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1. The appellant, which is an insurance company, has challenged the judgment dated 16.6.2006 of the Member of M.A.C.T., Thane, granting compensation of Rs. 4,12,500 to respondent No. 1 herein with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum along with costs and directing investment of a part of the amount.

2. The order of compensation came to be passed in an application of respondent No. 1 who was the mother of the deceased driver of a motor cycle against her husband, who was the owner of the motor cycle and against the appellant insurance company on the ground that the husband was bound to compensate the wife for the death of her son, the victim of the accident and that the liability had to be indemnified by the appellant insurance company since the vehicle was insured with them. The accident took place on 28.6.2004. The deceased is stated to have been earning a gross sum of Rs. 4,000 p.m. out of which Rs. 3,000 was shown to be by way of his salary and Rs. 1,000 by way of specified petrol allowance, which he earned upon supervising his father's business and for which the firm of his father issued the certificate. Deceased was 24 years old at the time of his death. The mother's application was made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the M.V. Act').

34. In the case of Appaji v. M. Krishna , in which the parents of the deceased driver of a scooter, who sustained fatal injuries applied under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act for compensation from the insurance company upon the claim of indemnity. It was held that Parliament did not intend to provide compensation to the person responsible for the accident on structured formula basis. Consequently, a person could not sue for compensation upon the tort or negligence on account of his own rash, negligent and imprudent act. It was observed that if that was so, a person could base his case upon his own fault and negligence and make an insurance company to pay for the same which is not the purpose of the legislation. In that case the meaning of the word 'victim' from Black's Law Dictionary and Chambers 20th Century Dictionary came to be seen. Since the common sense meaning of the term 'victim' is a sufferer or a prey, it implies a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result of another's activities. Consequently, it is in that sense that the term 'victim' in Section 163-A of the M.V. Act also must be understood. It can, therefore, not include the person who is a victim of his own action. He must be a victim in contradistinction to the victimiser or the one who falls victim to his own action.

38. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal , the claim was made under Section 166 on behalf of the deceased employee driver of the owner of the car upon the negligence of the driver of the car. In that case there was no special contract covering the deceased driver who was driving along with his companion. It was observed that though the M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation and summary procedure alone may be followed by a Tribunal in dealing with a claim, the contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity. Consequently, when a car belonging to an owner and driven by the driver employed by the insured meets with an accident, the primary liability is that of the driver. Hence, the owner becomes vicariously liable to compensate the victim. That vicarious liability of the owner is indemnified by the insurance company. Under Section 166 of the M.V. Act the third party is entitled to show the negligence of the driver and consequently the owner's vicarious liability and claim indemnity from the insurance company. Upon considering the necessity for insurance against third party risk under Section 146 of the M.V. Act, as well as the ambit of Section 147 of the M.V. Act, it has been held in para 11 of the judgment that compulsory cover required under Section 146 is only for liabilities relating to the person and property of third parties. Consequently, it has been held that the insurance company cannot be held liable to indemnify the owner for the death of one of his employees who was the driver of the vehicle when the liability does not arise under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Consequently, it was held that except for third parties, the third party cover would not extend to any person, and the insurance company cannot be made automatically liable to cover the driver of a vehicle.

42. The claim in this case is made under Section 163-A by the mother of deceased driver as his legal heir. It is contended on behalf of the respondent No. 1 (the original claimant) that the deceased was a victim under Section 163-A since he succumbed to the injuries which arose out of the accident when the motor cycle skidded and he fell off the highway. It is contended that the claim having been made under that section, the tort of negligence, if any, is not required to be seen. He, as the victim, is, therefore, taken to be a third party and is claimed to be covered under the mandatory third party cover required to be taken under Section 146 of M.V. Act as he was not expressly covered under any clause of the policy.