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2. The second ground on which the jurisdiction of the learned Subordinate Judge of Agra, and indeed of every other Court in British India, is questioned has reference to the domicile of the defendant, Gaikwar of Baroda's State Railway, no part of whose organization is in British India. It is contended, mainly on the authority of Gurdial Singh v. Raja of Faridkot (1894) 22 Cal. 222 that territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily resident within the territory, while they are within it; but it does not follow them after they have withdrawn from it, and when they are living in another independent country. Some of the dicta occurring in that case, at first sight, lend considerable force to the appellant's contention. To ascertain the ratio decidendi of that case in its true perspective, the circumstances of that case should be clearly borne in mind. The defendant in that case, who was a native of Jhind, an independent territory was sued by the Raja of Faridkot which is another independent territory and in which the defendant had been-employed as treasurer. The suit was instituted in one of the Courts at Faridkot for relief arising out of contract or tort, the defendant having incurred certain liabilities in relation to his duties as the treasurer of Faridkot State. The defendant was served with notice of the suit in Jhind, where he had resumed his residence before the suit. He did not enter appearance, and an ex parte decree was passed. Subsequently proceedings were taken in the Punjab before a British Indian Court, the action being founded on the decree passed by the Faridkot Court, which was rightly treated as the decree of a foreign Court and could be effective in British India only if another decree were passed by a British Indian Court under Section 13, Civil P.C., (Section 14, Act 14 of 1882). It was objected by the defendant that the decree passed by the Faridkot Court was a nullity as that Court had no jurisdiction over a foreigner like the defendant. The Chief Court overruled this objection; but the Privy Council upheld it. The gist of their Lordships' decision is contained in the following passage:

In a personal action, to which none of these causes of jurisdiction apply, a decree pronounced in absentem by a foreign Court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not in any way submitted himself, is by International law an absolute nullity. He is under no obligation of any kind to obey it, and it must be regarded as a mere nullity by the Courts of every nation, except (when authorized by special local legislation) in the country of the forum by which it was pronounced.

6. It follows from the exception thus recognized that, if the Indian legislature has conferred jurisdiction upon the Courts situate in British India to entertain suits against foreigners, where cause of action, wholly or in part, arose within its jurisdiction, such Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction if the conditions provided by the law to which it is subject exist. This brings us to the consideration of the question whether Section 20, Civil P.C., which is relied on by the plaintiff in support of the lower Court's jurisdiction, is wide enough to apply to a foreigner. It must be conceded that its language is so general as to entitle a plaintiff to sue in a Court in which his cause of action wholly or in part arose. There is nothing in that section which makes an exception as regards a foreigner, if other conditions are fulfilled. Subject to anything that may be said as regards the Indian legislature having power to make laws affecting the rights of foreigners, I think that a Court in British India cannot disclaim jurisdiction against a foreigner if the plaintiff's cause of action wholly or in part arose within its jurisdiction. Whatever may be the sanctity attaching to its decree whenever it is questioned in a foreign country, the Court which is required; to pass it or any other Court similarly situated cannot disregard the law made by the Indian legislature. The position and constitution of Indian States are so peculiar that abstract principles of International law, when applied to concrete cases arising in British India will lead to anomalous results. In the Faridkot case (1894) 22 Cal. 222 the jurisdiction of the Court situate in one State as regards a person owing allegiance to another State was in question. The relations between any two States situate in India are not the same as those subsisting between British India and the* States. International law regulates relationship between two absolutely independent states. The states of Faridkot and Jhind may be absolutely independent of each other; but the same however cannot be said in respect of an Indian-State vis-a-vis British India. The whole principle on which the rules of International law are based is, as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the Faridkot case (1894) 22 Cal. 222 (p. 238), that:

Their Lordships see no reason for doubting the correctness of the decision of the case of Girdhar Damodar v. Kassigar Hiragar (1893) 17 Bom. 662 at p. 666 where the defendant was a native of Cutch and the cause of action arose within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the British Indian Court in which the action was brought. But that case does not cover the present one.

13. The case to which their Lordships made reference has already been mentioned by me. It was held in that case that the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit on its original side against a native of Cutch as the cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction. Another case decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council, is Srinivasa Moorthy v. Venkata Varada Ayyangar (1911) 34 Mad. 257, on appeal from the decision in Srinivasa Moorthy v. Venkata Varada Ayyangar (1906) 29 Mad. 239, It must be said as regards this case that the decision turned on the question whether the defendant who was not a permanent resident of British India, was held to be dwelling within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court within the meaning of its Letters Patent. At first sight there seems an inconsistency between a dictum of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the Faridkot case (1894) 22 Cal. 222 and their reference with approval to Girdhar Damodar v. Kassigar Hiragar (1893) 17 Bom. 662, already quoted. It seems to me that the two are easily reconcilable. In the Faridkot case (1894) 22 Cal. 222 the question was whether the Court of one Indian State had jurisdiction over a person residing in another Indian State. Their Lordships held in the negative, even though the cause of action had accrued within the jurisdiction of the Faridkot Court, the reason being that one of these States had no authority to confer jurisdiction upon its Court so as to affect residents of another State, assuming the law in force in Faridkot conferred jurisdiction upon its Courts against foreigners in the manner laid down by Section 20, Civil P.C. In the case of Girdhar Damodhar v. Kassigar Hiragar (1893) 17 Bom. 662, the question was whether a Court in British India had jurisdiction against a resident of Cutch, where the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. The answer in the affirmative, given both by the Bombay High Court and their Lordships of the Privy Council is easily supported on the hypothesis which I have discussed above, namely, that the Indian legislature has so enacted Section 20, Civil P.C., as to confer jurisdiction on the British Indian Courts as regards parsons residing in Indian States, who owe allegiance to the Crown, from whom the Indian Legislature derives its authority.

37. In this country Section 20, Civil P.C., as I understand it, gives the Courts power to entertain cases against foreigners provided the cause of action wholly or in part arises within its local limit and we are bound to decide the case in accordance with the provisions of the Code regardless of the rule of "International comity". Another case on which reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant is the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gurdayal Singh v. Raja of Faridkote (1894) 22 Cal. 222. In that case the Baja of Faridkote obtained a decree in Court in Faridkote against the defendant who was not a resident of the State and who did not submit to its jurisdiction. On the basis of that decree, a suit was instituted against the defendant in the British Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that a decree obtained against the defendant under these circumstances passed by the State Court was a mere nullity. In the course of their judgment their Lordships made the following important observation: