Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

Mr. V. R. Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of BCI as also Mr. K.M.K. Nair, appearing on behalf of the Bar Council of Kerala, have contended that the term of the State Bar Council shall be deemed to have been extended on 13th of January, 1997, namely, the date on which the Resolution for extending the term was circulated to all the eighteen members of the BCI and since eight of the members had already given their consent for extending the term by a period of six months and others had not raised any objection, the Resolution of Confirmation adopted on 8th February, 1997 would relate back to the date on which the Resolution for extension of the term by six months was circulated under Rule 6 of the Bar Council of India Rules. That being so, the decision, it is contended, to extend the term of the State Bar Council shall be deemed to have been taken by the BCI on 13th January, 1997 and, therefore, the State Bar Council retained its jurisdiction to conduct fresh elections which had been validly held.

In order to find out as to how the BCI had proceeded in the matter, we sent for the original record which were produced before us by the counsel for the BCI. The record indicates that the BCI by its letter dated 13th January, 1997, addressed to all members, circulated a Resolution under Rule 6 for extension of the term of the Kerala Bar Council by six months. This letter reads as under :

"THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA BCI:D:118:1997 21, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area, New Delhi-110002.

BCI did not adopt the modes available to it under (a) and (b), but invoked the provisions of Rule 6 and adopted the mode indicated at (c). It circulated the resolution to its members proposing extension in the term of the Kerala Bar Council by six months. Opinion of only four of the members was obtained by 27.1.1997 which is the date on which the term of the Kerala Bar Council expired. Since majority of the members had not expressed their approval by that date in favour of the resolution, no "action" was taken. It was clearly a case of abandonment. The other essential requirements of Rule 6 were, therefore, not complied with. BCI, however, in its regular meeting held on 8.2.1997, passed a resolution extending the term of the Kerala Bar Council by six months under the Proviso to Section 8. Once the move initiated under Rule 6 was abandoned and no "action" was taken as majority opinion had not been obtained by 27.1.1997 nor even thereafter, the BCI or the Kerala Bar Council cannot legally fall back upon Rule 6 to contend that the resolution adopted on 8.2.1997 would relate back to the date on which the resolution under Rule 6 was circulated.

This principle cannot be applied in the instant case. BCI, as pointed out earlier, took no "action" on the basis of the resolution circulated to its members. In fact, it abandoned the whole process and adopted a resolution of extension only at its meeting on 8.2.1997 which would not relate back to the date of circulation as 'mere circulation' is not "action" and that too, based on majority opinion, within the meaning of Rule 6 which was required to be confirmed.

Learned counsel for the respondents in their written submissions have referred to Dictionary meaning of the word "confirm" or "confirmation" in support of their argument that it has as the effect of validating the earlier act. We appreciate their effort and add to their research the maxim, "Confirmatio omnes supplet defectus, licet id quod actum est ab initio non valuit". (Confirmation supplies all defects, though that which had been done was not valid at the beginning.) But, as pointed out above, it was not a case of "confirmation" as no "action" under Rule 6 was taken. Since the term of the Kerala Bar Council had expired on 27th January, 1997 and they had ceased to be members with effect from that date, their term could not be legally revived with retrospective effect by BCI on 8th February, 1997 when it adopted the resolution for extension of the term by six months. The Kerala Bar Council had ceased to have any jurisdiction and could not hold fresh elections which could be held only by the Special Committee appointed by the BCI.