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This section is retrospective in its operation & affects all pending suits & proceedings in execution. The suit, in the present case, was laid for the ejectment of deft 2 on the ground that he had transferred the holding without the consent of the landlord. Although he had transferred the holding, it cannot be said that he ceased to be a tenant from that very moment, until he was actually evicted in execution of a decree in ejectment his tenancy continues. As a result of the transfer, the privity of estate between him & the landlord is assigned. The transferee becomes liable for the rent by reason of his getting possession of the estate. Section 100, Tenancy Act says that "no tenant shall be ejected from his tenure or holding except in execution of a decree". To regard a tenant who has transferred his holding - assuming it to be non-transferable - as a trespasser from the date of his transfer would be to put restrained construction & the reverse of a liebral one. All that can be said in such a case is that he incurs forfeiture for breach of a condition of the tenancy but if the breach is capable of being remedied the forfeiture can foe relieved against. I can find no support either in the T. P. Act or in the Tenancy Act itself for the proposition that the moment the lessee violates a provision of the lease he becomes a trespasser & ceases to be a tenant. I cannot conceive of any suit for ejectment of a tenant unless he has violated some condition of the tenancy. To read the clause "any suit for the ejectment of a tenant" occurring in Schedule as being applicable only to a person who was a tenant complying with all the conditions of the tenancy would be to confine to the letter of the enactment and not to the spirit, & would be sacrificing good sense to technicality.

29. The Act, as a whole, is declaratory & remedial. It declares the law applicable to homesteads in Schedule as the law that was then applicable to occupancy raiyats . It is remedial in the sense that it removes uncertainties in the tenure of homestead tenants & declares the law that has to be applied in future. It does not purport to reopen proceedings that had already been closed but has been specifically made applicable to pending proceedings. It undoubtedly affects the existing rights of persons & is retroactive in its scope. The Act should therefore, be so construed as to extend the provisions to all cases within the reason of the rule. The repeated use of the words any tenant' in both Schedule (sic) leads me to think that the words are large enough to embrace such cases as the present & are within the mischief intended to be dealt with in the Act. It is by no means unusual, in construing a remedial statute, to extend enacting words beyond their natural import & effect in order to include cases within the mischief - See 'Dean and Chapter of York v. Middleborough', (1827) 148 ER 888: (2 Y & J 196). In 'Wright v. Person', (1869) 4 QB 582: (38 LJQB 312), a case under the Dogs Act of 1869, the word 'cattle' was interpreted to include horses, pigs & mares as they could also be bitten by dogs. The Act, in my opinion, embraces not only tenants but also their assignees & protects them from eviction provided ejectment has not been carried out & a suit or execution proceeding for such eviction is still pending on the day the Act came into force. Such a provision was necessary to quiet titles which had been made insecure, as a result of diversities in judicial decisions & the changes in law relating to homesteads that were taking place with the growth of the community & its concerns. There is no rule that when a person has commenced an action he has a vested right in the then state of the law - 'Hurst v. Hurst', (1882) 21 Ch D 278: (51 LJCH 729) & 'A. G. v. Thobald', (1890) 24 QBD 557 at p. 560: (62 LT 768). In 'Quilter v. Mapleson', (1882) 9 QBD 672: (52 L J Q B 44), relief against forfeiture in an action in ejectment was sanctioned by the Ct of Appeal although, when the action was before the Ct of the first instance ,the new statute had not come into operation. Great weight is to be attached to the fact that the Act was designed to protect the public interest & was remedial in its object. As was observed in 'Pardo v. Bingham', (1869) 4 Ch 735: (20 LT 464), we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute & the remedy sought to be applied, & consider what was the former state of the law & what it was that the Legislature contemplated. But quite apart from interpretation the language of Schedule clearly affects the existing rights of landlords. It necessarily follows that the existing breaches of covenants & existing obligations incurred thereby are also affected by the Act. If the landlord had the right to eject he cannot enforce it. If deft 1 had committed a breach of any of the covenants of the lease, he does not incur the liability of forfeiture or eviction. The Act applies to leases made before the Act. Can it be said that it does not apply to breaches committed before the Act? It applies to all breaches so long as the landlord has not obtained possession. The Legislature did not want to discriminate between tenants whose rights were under challenge at the time the Act was passed & those whose rights may thereafter be challenged. I see no reason why the interpretation of the Act should be confined to breaches committed after the Act - See 'Raghu Raj Singh v. Harikishen', AIR (31) 1944 PC 35: (ILR (1944) Kar PC 199) and 'Syamakanta v. Ram Bhajan', AIR (26) 1939 FC 74: (ILR (1939) Kar 165). Supposing deft 2 had transferred his interest one day after the Act. He or his assignee would clearly be protected against eviction. If he had done it a day before the Act, could it be said that the Legislature intended to exclude him from the protection? If, again, deft 2 had transferred only a portion of his interest he would nonetheless continue to be tenant, but according to the argument of the resp if he had transferred the whole of his interest he becomes a trespasser. Section 4 means that all the proceedings which were pending on the day the Act came into operation are to be treated as having been commenced after the Act came into force. That is the only meaning that can be attached to the expression "as if it had been in force at the time of the institution of the suit in the Ct of the first instance."