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12. It is now quite settled that the more appropriate mode of setting aside a consent-decree for fraud is by a separate action instituted for that purpose where charges of fraud can be fully investigated, rather than by a motion in the cause in the nature of a review; but such, a suit is not, I think, the same as an action of review or the old bill of review: Mussummut Gulal Koer v. Badshah Bahadur (1909) 10 C.L.J., 420. Legislative recognition of this mode of procedure is afforded by Article 95 of the Limitation Act. A suit instituted for that purpose is an ordinary civil suit and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a suit must depend on the provisions of the Civil Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not said that suits to set aside decrees were exempted from the cognizance of Munsifs and under Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act therefore Munsifs have jurisdiction to try suits of this class. If the suit is considered to be one for the determination of a right to, or interest in, immoveable property, the District Munsif's Court, Tiruppur, was the proper Court to try it (section 16 of the Code); otherwise the same Court will have jurisdiction to try it as the defendant actually and voluntarily resides within the local limits of its jurisdiction (section 20 of the Code). If for instance the plaintiff in the present suit had executed a mortgage deed in favour of the defendant for Rs. 1,700 and interest on the security of the property charged by the decree in satisfaction of his claim in. the previous suit and if that suit had been withdrawn or dismissed as adjusted without there being a decree and if the present suit was to set aside the mortgage on the ground of fraud, there can scarcely be any doubt that the District Munsif of Tiruppur would have jurisdiction to entertain it. For the purpose of determining the Court in which the suit should be filed I do not see any difference between the two suits. The District Judge may also have concurrent jurisdiction, but the suit must be instituted in the District Munsif's Court as that is the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. That is how the matter stands on the construction of the relevant portions of the statutes which prescribe or limit the jurisdiction of Courts.

14. The learned District Judge in his judgment in appeal in this case draws a distinction between the jurisdiction of the Court to treat a decree obtained by fraud as a nullity when the impeachment of the decree arises incidentally or is only one of the reliefs prayed, and the jurisdiction of the Court where the impeachment of the decree is the sole object of the suit. It is quite possible that a Court which has jurisdiction over a cause, may have jurisdiction to decide on the validity of a decree though if the suit was wholly to set aside that decree it may have no jurisdiction on the ground that no part of the cause of action arose within its local limits or the defendant did not reside there. That difference arises, not out of any distinction between a direct and collateral impeachment of the decree, not out of any difference in the nature of the suits, but arises solely out of the difference in the place of suing as determined by the provisions of the Code or any other law determining the venue. I do not understand how a Court which is not competent to adjudicate directly on the validity or the invalidity of a decree can do so indirectly. If a decree obtained by fraud is a nullity and is wholly void (which I think it is not in spite of some expressions to the contrary in the reported judgments), the Court may ignore it; but if it is binding till set aside, the face that it is impeached in a suit in which other or substantial reliefs are asked which depend or are consequential on the setting aside of the decree cannot confer a jurisdiction which otherwise the Court did not possess. The recent decisions of the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts, some of which were confirmed by the Privy Council, support the view taken above. In an early case in Calcutta, Pontifex, J., in connection with an application to take the plaint off the file on the ground that leave to sue was not obtained is reported to have said, that:

where the principal part of the prayer of the suit was to set aside a consent-decree of the High Court in a previous suit., that Court and that Court alone had jurisdiction.

Bibee Soloman v. Abdool Aziz (1879) 4 C.L.R., 366. In that case the whole cause of action appears to have arisen within the local limits of the original jurisdiction of the High Court as the fraud which gave rise to the action was committed within the local limits. The suit itself appears to be one in which substantial relief for the recovery of property appears to have been claimed and the previous decree which limited the right of the plaintiff was sought to be set aside as a preliminary to obtain such relief. If that be so, the later decision of the same Court on the original side in Nistarini Dassi v. Nundo Lall Bose (1899) I.L.R., 26 Calc., 891 which was confirmed in appeal, which again was confirmed by the Privy Council, is conclusive authority for the position that a Court which has jurisdiction over the cause has jurisdiction to set aside the decree of another Court on the ground of fraud as an auxiliary to the granting of the other reliefs: Benode Behari Bose v. Nistarini Daasi (1906) I.L.R., 83 Calc., 180 (P.C.). I would draw particular attention to the judgment of Chief Justice Maclean in appeal at pages 380 and 381 in Nistarini Dassi v. Nundo Lal Bose (1903) I.L.R., 30 Calc., 369 where the question of jurisdiction of one Court to set aside the decree of another Court for fraud is discussed with reference to the Indian statutes. In Kedar Nath Mukherjee v. Prosonna Kumar Chatterjee (1901) 5 C.W.N., 559 the suit was to set aside On the ground of fraud a decree of a Small Cause Court at Krishnagar and sale of immoveable properties in execution of that decree on transfer by a Munsif's Court. The plaintiff also claimed to recover possession of the property sold in execution and instituted the suit in the Munsif's Court. On objection taken, the jurisdiction of the Munsif to entertain the suit was sustained, but the learned Judges were disposed to hold that if the action was brought simply to set aside the decree, the suit should have been instituted in the Krishnagar Civil Court. It is important to note that the learned Judges say that the suit to set aside the decree of the Small Cause Court would not lie in that Court, but would have to be brought in the ordinary Civil Court, and it may be that Krishnagar Civil Court was the only Court which could take cognizance of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, if it was simply to set aside the decree.

18. There was a reference made to Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, but that section has no application to the present case, for the Court is not asked to stay any proceedings in a superior Court.

19. The respondent broadly contended that there was some principle of law which obliged a party desirous of setting aside a decree obtained by fraud, to seek relief in the Court which passed the decree; but except the dictum of Pontifex, J., he did not refer to any other authority. If that contention is correct, a Court of Appeal which has no original jurisdiction and a Small Cause Court or a Revenue Court which has only a limited jurisdiction cannot entertain an original suit to set aside its decree, and no other Court can. This, however, does not appear to be the law. In Flower v. Lloyd (1877) 6 Ch.D., 297, the Court of Appeal in England held that that Court had no original jurisdiction to hear an application to set aside their decree passed in appeal on the ground of fraud but that a fresh action should be brought in a Court having original jurisdiction to set aside the decree. In the same case, Baggallay, L.J., no doubt said that under the old practice when a decree has been obtained by fraud a bill was filed in the Original Court in which suit had been brought for the purpose of setting the decree aside and the same may be done even after the Judicature Acts came into force. I doubt however whether the Lord Justice was thinking of Courts of different grades exercising similar jurisdiction. I therefore think that the District Munsif of Tiruppur had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, though he had no power to grant the second prayer of the plaint which however did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. It may be mentioned that the plaintiff agreed to withdraw this prayer in the first Court.