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(17) It is obvious that neither of the two suits could be said to belong to the category of suits which are excluded from the operation of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The provision of Section 8 would, therefore, be applicable to both the suits provided court fees in respect of the reliefs claimed in these is payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, 1870. It is also not in dispute that in relation to the reliefs of accounts, injunction and recovery of money court fees has to be paid ad valorem under the appropriate sub-clauses of clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. It follows, therefore, that the value of the suits for purposes of jurisdiction in relation to these reliefs has to be the same as has been determined for the purposes of court fees, unless 'there is anything in the Rules of the Lahore High Court, if applicable, which provide to the contrary. It was not disputed that if ad valorem court fees was payable and the Rules framed by the Lahore High Court did not come to the aid of the plaintiff the jurisdictional value of the suits would fall short of the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. The suits were, however, sought to be saved on the ground that the reliefs of declarations were for declarations simplicitor and the other reliefs were not consequential but substantive reliefs in themselves with the result that the relief of declaration simplicitor would attract fixed court fees under Schedule Ii and take the suits outside the mischief of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act so that the plaintiff was free to value the suits for purposes of jurisdiction and the valuation for such a purpose need not follow the valuation, if any, for the other purpose. Alternatively, they were sought to be justified on the ground^ that in view of the Rules framed by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act the two computations need not be co-extensive and different valuations could be placed on the suits for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction in accordance with the. aforesaid Rules.

(20) It is fairly well settled that it is not the form of the plaint or the manner in which the relief is worded in it, but the substance of it, which is determinative of its real nature and character and in determining whether a suit is a suit for a mere declaration or for a declaraton with consequential relief Court must not be carried away by the form of the plaint but must look to the substance of it (1). It is equally well settled that the question whether the suit would be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) or Article 17 of Schedule Ii of the Court Fees Act must be determined not on what relief the plaintiff should ask to be able to succeed but according to the relief actually claimed in the plaint (2). It is equally well settled that the question whether a suit comes within the terms of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act or not will have no impact on the question of valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fees but must be determined on the basis of what the plaintiff actually seeks and not on the basis of what he may be entitled to sue for (3). In case the suit is for a declaration simplicitor it would be necessary for the Court to consider whether a consequential relief is implicit in the declaration. If it is, the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act would be attracted (4). If on the whole and in substance a suit appears to ask for some relief other than or in addition to a mere declaration the suit must be held not to be one for a bare declaration even though the plaint may be cast in a declaratory form (5). It is, however, open to the Court, in considering the question, to take into account the maintainability or otherwise of a suit for a bare declaration (6). The consequential relief must be such that it will constitute further relief within the meaning of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act (7). It must be a relief to which the plaintiff would not be entitled unless a certain title was established and unless the plaintiff would necessarily be entitled to such relief on such title being established (8). A relief is consequential to a declaration if it follows on such declaration and depends on it (9). What ensues or follows must have a necessary connection with the cause. Cause and consequence are co-relative terms, one implying the other. What the courts must, therefore, see is whether the relief, other than the declaratory decree, follows as a natural consequence from the declaration or in other words flows from it (10). But the mere fact that a certain relief flows from the right declared will not by its own force make it consequential relief unless it is asked for as incidental to the declaration (II).