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Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 SC 606.

(v) Mahabir Prosad Choudhary Vs. M/s. Octavius Tea and Industries (Civil Appeal No. 8320 of 2011).

on the question no.2, he also places reliance upon :

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(vi) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others, (2008) 7 SCC 169.

On question no.2, learned Counsel for the respondent, has also relied upon the judgments in Mukri Gopalan; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises and Kapil (supra) which are also relied upon by Mr. Anand Deshpande, learned Counsel for the petitioner.

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9. Mr. Harish Thakur, learned Counsel agrees that the expression "within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the copy thereof" as occurring in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1971, means that the limitation prescribed does not start to run from the date of the order. He submits that the Act of 1971 is a Special Act dealing with various forms of unfair labour practices. He contends that adjudicatory Forums such as the Labour Court and Industrial Court are constituted for redressal of grievances relating to commission of unfair labour practices by the employer as well as the employees/union. Section 46 of the Act of 1971 gives finality to the orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court. Section 31(1) empowers the Court to pass ex parte order, if one of the parties has not appeared. This ex parte order brings about finality to the litigation process, unless the aggrieved party approaches the Court within the limitation period to set aside the ex parte order. He contends that if the provisions of Section 31(2) are literally interpreted and a party is permitted to approach the Court with an application for setting aside the ex parte order after several years but within thirty days of the obtaining copy of the said order, then there will be no finality to the adjudication process. This will bear harshly Civil WP 6694 of 2018.odt on the other litigating party. Learned Counsel, for this proposition, places reliance upon Popat Rautray (supra).

(c) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) holds that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available in the matter of calculating the limitation period prescribed in Section 32 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the same principle as enunciated in Mukri Gopalan (supra) that there was no provision in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application made under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

(d) Kapil (supra) also relies upon Mukri Gopalan (supra) to hold the applicability of the Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29 (2) as contained therein, to the proceedings of appeal under the Railway Civil WP 6694 of 2018.odt Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, on account of there being no express exclusion.

(e) In Superintending Engineer, Dehar Power House (supra) while considering the issue as to whether the High Court, exercising revisional power under Section 38 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, can condone the delay in a case of revision under Section 48 of the said Act, if the revision is filed beyond ninety days from the date of communication of the order or it excludes the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and in consequence of Section 5 thereof too, the principles as laid down in Mukri Gopalan (supra), Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), Mangu Ram (supra) were considered, to hold that since there was no express exclusion of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the same would be applicable, by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act.