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(37). Mr. Kaushal also retorted to those contentions which were not raised by the writ-petitioners in Ram Puri or Babu Singh Bains and maintained that even the new challenges mounted on Section 8-A merit rejection. He urged that Section 9 was struck down in M/s.

Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam for want of guidelines in the Act as the Government could act discriminatorily by taking lenient action against one defaulter and a harsh one of resumption against the other. The discrimination so perceived in M/s. Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam's case was later disapproved by the Constitution Bench in Maganlal Chhagganlal [P] Ltd. laying down that where a Statute provides for more drastic procedure different from that of the ordinary procedure without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the Statute though will be hit by Article 14 yet the provision for appeal may cure the defect. Nonetheless, the Legislature cured the pointed defects while inserting Section 8-A which possesses inbuilt guarantees and safeguards to (i) ensure a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed resumption; (ii) restriction on forfeiture beyond 10% of the total amount; (iii) the obligation on the Estate Officer to give reasons in support of his conclusion after giving opportunity to lead evidence; and (iv) the statutory remedy of appeal and revision under which the resumption order can be 'varied', 'reversed', 'altered' or 'rescinded'. (38). The contention that Section 8-A is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31 of the Constitution was refuted with a pointed reference to previous decisions by the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Puri and later on by the Supreme Court in the Babu Singh Bains case, where Section 8-A, on identical grounds, was challenged. He argued with reference to Article 31 as it existed before 44th Amendment to the Constitution, that no meaningful contention of its violation was raised by the aggrieved allottees in the above-cited two decisions nor did they have now been able to establish their right to seek compensation which could arise only in a case of 'acquisition' of property. The civil sanction of 'resumption', on the other hand, is a somewhat punitive action taken for violation of building byelaws or breach of terms and conditions of allotment. It was maintained that if Section 8-A did not violate Article 31, it could not on the same analogy delict Article 300-A also as the deprivation of an allottee of his property due to 'resumption' is by the authority of law on a proven charge under the 1952 Act which in no circumstances amounts to taking away one's property through police power. It was clarified that since the 'resumption' power can be invoked as a last resort only when the other punitive actions have failed to deter the violators, it is neither unjust or unreasonable nor does it violate anyone's human rights. It was vehemently argued that an allottee who calumniously violates and breaches the regulatory laws applied uniformly in the UT Chandigarh and is relentless to deface the very legislative objects of the 1952 Act, cannot cry hoarse for protection of his fundamental or human rights for which he must give equal respect to the 'duties' tied with such rights.

(68). If we were to accept the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the respondents, the reference order dated 16.11.2010 stands fully answered by our findings given hereinabove. However, in all fairness to counsel for the parties who have been heard at length and slightly deviating from the established conventions, we incline to dwell upon the petitioners' renewed attack on Section 8-A through supplemental and additional contentions. We proceed accordingly. (69). The petitioners are on firm footing in contending that the 44th Amendment of the Constitution is prospective w.e.f. 20th June, 1979 and any law enacted prior thereto is open to challenge on the ground of contravention of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f) & 31 of the Constitution. The Waman Rao & Ors.

authoritatively ruled that the deletion of the right to property from the array of Fundamental Rights will not deprive the petitioners of the arguments which were available to them prior to the coming into force of the 44th Amendment, since the impugned Acts were passed before June 20, 1979 on which date Article 19(1)(f) was deleted. In Kamal Sukumar Durgule's case, the provision defining "vacant land", was struck down as it was found to be violative of Articles 14 & 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. A somewhat similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court as late as in 1997 in Chairman Railway Board's case also.