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4. Heard Shri K. Ramakumar, Shri N. Nandakumara Menon, and Shri V. Chitambaresh, learned Senior Counsel, and learned counsel Shri V.V. Nandagopal Nambiar, Shri P.P. Jacob, Shri C.P. Mohammed Nias, Shri George Poonthottam, Shri Kaleeswaram Raj and Shri Sudhi Vasudevan, for the petitioners, and learned Advocate General Shri C.P. Sudhakara Prasad for the State and Shri Murali Purushothaman learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Delimitation Commission.

5. The questions raised in these writ petitions are many fold, requiring interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and that of the Municipalities Act. The main contentions are the following: Article 243Q provides constitution of three types of local bodies, viz. Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council and Municipal  Corporation. The Village Panchayats herein are really rural areas and if at all there is a transition to an urban area, going by Article 243Q, they can be formed only as a Nagar Panchayat which is envisaged for a "transitional area" and there is no provision to add them to a Municipal Corporation. Therefore, it is contended that a Grama Panchayat cannot be directly added to/or converted as a Municipal Corporation. Section 4(2)(e) of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), providing such merger of a Panchayat area geographically lying adjacent to a Municipality, is unconstitutional, as it is in contravention of Article 243Q. If at all Section 4(2)(e) is applicable, then the Grama Panchayat can only be added to a Municipality and there is no provision for including it in a Municipal Corporation. It is mainly contended that the Governor of the State will have to notify under Article 243Q a "transitional area" a "smaller urban area" or a "larger urban area" based on the yardsticks provided therein and in the absence of a notification, the Government cannot propose merger of those Grama Panchayats with a Municipality. The proposal by the Government in that regard is therefore without jurisdiction, as the Government cannot take such a decision even going by the proviso to Section 4(2)(e) of the Kerala Municipality Act. It is further pointed out that  there is absence of consultation with the village Panchayats, which is mandatory. One of the contentions raised is that the unification of a Village Panchayat to a Corporation will deprive large Sections of the society the benefits distributed by Village Panchayats including the benefit of the scheme, viz. "National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme" which are being implemented by the Panchayats concerned, with the funds provided by the Central Government and State Government. It is also contended that none of the Panchayats can be termed as having any urban character and the decision otherwise taken by the Government is politically motivated , ignoring the relevant aspects and without applying the mind.

It was further held in para 14 thus:

"While Art.243(g) gives no constitutional yardstick for the Governor to ascertain and specify a village, Art.243Q(2) provides yardsticks to identify transitional area, smaller urban area and larger urban area. It has been held by the Apex Court in State of  U.P. v. Pradhan singh Kshettra Samiti, (1995) Supp (2) SCC 305 that in specifying villages for the purpose of Part IX, the Governor is not bound by any particular yardsticks. Art.243Q(2) provides the yardsticks for the three types of areas mentioned in Art.243Q (2) and the municipal area as defined in Art.243P(d) is the territorial area of a Municipality as is notified by the Governor.

14. Learned Advocate General submitted that Section 4(2)(e) is not violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution and therefore the contention cannot be accepted. True, that in Article 243Q three types of  institutions of local self government will have to be constituted, after undergoing an exercise under Article 243Q(2), by the Governor of the State. There is no prohibition under any of the provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution against the power of the Government to unite a village panchayat which has been declared as a larger urban area, to a Municipality. As already noticed, the word 'Municipality' takes in all the three institutions. Therefore, once it forms the character of a larger urban area it is open to the Government to unite it to a Municipal Corporation if the same is lying adjacent to the Municipal area. Therefore, the contention that Section 4(2)(e) is unconstitutional, as it is in violation of Article 243Q, is clearly unsustainable. It was also contended that merger of a grama panchayat straight away to a Municipal Corporation is also illegal. The argument is that only the word 'Municipality' alone is available under Section 4(2)(e) and the merger of a panchayat with a Municipal Corporation is not envisaged. As already held, the word 'Municipality' takes in all the three institutions including a Municipal Corporation and therefore the said contention also does not merit any consideration. It is not the law that the transformation of a village panchayat, once it gains the urban character should be as Nagar Panchayat, then as Municipal Council and as Municipal  Corporation, in that pattern. It depends on the notification by the Governor under Article 243Q(2). There is no indication therein that a rural area, on getting urban character and by fulfilling the yardsticks contained therein, can only be declared as a transitional area.

(e). Going by Ext.P6 order by the Government, various objections and suggestions have been considered and therefore there is no violation of the requirements contained in the proviso in that regard. The notification under Article 243Q also was issued by the Governor. Herein, Shri K. Ramakumar, learned Senior Counsel submitted that both the final notifications are issued by the Government and the notification under Article 243Q is not issued by the Governor and therefore it cannot be treated as a notification under Article 243Q. As already noticed, the Governor is acting on the advice of the Government and the Council of Ministers and therefore the rules of business under Article 166(3) squarely comes into play and therefore Ext.R1(c) cannot be said to be erroneous.