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Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that time is not the essence of the contract; and, the performance, though it was fixed for May 28, 1989, the other clauses relating to payment of interest for the delayed period of performance would indicate that the time is not essence of the contract. The application. therefore, could not have been dismissed at that stage. It is further contended that the appellants had an oral agreement with the respondent that the agreement will be performed after the respondent obtained requisite permission from the competent authority. Thus, his contention is that the relief of specific performance was not barred by limitation. it is then contended for the respondent that by operation of first clause of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, once the date has been fixed for the performance, limitation begins to run form that date. Whether time is the essence of the contract of not is not relevant for the purpose of deciding the question of limitation. in the agreement, time having been fixed for performance of the contract as may 28, 1989, the limitation began to run under the first clause from that date. the second clause, therefore, has no application to the facts in his case. The courts below, therefore, were correct in refusing permition for amendment of the plaint introducing specific relief of performance.

The suit for specific performance in fact was claimed by way of amendment application filed under order VI, Rule 17, CPC on September 12, 1979. It will operate only on the application bring ordered. Since the amendment was ordered on August 25, 1989, the crucial date would be the date on which the amendment was ordered by which date, admittedly, the suit is barred by limitation. the courts below, therefore, were not right in decreeing the suit."

The question in whether a date was fixed for the performance of the agreement and in our view the answer is in the affirmative. It is true that a particular date from the calendar was not mentioned in the document and the date was not ascertainable originally, but as soon as the plaintiff redeemed the mortgage, it became an ascertained date. If the plaintiff had, immediately after the redemption, field the suit, could it be thrown out on the ground that she was not entitled to the specific performance asked for? We do not think so. she would have been within her right to assert that she had performed her part of the contract and was entitled to insist that her brother should complete his that her brother should complete his part. the agreement is a typical illustration on a contingent contract within the meaning of Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and become enforceable as soon as the even of redemption) by the plaintiff herself) happened, We agree with the view of the Madras High Court in R. Muniswami Goundar vs. B.M. Shamanna Gauda expressed in slightly different circumstances. The doctrine of id certum est quod certum reddj potest is clearly applicable to the case before us which in the language of Herbert Broom (in his book dealing with legal maxims) is that certainty need not be ascertained at the time; for if, in the fluxion of time, a day will arrive which will make it certain, that is sufficient. A similar question had arisen in Duncombe Vs. Brighton Club and Norfolk Hotel Company, relied upon in the Madras case. Under an agreement, the plaintiff had supplied some furniture to the defendant for which payment was made but after some delay. He claimed interest. The rule at common law did not allow interest in such a case, and the plaintiff in support of his claim relied upon a statutory provision which could come to his aid only if the price was payable at a certain time. Blackburn, J. observed that the did not have the slightest hesitation in saying that the agreement contemplated a particular day, which, when the goods were delivered would be ascertained; and then the money would be payable at a certain time; but rejected the plaintiff's demand on the ground that the price did not become payable by the written instrument at a certain time. The other learned Judges did not agree with him, and held that the statute did not require that the document should specify the time of payment by mentionion the event upon which the payment was to be made, and if the time of event was capable of being ascertained the requirements of the action were satisfied. the same is the position in the case before us. The requirement of Article 54 is not that the actual day should necessarily be ascertained upon the face of the deed, but that the basis of the calculation which was to make it certain should be found therein. We accordingly, hold that under the agreement the date for the defendant to execute the sale deed was fixed, although not by mentioning a certain date but by a reference to the happening of a certain event, namely, the redemption of the mortgage; and, immediately after the redemption by the plaintiff, the defendant became liable to execute the sale deed which the plaintiff was entitled to enforce. The period of limitation thus started ruining on that date. The case is therefore, covered by the first part of Article 54 (third column) and not the second part." Under these circumstances, it must be held that for the purpose of limitation, what is material is that the limitation begins to run from the date the parties have stipulated for performance of the contract. The suit required to be filed within three years from the date fixed by the parties under the contract. Since the application for amendment of the plaint came to be filed after the expiry of three years, certainly in changed the cause of action as required to be specified in the plaint. The suit for mandatory injunction is filed and the specific performance was sought for by way of an amendment. The cause of action is required to be stead initially in the plaint but it was not pleaded. It was sought to be amended, along with an application for specific performance which, as stated earlier, was rejected. Under there circumstances, even by the date of filing of the application, namely, November 5, 1992, the suit was barred by limitation. the high Court, therefore, was right in refusing to permit the amendment of the plaint.