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3. The first point has been expressly decided in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344. In that case the defendants had been in possession for less than twelve years at the time of attachment, but continued in possession until the suit was brought more than twelve years after their possession commenced. It was held in this Court that the attachment could not have the effect of arresting the running of time against defendants. If that ruling is adopted, it is clear that the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. But it is urged for the appellant that the decision in Paridiyan Pillai v. Vellayappa Rowther (1917) 33 MLJ 316 is authority to the contrary, and this contention appears to have some force, for, in that case, the facts were very similar and it was decided against the parties claiming adverse possession. Reference is made in the judgment to Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 and it is not dissented from nor criticised in any way, apparently because it was held that no question of interruption of possession or of its continuance despite the attachment arose. Although, therefore, the decision appears to be in direct contravention of the decision in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 it is based on other grounds, grounds which are not too clear, because in the judgment the facts do not appear to be correctly set out owing to the apparent transposition of the words "plaintiff" and "defendant" in two places. Reliance is also placed on Vasudeo Atmaram Joshi v. Eknath Balkrishna Thite (1910) ILR 35 B 79 and that no doubt is an authority directly in favour of the appellant, for it was there held that in such a suit, namely, under Section 283 of the old Civil Procedure Code, it must be proved " that on the date of attachment which was subsequently raised by order of the Court on the application of the 1st respondent, their judgment-debtors had a subsisting right to the property." For this proposition Harishankar Jebhai v. Naran Karsan (1893) ILR 18 B 260 is relied on, but a reference to the latter shows that in that case the date of the order on the claim petition was treated as the date on which the adverse possession ceased. If that date is taken in the present case, namely, 10th June, 1918, the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. This latter proposition is supported by the authority of the Calcutta High Court in Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra (1907) ILR 35 C 202 (PC), where it was held that the order of the Court was the basis of the subsequent suit. We have not been referred to any other authority than Vasudeo Atmaram Joshi v. Eknath Balkrishna Thite (1910) ILR 35 B 79, which is directly in point, and inasmuch as that case purports to be based on a prior decision which was not to the same effect, there is no argument in the judgment which goes to show that the decision in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 is incorrect.

4. It is suggested that we should refer this point for the decision of a Full Bench, but I do not think it is necessary in view of the following circumstances. In the first place, the decision in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 has never been dissented from, although it was given so long ago as 1901, and on the merits I respectfully agree with the conclusion. Attachment of immoveable property is effected by an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. (Order 21, Rule 54, Civil Procedure Code.) It has always been held that an attachment does not confer any interest in the property, and it is difficult to see how a mere attachment can disturb the continuance of physical possession of the holder at the time. There are many authorities for holding that adverse possession is not disturbed except by actual ouster. For instance in Pankaj Mohan v. Bipin (1922) 38 C LJ 220 where the Court ordered the property to be put in possession of a Receiver, but possession was not actually given, it was held that possession was not disturbed. Again in Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Chokkalinga Mudaliar (1922) ILR 46 M 525 : 43 MLJ 737 it was held that a declaration that the party in possession had no title has not the effect of interrupting the continuity of his adverse possession. In Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mahammad Mustapha Marcayar (1923) ILR 46 M 751 : 45 MLJ 588 (PC) it was held that a decree which was not executed did not disturb possession. In view of these decisions it is difficult to hold that a mere attachment, under which possession is in no way disturbed, can affect the continuity of adverse possession. Appellant relies on two cases reported in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Isakapalli Subbiah (1902) ILR 26 M 410 and Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debi (1921) 34 C LJ 602 but in both these cases the attachment was not one made under the Civil Procedure Code, but was made by a Magistrate in proceedings under Chap. XII of the Criminal Procedure Code and must be distinguished on the ground that an attachment under that Chapter implies an actual taking posses-sion of the property by the Magistrate or by some one under his orders. I am therefore of the opinion that the decision in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 is correct and see no necessity for referring the case to a Full Bench as there is no actual conflict of opinion in this Court. In this view it is unnecessary to decide the second point raised which was not raised in the Lower Courts. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

7. It will be observed that both the plaints are more than 12 years from the date of the symbolical delivery of the plaintiff's share to Dikshitar but the attachment by the plaintiff on the 3rd of July, 1917, is within 12 years.

8. Now as to the first point reliance is placed by the appellant on the cases reported in Kocherlakota Venkatakrishna Rao v. Vadreuv Venkappa (1903) ILR 27 M 262 and Thakur Sri Radhakrishna v. Ram Bahadur (1917) 34 MLJ 97 (PC). In the first case it was held that the effect of symbolical delivery arises in the case of the judgment-debtor himself absolute, but where the judgment-debtor is not the party in possession, adversely to a third party (as here), delivery made in the absence of that third party and not personally to him, cannot by itself affect his possession, nor amount to an ouster or dispossession of him and his possession will continue uninterrupted; but if he was present and the delivery takes place adversely to the claim of such third party, it may be equally operative as against him. It was contended that the present case is the case of a stranger resisting the suit, not of a stranger trying to recover as defendant No. I was not a party to the suit. In Thakur Sri Radhakrishna v. Ram Bahadur (1917) 34 MLJ 97 (PC) it was held that symbolical possession will avail to dispossess defendants sufficiently because they were parties to the proceedings in which it was ordered and given, Juggobandhu Mukerji v. Ram Chandra Bysack (1880) ILR 5 C 584 (FB) is affirmed.

10. A greater part, however, of the argument before us has been centred on the second point, viz., as to the effect of attachment as interrupting adverse possession, there being no doubt, as already pointed out, that on the date of the suit the period requisite to establish adverse possession had elapsed. It is said that there are two cases neither of them reported in the authorised reports on each side of the line.

11. For the appellant it is frankly admitted that the case reported in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 is against his position. There the learned Judges distinctly and in so many words lay down that attachment could not have the effect of arresting adverse possession by strangers holding adversely when the properties were attached by the plaintiff as belonging to certain of the defendants in the case against whom the strangers were holding. It is said that the case in Pandiyan Pillai v. Vellayappa Rowther (1917) 33 MLJ 316 is diametrically opposed to this, and the headnote certainly gives some colour to this view. The learned Judges however dispose of the case in another manner. The decision in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 was brought to their notice, but they merely remark : "An old decision of this Court, not reported in the authorised reports, namely, Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 supports Mr. Devadoss." They preferred to dispose of the case on a different ground, namely, "that a decision in a regular suit instituted to contest the order in the claim proceedings places the parties in status quo ante either by vacating the order made in the said execution proceedings or by confirming it. The result is the plaintiff is directed not to interpose obstacles in carrying out the further steps necessary to reap the fruits of the attachment. Both the parties are bound by that pronouncement, consequently no question of interruption of possession or of its continuance despite the attachment arises. So far from intending to overrule or disapprove of the decision in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 it appears to me from this last sentence quoted from the judgment that the learned Judges held that the question did not arise. In my opinion, therefore, as far as authorities have been brought to our notice, the case in Seetharami Reddi v. Venku Reddi (1901) 11 MLJ 344 stands uncontradicted. It as a case that has stood for over 23 years and it seems to me that it would be improper for us to decline to follow it unless there was some very cogent reason for doing so.