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Showing contexts for: kidnapping case in Emperor vs Ismail Sayadsaheb Mujawar on 24 March, 1933Matching Fragments
Murphy, J.
7. The point for the decision of the full bench arises on Sections 361 and 363 of the Indian Penal Code. The former section defines the offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship and limits the cases to those committed against persons who are, if males, under the age of fourteen, and if females, under the age of sixteen. Section 363 provides the punishment for kidnapping from lawful guardianship but does not repeat the phrases enacting the two age limits, and as it stands, makes punishable all kidnapping from lawful guardianship, which, in the ordinary sense, would mean of persons who have a lawful guardian, that is, all persons of unsound mind, and others under eighteen or twenty-one, as the case may be, these being the two possible limits of minority.
So that the statute first under the heading "Kidnapping" says that kidnapping is of two kinds, then defines both in Sections 360 and 361 respectively, and makes them punishable under Section 363. The arrangement of the sections seems to be complete and in conformity with the general scheme of the Code. Apart from Section 361 there is no definition of the offence of "kidnapping from lawful guardianship". Now it is said that no definition is necessary, that the offence is both created and punished by Section 363. The answer to the argument is that if the legislature intended to make kidnapping a minor from lawful guardianship, irrespective of his age, an offence, then Section 361 is clearly redundant. Secondly, that part of Section 361 which refers to the case of a person of unsound mind is equally redundant. Why, again, was it necessary for the legislature to define the offence of kidnapping from British India in Section 360 ? Assuming that the word "kidnapping" required no explanation, can it be said that the expression "lawful guardianship" would require no definition or explanation ? In the legal acceptation of the expression it would apply to the case of either a natural or testamentary guardian or a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act. But would it include the case of a person to whom the custody of a minor is entrusted ? By the explanation to Section 361 the term "guardian" has been extended to any person lawfully entrusted with the care and custody of the minor. If it be said that for that purpose the Court may adopt the definition of that expression in Section 361, the answer would be that that definition is limited only to that section and only for the purpose of that section. Without this explanation the guardianship would be limited to lawful guardianship in its legal sense. The explanation says that the term "lawful guardian" is to be understood in that extended sense only "in this section," i.e., Section 361.
15. The definitions of offences in the Indian Penal Code are exhaustive. Whenever it is provided in the definitions that whoever does such and such a thing, &c., is said to do something, &c., which is made punishable as an offence, the thing or things thus described are the essential ingredients of the offence, and unless a person comes within the ambit of the definition, he cannot be held to have committed the offence, e. g., Sections 339, 340, 351, 378, 415, 441, &c. Reading Section 363 with Sections 359 and 361 it follows that no one can be convicted of kidnapping from lawful guardianship unless the case comes within the ambit of Section 361.
18. It is said that on principle it is difficult to see why a boy of fourteen or a girl of sixteen should be protected and not a boy of fifteen or a girl of seventeen. The policy of legislature in fixing the age limits in the case of certain offences is a matter of no concern on the question of the construction of the statute. The Indian Penal Code was enacted in 1860. The Indian Majority Act was enacted in 1875. When the Indian Penal Code was enacted the age of majority was fifteen in Bengal and sixteen in this Presidency in the case of Hindu minors under the Hindu law. In the case of Mahomedans the age was the age when the minor, male or female, attained puberty, which was presumed at the latest to be the completion of fifteen years. The fact, therefore, that the ages of fourteen and sixteen are specified in Section 361 seems to indicate that the legislature did not intend that the offences of kidnapping from lawful guardianship should depend upon the age of majority under the personal law of the Hindus and Mahomedans, and the legislature seem to have considered that for the purpose of such an offence the age limit should be reduced, Before the Indian Majority Act the legislature might very well have taken the age of sixteen for both boys and girls and this would have included all minors, whether boys or girls, Hindus or Mahomedans. It was not necessary to make any distinction as the Indian Penal Code seems to have made in Section 361 between boys and girls and fixed a lower age limit for boys and a little higher for the girls. It seems to me, therefore, even from the point of view of the policy of the legislature, that the ages of fourteen and sixteen, as the case may be, were fixed upon deliberately in the definition of kidnapping a minor from lawful guardianship in Section 361 and other factors were considered besides that of legal minority. Throughout the Code there is an indication that the legislature has prescribed different age periods in the case of children and minors in connection with certain offences. In some cases you have the age of eighteen, in some fourteen, and in others ten, and so on, e.g., Sections 369, 372, 373, &c. Although, therefore, one may desire to see a change effected and the age limit advanced, it is not open to one to discuss the reasons which have led the legislature to prescribe certain limits in certain cases.