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Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to in sub-clause (b), if from information received or otherwise and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, is satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such resignation.‖ Sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of Article 190 indicates that a seat ―shall thereupon become vacant‖ when a Member ―resigns his seat‖ and the resignation is accepted by the Speaker and the Chairman, as the case may be. The provisions of sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of Article 190 were amended by the Constitution (Thirty-Third Amendment) Act 1974 to incorporate a specific provision for the acceptance of the resignation of a Member by the Speaker. The expression ―shall thereupon become vacant‖ indicates that a vacancy arises only upon the acceptance of the resignation by the Speaker, or as the case may be, the Chairman of the House. The proviso to clause (3) of Article 190 indicates that a resignation shall not be accepted if the Speaker or Chairman is not satisfied that the resignation is ―voluntary or genuine‖. Before this satisfaction is arrived at, the proviso requires the Speaker or the Chairman (as the case may be) to make an enquiry as is thought to be fit. These provisions were introduced through a constitutional amendment to safeguard the membership of elected members of the legislature being forfeited by coercion or misrepresentation. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the constitutional amendment explained its purpose in the following terms:
(vii) Though, the term ―genuine‖ has not been defined, what is meant is the authenticity of the letter of resignation; and
(viii) Though, the expression ―voluntary‖ has not been defined, it would mean that (2020) 2 SCC 595 a resignation should not be a result of threat of force or coercion.

Justice N V Ramana speaking for the three-judge bench of this Court elaborated on the role which has been entrusted to the Speaker, stating:

―79. Third, the Speaker can reject the resignation, if the Speaker is satisfied that the resignation was ―not voluntary or genuine‖. Herein, our attention is drawn to the Chapter 22, Rule 202(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karnataka Legislative Assembly […] Reading the rule in consonance with Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and its proviso, it is clear that the Speaker‘s satisfaction should be based on the information received and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit. The aforesaid aspects do not require a roving inquiry and with the experience of a Speaker, who is the head of the House, he is expected to conduct such inquiry as is necessary and pass an order. If a Member appears before him and gives a letter in writing, an inquiry may be a limited inquiry. But if he receives information that a Member tendered his resignation under coercion, he may choose to commence a formal inquiry to ascertain if the resignation was voluntary and genuine.‖ The three judge Bench of this Court finally held:
―83. In view of our above discussion we hold that the Speaker can reject a resignation only if the inquiry demonstrates that it is not ―voluntary‖ or ―genuine‖. The inquiry should be limited to ascertaining if the Member intends to relinquish his membership out of his free will. Once it is demonstrated that a Member is willing to resign out of his free will, the Speaker has no option but to accept the resignation. It is constitutionally impermissible for the Speaker to take into account any other extraneous factors while considering the resignation. The satisfaction of the Speaker is subject to judicial review.‖ It is in the above context that the inquiry by the Speaker or Chairman (as the case may be) has to be understood. The Court cannot fetter the discretion of the Speaker to conduct an inquiry into whether a resignation is ―voluntary‖ or ―genuine‖. However, neither can the Speaker exceed the terms of the mandate and conduct an overbroad inquiry into the underlying motives of the Member. It is sufficient that the Speaker is satisfied that the Member‘s resignation is ―voluntary‖ and ―genuine‖.

47. In the present case, the facts which have come on the record indicate the Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly had been convened on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers to commence from 16 March 2020. The Governor was intimated that twenty-two Members owing allegiance to the INC had tendered their resignations to the Speaker of the Assembly. Copies of the resignation letters were forwarded to the Governor. At this stage, the validity of these resignations had not been discerned and no decision had been made by the Speaker as to whether the resignations were ―voluntary‖ or ―genuine‖. The Chief Minister subsequently tendered advice to the Governor for the removal of six Members who were ministers in the State government. On 13 March 2020, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly issued notices of disqualification. However, on 14 March 2020 the resignations of six Members who were ministers of the incumbent government were accepted by the Speaker acting in exercise of the constitutional authority under the proviso to Article 190(3)(b). The Chief Minister, adverting to the turmoil in the state, addressed a communication to the Governor on 13 March 2020 stating that the convening of the floor test would be a sure basis for resolving the conundrum. This is a strong indication that the Chief Minister himself was of the opinion that the situation in the state had cast his government‘s majority in doubt. However, upon the convening of the Legislative Assembly, no floor test was conducted, and the House was adjourned till 26 March 2020. These facts form the basis on which the Governor advised that a floor test be conducted. Based on the resignation of six ministers of the incumbent government (accepted by the Speaker), the purported resignation of sixteen more Members belonging to the INC, and the refusal of the Chief Minister to conduct a floor test despite the House having been convened on 16 March 2020, the exercise of power by the Governor to convene a floor test cannot be regarded as constitutionally improper.