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6. In another part of the judgment, the learned Chief Justice points out that even if the acts of the executive are illegal, in the sense that they were not warranted by law, no fundamental right of the petitioners had been infringed thereby and no application under Article 32 of the Constitution would lie. The learned Advocate General who has cited this case has argued that although everything that is done by Government in the administration of property may be called executive action in an enlarged sense, because it is certainly not judicial or legislative, it does not follow that formality should be observed strictly as long as the rights of third Parties are not affected. Coming back to Article 154 (166?) Mr. Ray has cited the case of Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay, where it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the provisions in the Article were directory and not mandatory. Mr. Ray concedes that the position now is this, that if the Constitutional formality is not observed, then the order does not become void but is only voidable, and a person who is affected might make an application to the Court, and the Court will have to be satisfied that the order has really been passed by the Government. Coming back to the facts of this case, therefore, we have to look at it from two points of view. The first point of view, which seems to me somewhat fundamental, is as to whether the order that is complained of, namely, the grant of permission to Messrs. A. L. Chopra to hold a circus on a part of the maidan, affects any of the legal rights vested in the petitioner. In other words whether that action on the part of the Govt., or its duly authorised agent, was an executive action which affected his rights, and therefore should have been given in a particular form. -The second point to consider is that, assuming that such was the case, namely, that the petitioner had a legal right which was affected, the question is as to whether the respondents have satisfied me that the order made was a Governmental order. With regard to the first point, I have already stated the facts relating to the use by the public of the open stretch of land in Calcutta known as the Maidan. In my judgment given today in I have already pointed out the great desirability of keeping this "great piece of open land" for uninterrupted use by the public. But no kind oi legal right has been established before me. There is no suggestion that there has accrued any right by prescription or any other right which could be called "a legal right", enabling the petitioner to apply for a Writ in the nature of Mandamus, because such right has been affected. The Maidan belongs to the Indian Union. As a matter of good Government, it is allowed to remain as an open-space and constitutes the "lungs of the city". Hitherto, commercial enterprises were not allowed within its precincts, and from time to time opinions have been expressed against permitting such things to be done. This, however, would not, and has not until now, given rise to any legal right which may be said to be vested in the members of the public, who are permitted to use the maidan for purposes of sports or physical exercise or mere perambulation. This is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that one could have understood the petitioner making an application in respect of the rejection of his own application. But I cannot see how any right of his was violated because a permission has been granted to somebody else. The only way that that permission could have been challenged was by way of bringing it within the purview of Article 15 of the Constitution, but no such attempt has. been made in this case. I therefore fail to see any legal right vested in the petitioner which has been affected by the permission granted to Messrs. A. L. Chopra which is impugned in this application. That being BO. the first aspect of the question must be decided against the contention of the petitioner. Since he is not vested with any legal right which has been affected, he cannot complain of the absence of any legal formality in an order which does not concern him but concerns two parties who have no complaint to make in respect thereof. Even assuming that he had a legal right and there has been a violation thereof, the question is whether the tests laid in the case of (supra) have been satisfied. In other words, has it been shown on the affidavits before me that the order which is impugned or challenged is a Governmental order. Looking through the affidavits, which in this case are much more fuller than the case which has been disposed of this morning, I find that there are statements which should induce me to come to the conclusion that the order made was a Governmental order, that is to say, an order properly authorised by government. I have already stated the facts contained in the' affidavits filed before me, which would show that at every stage the matter went, not only through the State Government, but also through the Government of India. The initial approach was at the highest level and the policy behind it was a policy of international contact, to which no exception can be taken by any right-thinking person. The matter went through the Governmental authorities of Bengal and actually it is stated that the Chief Minister, in consultation with the military authorities and the Commissioner of Police, himself chose the site. That the permission granted to Messrs. A. L. Chopra was made with the approval of the State Government has been repeatedly stated in the affidavits on oath. Reference may be made to the affidavit of Purnendu Sekhar Majumdar, who has stated in paragraph 15, categorically, that the approval of the State Government had been obtained. This has also been mentioned in the affidavit of Saradindu Narayan Ghose, the Assistant Secretary, Home (Police) Department of the Government of West Bengal. The detailed particulars of the holding of the circus show in Calcutta have been set out in the affidavit of Mr. A. L. Chopra affirmed on the 19th day of December, 1959, in paragraph 8. In the affidavit-in-reply there has, been a general denial, but these particular statements could not be denied. In my opinion, it would be impossible on these materials to hold that this order was not a Governmental order, or that it had not the authority of government. If, therefore, the provisions of Article 154 (166 ?) are directory & not mandatory and if it is possible to uphold an order if the Court is satisfied that the order passed is a Governmental order, then in my opinion this order has passed the constitutional test, and cannot be declared as void. Mr. Roy has taken me through the various constitutional Acts starting with the Government of India Act, 1888 and the India Council Acts culminating in the Government of India Act, 1915 read with the Act of 1919". He has drawn my attention to the fact that under the 1919 Act, for the first time, the responsibility of Government came to be divided between the Centre and the different Provinces. Under Section 45A of the 1919 Act, provision has been made for enacting rules for the use, under the authority of the Governor-General in Council, of the agency of local Governments in relation to central subjects, in so far as such agency may be found convenient, and for determining the financial conditions of such agency. Rules have been framed and my attention was drawn to rule 46, whereby it is prescribed that the Governor-General in Council may employ the agency of the Governor in Council of any Province in the administration of central subjects, in so far as such agency may be found convenient. In the present Constitution also, we have Article 258, by which the President may with the consent of the Governor entrust to a State Government or its officers, functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. I do not see why I should consider this devolution of power in any great detail. Mr. Roy has said that by the 1921 letter, which according to him, had to be written because of these devolution rules, the power of administering the Maidan was delegated to the Provincial Government. Assuming that it is so, it gives us a starting point, namely, that at least in 1921 the power of administering the Maidan was legally delegated to the Provincial Government. There is no doubt that this authority has devolved upon the State Government of West Bengal. There is no law by which the State Government, administering a piece of property, should do it in any particular manner Or through any particular official, and I see no legal bar in doing so through the Commissioner of Police, as it has been' done ever since 1903, and perhaps even before. That being so, I will come back to the original point made by Mr. Roy, namely whether the permission granted was an executive action which was in a form violative of the Constitution. As I have said, the answer to it is that the petitioner has no legal right which has been violated, and even assuming that the strict formalities of the constitutional provision have not been carried out, the respondents have satisfied the Court that the order made, is an order of the Government. The other point taken is that the order amounts to a contract, and therefore is violative of Article 299, which lays down that such contracts must be expressly made in the name of the Governor. The learned Advocate General has not gone into the disputed question as to whether this permission amounts to a contract. Mr. Roy has argued that the promise to pay a sum of money to the Military-Welfare Fund amounts to a consideration and therefore there is a contract. The learned Advocate General argues that assuming that it is a contract, any violation of it is a matter that concerns the contracting parties, and the petitioner would have no locus standi to challenge any defect in the same. In my opinion that must be so. Such a contract, even it it is in an unconstitutional form may be adopted or ratified by the parties themselves, and I cannot see how an outsider can come in and agitate its defects and obtain relief by way of a high prerogative writ.