations of a fact-finding forum. Additionally, it
would be pertinent to note that the Appellant has received the benefit of
wages of under Section 17-B of the ID Act for a considerable period of time.
36. Therefore, in consideration of the totality of circumstances of this
present case, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the Impugned
Judgement. Accordingly, the present L.P.A stands dismissed.
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ
SANJEEV NARULA, J.
SEPTEMBER 6, 2023/aks LPA 139/2023 Page 17 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitaaly Signed By:BHUPINDER SINGH ROHELLA Signing Date:20.09.2023 15:31:02