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5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties and on going through the evidence, oral and documentary, which I have been taken through, I will take up for determination, in the first instance, the point raised on behalf of the accused-petitioner, relating to jurisdiction, as it goes to the very root of the case. Jurisdiction is the very foundation of the case; it is the plinth whereupon rests the entire superstructure of the proceedings. Any order passed in a case, vitiated by the absence of jurisdiction, will be a nullity. As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held in the case of Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. King that even an order of acquittal passed in a case without jurisdiction would not be binding even if it is not appealed against and set aside-Sir John Beaumont delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee observed that "but if the orders were a nullity there was nothing to appeal against". Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apparently adopts the Common Law of England that all crimes are local and justiciable only by the local courts within whose jurisdiction they are committed. The Lord Chancellor. Lord Halsbury delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the case of Muhammad Yusuf-Ud-Din v. Queen-Empress, (1898) ILR 25 Cal 20 (PC) observed at page 30 that: "It is important to observe this because crime is in its essential nature local". The General Rule of Lex fori as contained in Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is modified by the exceptions or alternatives provided for in the following sections under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Full Bench case of Charu Chandra Majumdar v. Emperor reported in ILR 44 Cal 595 = (AIR 1917 Cal 137) (FB), Sir Asutosh Mukherjee observed at page 621 that "section 177 formulates the general principle that the ordinary place of enquiry and trial is the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offence is committed . . . Sections 179-84 embody provisions in the nature of exceptions or alternatives to Section 177". For properly appreciating the point raised, it will be pertinent to refer to Section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is as follows: "The offence may be tried by the court within whose jurisdiction -- (i) any part of the property was received by the accused, or (ii) was retained by him, or (iii) the offence was' committed." There was at one stage a cloud raised over the interpretation of the above mentioned provision by the conflicting decisions of the different High Courts, as also of other courts but the same has since been lifted by a series of recent decisions and I would refer only to a few of those to avoid repetition. The starting point of one school of thought appears to be the case of Reg v. Davison and Gordon decided by Baron Alderson and Coleridge J. as reported in (1855) 7 Cox C. C. 158. Baron Alderson observed therein at pp. 162-163 that "where there is no evidence of fraudulent embezzlement except the non-accounting the venue may be laid in the place where the non-accounting occurred, because the jury may presume that there the fraudulent misappropriation was made, but this cannot apply where there is distinct evidence of the misappropriation elsewhere". The aforesaid case was discussed at great length in a Division Bench decision of this court by Mr. Justice Blagden, who ultimately observed that the learned Baron "was dealing with the Common Law of England which at that date almost wholly regulated English criminal procedure, and our law of procedure is codified." and that "there is no justification for holding that the English law is the law of Bengal." I agree with the said observations of Mr. Justice Blagden and I hold that the above-mentioned observations of the Lord Baron were made in a different context while dealing with the statutory offence of embezzlement and that our law of procedure being codified, the English law on the point should not be taken as a precedent for interpreting the relevant Indian law. There are also some cases of the different High Courts in India supporting this other school that the failure to render account at a particular place provides an alternative venue for a trial of the case therein and to avoid repetition a reference may be made to some of these cases. In the case of Gunananda Dhone v. Lala Santi Prokash Nanley, decided by Mr. Justice Suhrawardy and Mr. Justice Mukerii and . Mr. Justice Mukerji delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 437 that "where the accused is under a liability to render accounts at a particular place and fails to do so by reason of having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust which is alleged against him, the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction that place is situate, may inquire into and try the offence under the provisions of Section 181, Sub-section (2), Cr. P. C.". The next case is the case of Paul De Flonder v. Emperor decided by Mr. Justice Lort-Williams and Mr. Justice S.K. Ghose. Mr. Justice Lort-Williams delivering the judgment of the court approved of the decision in the case of G. N. Pascal v. Raj Kishore Mathur reported in AIR 1931 Cal 521 and dissented from the decisions reported in 29 Cal WN 432 and in 26 Cal WN 175 = (AIR 1922 Cal 46(1)) and observed at page 815 of (35 Cal WN) = (at page 531 of AIR) that : "If there is no evidence to show where the misappropriation was committed other than the fact of non-accounting then the venue may be laid in the place where the accused failed to account, because that is where the offence was committed within the meaning of Section 181 (2) -- R. v. Davison and Gordon, (1855) 7 Cox C. C. 158.(6)"