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Foreign, decrees of divorce including decrees of sister States save been, either accorded recognition or have been treated as invalid, depending on the circumstances of each particular case. But if a decree of divorce is to be accorded full faith and credit in the courts of another jurisdiction it is necessary that the court granting the decree has jurisdiction over the proceedings. A decree of divorce is thus treated as a conclusive adjudication of all matters in controversy except the jurisdictional facts on which it is founded. Domicil is such a jurisdictional fact. A. foreign divorce decree is therefore subject to collateral attack for lack of jurisdiction even where the decree contains the, findings or recitals of jurisdiction facts.(6) To confer jurisdiction on the ground of plaintiff's residence and entitle the decree to extraterritorial recognition, the residence must be actual and genuine, and accompained by an intent to make the State his home. A mere sojourn or temporary residence as distinguished from legal domicile is not sufficient.(7) In Untermann v.

(1) Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 27B, Paragraph 326. pp. 786-787.

(2) De Nova (1964), 8 American Journal of Legal History pp. 136, citing the American author, Livermore, (3) State vs. Najjar, 2 N. J. 208.

(4) Langner vs. Langner, 39 N. Y. S. 2d. 9181 (5) Latey : "The Law and Practice in Divorce and Matrimonial Causes" 15th Ed. (1973) p. 461. (6) Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 27B. paragraph 335, pp. 796, 797.

(7) Harrison vs. Harrison, 99 L. Ed. 704.

Untermann,(1) a divorce decree obtained by a husband in Mexico, after one day's residence therein, was held invalid. A foreign decree of divorce is subject to collateral attack for fraud or for want of jurisdiction either of the, subject matter or of the parties provided that the attacking party is not estopped from doing So.(2) A foreign decree of divorce, obtained by fraud is void. Fraudulent simulation of domicile is impermissible. A spouse who goes to a State or country other than that of the matrimonial domicile for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce perpetrates a found, and the judgment is not binding on the courts of other States.(3) In regard to the divorce law in force in Nevada it is only necessary to State that though the plaintiff in a divorce action is required to "reside" in the State for more than six weeks immediately preceding the petition, the requirement of residence is construed in the sense of domicil.(4) In Lane v. Lane(5) it was held that under the Nevada law, intent to make Nevada plaintiff's home is a necessary jurisdictional fact without which the decreeing court is powerless to act in divorce action. Accordingly, a husband who did not become a bona fide resident of Nevada, who continued lease of his New Jersey apartment, who failed to transfer his accounts, who continued his business activities in New York City, and who departed from Nevada almost immediately after entry of divorce decree, was held never to have intended to estabilish a fixed and permanent residence in Nevada, and, therefore any proof, which he submitted to Nevada court in his divorce action, and on which such finding by court of bona fide residence was based was held to constitute a fraud on such court.(1) A survey of American law in this jurisdiction would be incomplete without reference to a decision rendered by the American Supreme Court in Williams v. State of North Carolina(7) the second Williams case. Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix who were long-time residents of North Carolina went to Nevada, stayed in an tuto court for transients, filed suits for divorce against their respective spouses immediately after a six weeks' stay, married one another as soon as the divorces were obtained and promptly returned to North Carolina. They were prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation under section 14-183 of the General Statutes of North Carolina (1943). Their defence to the charge of bigamy was that at the time of their marriage they were each lawfully divorced from the bond of their respective first marriages. The question which arose on this defence was whether they were "lawfully divorced", that is, whether the decrees of divorce passed by the Nevada court were lawful. Those decrees would not be lawful (1) 19 N. J. 507.

While upholding the conviction recorded in North Carolina, Frankfurter J., speaking for the majority, said, (i) a judgment in one State is conclusive upon the merits in every other State, only if the court of the first State had jurisdiction to render the judgment; (ii) a decree of divorce passed in one State can be impeached collaterally in another State on proof that the court had no jurisdiction even when the record purports to show that it had jurisdiction; (iii) under the American system of law. judicial power of jurisdiction to grant. a divorce is founded on domicile; and (iv) domicile implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance. The learned Judge observed: "We conclude that North Carolina was not required to yield her State policy because a Nevada court found that petitioners were domiciled in Nevada when it granted them decrees of divorce. North Carolina was entitled to find, as she did, that they did not acquire domiciles in Nevada and that the Nevada court was therefore without power to liberate the petitioners from amenability to the laws of North Carolina governing domestic relations." Murphy J. in his concurring judgment said: "No justifiable purpose is served by im- parting constitutional sanctity to the efforts of petitioners to establish a false and fictitious domicile in Nevada.... And Nevada has no interest that we can respect in issuing divorce, decrees with extraterritorial effect to those who are domiciled elsewhere and who secure sham domicils in Nevada solely for divorce purposes." Those then are the principles on which American courts grant or refuse to grant recognition to divorce decrees passed by foreign courts which includes the courts of sister States. Shorn of confusing refinements, a foreign decree of divorce is denied recognition in American courts if the judgment is without _jurisdiction or is procured by fraud or if treating it as valid would offend against public policy. Except where the issue of jurisdiction was litigated in the foreign action or the defendant appeared and had an opportunity to contest it, a foreign divorce may be collaterally attacked for lack of jurisdiction, even though jurisdictional facts are recited in the judgment. Such recitals are not conclusive and may be contradicted by satisfactory proof. Domicil is a jurisdictional fact. Therefore, a foreign divorce decree may be attacked, and its invalidity shown, by proof that plaintiff did not have, or that neither party had, a domicil or bona fide residence in the State or country where the decree was rendered. In order to render a foreign decree subject to a collateral attack on the ground of fraud, the fraud in procurement of the judgment must go to the jurisdiction of the court. It is necessary and sufficient that there was a fraudulent representation designed and intended to mislead and resulting in damaging deception. In America, in most of the States, the wife can have a separate domicil for divorce and it is easy enough for anyone, man or woman, to acquire a domicil of choice in another State.

domicil and the decree of the Czech Court was therefore without jurisdiction. The House of Lords upheld the. validity of the Czech divorce. Though the decision in Indyka broadened the prevalent rules for recognition of foreign decree and though a new look at the Le Mesurier doctrine was imperative in a changed world, it is not easy on a reading of the five judgments in the Indyka case to lay down a definitive act of rules as to when an English court will or will not recognise a foreign decree of divorce. Cheshire says : "One cannot turn from Indyka v. Indyka without expressing grave concern at decisions of the House of Lords which, though unanimous., epitomize the adage "tot hominess, quest sententiao' Graveson observes : "Although each of the five judgments in this case differs from the other four, none is dessenting; ....... (2) The English Law Commission opined that "in any case a complete overhaul of the relevant law is urgently needed since recent decisions have left it in a state of considerable uncertainty."(3) Very recently, the extended rule in Indyka was applied in Nessina vs. Smith(4) where a Nevada decree of divorce obtained by the wife was granted recognition in England. The wife was resident in the United States for a period of six years but the domicil of the spouses, in the strict sense, was in England. The Nevada decree was accepted as valid on the ground that the wife had a sufficient connection with the court granting the decree and that if the Nevada decree could be recognised as valid by the other States in America under Article IV, Section 1 of the American Constitution, there was no justification for the English courts to deny recognition to that decree. English courts have thus been attempting to free the law of divorce from the stronglehold of the Council rule. The Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971 which came into force on January 1, 1972 has brought about important changes in the law of England and Scotland relating to the recognition of divorces and legal separations in the British Isles and abroad. The Act results from the Hague Convention agreed to by most coun- tries in 1970, and ratifies that Convention in accordance with the terms set out in the Act.