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6. The appearance of the document is to our minds not in keeping with its professed antiquity. The ink is unfaded, and the paper unsoiled, showing no trace of damp or ravage by insects or of the natural decay that one would expect to find in a document nearly 120 years old. These circumstances arouse in us the gravest suspicion as to the genuineness of the sanad.

7. But assuming that the sanad is as old as it professes to be, and is genuine, the next question we have to determine, is whether the debutter character of the grant has been established. Debutter property is property dedicated to a god or gods. In the sanad there is nothing to show that there was such a dedication, except the use of the word debutter. The grant is made to Bichitra Mohunt Goswami apparently for his personal use. "By bestowing your blessings on us you do enjoy and possess the same with great felicity." There is not a word here that the income is to be applied to the service of any god, or in any other way than the personal enjoyment of the grantee. It is true that the latter is styled Mohunt Groswami, which would prima facie indicate that he is a shebuit, but the documents produced in this case from the records of a litigation that took place in 1883 show that this is an appellation borne by other members of the family, and the oral evidence also disclosed that it is not uncommon in the neighbourhood. Had there been any intention to dedicate the property to any particular idol, we should at least have expected, if the dedication was not made expressly to it, that Bichitranand would have been described as the Mohunt or shebait of the idol to be benefitted. If we had to base our finding on the terms of this document alone, we should not be satisfied that mauza Grarfalbari had been dedicated to any idol, or that the word "debutter" signified anything more than that the grantee as a pious Brahman was to hold the land rent free. The .grantor may very naturally have contemplated that as a matter of fact the profits of the property after satisfying the personal wants of the grantee would be devoted to the service of the God whom he worshipped and on whom he attended. Such an exception may explain the use of the word "debutter," but does not suffice to constitute a valid dedication to that God. As has been remarked in a similar case by Mr. Justice Mukerjee, whose opinion on such a subject is entitled to great weight, the use of the word "debutter" is obviously not conclusive, because whether the property be absolutely dedicated to a Thakur or be secular, subject to a religious charge, it would in popular language be fittingly described as "debutter." Ram Kanai Ghosh v. Raja Sri Sri Sari Narayan Singh Deo Bahadur (1905) 2 C.L.J. 546, 552.

9. The defendants, on the other hand, point to the plaint, written statement and a deed of compromise filed in a suit instituted in 1883 to show that this mcuza was never treated as debutter property in the true sense of the term. The plaintiff in that suit was Balanand, a grandson of Bichitranand, and the principal defendant was Pranenand, the Mohunt of the idol Raghunath Thakur. It was alleged that Prananand had neglected the worship of the idol, and the plaintiff had thereby been disgraced before God and man and had suffered spiritual degradation. The plaintiff therefore prayed that he might be awarded possession of the idols for six months in the year and also possession of a moiety of the debutter properties. The debutter properties were specified and consisted of two annas share of two mauzas, Achkada and Backetin. But no mention is made of Garfalbari, which, if the present plaintiffs' case be true, was part of the debutter property.

10. In the oral evidence adduced an attempt is made to explain this omission by saying that mauza Grarfalbari was charged with be much expenditure for the Durga puja, that it was purposely omitted as being too burdensome. The Subordinate Judge has accepted this explanation as adequate. But there is no indication of the manner in which Grarfalbari came to be charged with this expenditure. The charge was not imposed by the sanad to which the plaintiffs look as the deed of endowment. Moreover, if the explanation suggested had been correct, Prananand is not likely to have failed to detect the plaintiff's attempt to escape liability and would himself have mentioned Garfalbari as one of the debutter properties, and all the more so as in paragraph 7 of his written statement filed in that suit, he specifies several debutter properties other than the two mauzas named by Balanand, and alleges that these other properties had been omitted "with the fraudulent motive of raising disputes in future with respect thereto." If Garfalbari had been one of the debutter properties and a burdensome property, Prananand could hardly have failed to specify it.

13. In the view that mauza Garfalbari is not debutter property, the alienation made by Prananand in 1860 and by Raghabanand in 1896 (subject to the question of the latter being a lunatic) are valid, and no question of limitation arises.

14. But, even if the mauza were debutter property, we think that the suit is barred by limitation as regards the portion demised by Prananand in 1860. A permanent mokarari lease is an alienation of the proprietary interest pro tanto and if the property was debutter, the alienation by Prananand was beyond his legal competence and the possession of Ananga Mohini Debi the lessee became adverse to the lessor as from the date of the lease. The case would then be governed prima facie by Article 144 of the Limitation Act, and the suit be barred by reason of its being brought more than 12 years after the alienation. This was the view taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gncnwsambanda Pandora Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 271. It is however contended on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents that the article applicable is No. 134 read with Section 10 of the Limitation Act. That article refers to a suit "to recover possession of immoveable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards purchased from the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration," and imposes 12 years from the date of the purchase as the period within which such a suit must be brought. Section 10 of the Act exempts from the operation of the Act suits "against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration) for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property." It is urged that in the present case Ananga Mohini became a mala fide purchaser, as she took the lease with notice that the property was debutier, and that the word "purchased" in Article 184 refers only to a bond fide purchaser. Here there was nothing to affect the lessee with notice save what appeared on the face of the lease itself. It was further urged that she did not profess to acquire 'an absolute title in the property, and was therefore not a purchaser within the meaning of the article just quoted. It is also argued that as she had notice that she was purchasing what was debutter, she was not an assign for valuable consideration within the meaning of Section 10, but must be held to have acquired only the interest that the trustee himself held in the property. In support of these propositions reliance is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Radlia Nath Boss v. Gisborne & Co. (1871) 15 W. R.P.C. 24 : L.R. 27 I.A. 69. 14 M.I.A. 1 and also on a decision of this Court in Ram Churn Ternary v. Protap Chandra Dutt Jha (1886) 2 C.L.J. 448. In the case before the Privy Council the plaintiff sued to redeem a usufructuary mortgagee, and one of the defences set up was that the suit was barred by limitation under the provisions of the law .then in force (Act XIV of 1859), the 5th section of which dealt with "suits for the recovery from the 'purchaser or any person claiming under him of any property purchased bond fide and for valuable consideration from a trustee or mortgagee." The defendants set up that they were purchasers within the meaning of that section from a mortgagee. Their Lordships pointed out that the word purchaser in that section meant the purchaser of an absolute title and not the purchaser of the mortgage, that is of the mortgagee's interest, and on a review of the evidence in that case decided that the defendants had only acquired the mortgagee's interest and were therefore not purchasers within the meaning of the words quoted.