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(H) that it is not in dispute that as per the rectified Sale Deed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, the appellant/plaintiff is the owner of the property to which the suit pertains.

13. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents/defendants No.2 & 4 at the outset stated that the respondents/defendants give up their plea of having title to the land to which the suit pertains and are now contesting these proceedings only on the aspect that the land purchased by the appellant/plaintiff in the year 1954 was not the land to which the suit pertains and the Rectification Deed got executed by the appellant/plaintiff during the pendency of the suit and behind the back of the respondents/defendants and without taking permission of the Suit Court, cannot vest any right in the appellant/plaintiff.

(ii) that the rectification, while the matter was sub-judice, could not be without the permission of the Court;
(iii) that the execution of the Rectification Deed amounted to creating third party rights during the pendency of the suit;
(iv) that the Rectification Deed could have been executed only within three years of the Sale Deed and not thereafter.

15. It was at that stage enquired from the counsel for the respondents/defendants whether they admit to be in possession of the plot No.A-199, Majlis Park. They again replied in the affirmative.

23. The counsel for the respondents/defendants though has argued that the Rectification Deed dated 26 th August, 1983 could not have been executed during the pendency of the suit for possession, without the permission of the Court, but has not supported the said argument neither by any law or precedent nor by any legal logic. The Rectification Deed executed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff is by a non party to the suit. The reference by the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is incomprehensible. Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act deals with transfer of property pending a suit relating thereto. If it is the case of the respondents/defendants that the property to which the suit pertained was not the property purchased by the appellant/plaintiff vide Sale Deed dated 12th May, 1954 then the rectification of the said Sale Deed cannot bring into play Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the contrary, if it were to be the case of the respondents/defendants that it is the same property, then there is no transfer thereof inasmuch as all that the Rectification Deed does is to clarify that the property subject matter of the suit is the property which was sold to the appellant/plaintiff vide Sale Deed dated 12th May, 1954 and there is no transfer of the said property to any other person. Even otherwise, the purport of Section 52 is only to render the pendente lite transfers subservient to the outcome of the suit. I fail to see, as to how the principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 is attracted to the situation in hand.

26. Once, it is admitted by the counsel for the respondents/defendants that the property in possession of the respondents/defendants is the same as the property which was sold to the appellant/plaintiff vide Sale Deed dated 12 th May, 1954 as rectified vide Deed dated 26 th August, 1983, I have wondered whether not it was open to the appellant/plaintiff to have, after the Rectification Deed dated 26th August, 1983 sued afresh for recovery of possession, even if there were any errors in the description of the property in the plaint as earlier filed or any ambiguity as to the identity of the property. I fail to see, as to why the appellant/plaintiff could not have done so. It was the plea of the respondents/defendants that the property of which the appellant/plaintiff claimed title under the Sale Deed dated 12th May, 1954 was not the property in their possession; so the fresh suit by the appellant/plaintiff for possession on the basis of title in terms of Rectification Deed would not have been barred. Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the CPC also entitles a plaintiff to leave to sue afresh where the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the same subject matter. Once, it is so, I fail to see as to what prejudice the respondents/defendants can be said to have suffered on account of the amendment of the suit in pursuance to the Rectification Deed.