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11. A close reading of the aforesaid Regulations leave no manner of doubt that a delinquent officer employee has been given right of appeal under regulation 17 to the Appellate Authority against the order of Disciplinary Authority and such orders may be assailed before the Reviewing Authority in review under regulation 18. The Bank Regulations, thus, provide for appeal and review against the order of Disciplinary Authority. In S.S. Rathore, the seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court ruled that powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in Courts are being exercised under the law by tribunals and other constituted authorities and in respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the Court is now barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in tribunals and authorities and therefore, there is no justification in drawing distinction between the Courts and tribunals in regard to the principle of merger. The Apex Court took into consideration its earlier judgments viz., Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur and Ors., , State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86, Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to the Government of Orissa , Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. and Somnath Sahu v. The State of Orissa . Sita Ram Goel's case has been overruled by the seven Judge bench of the Apex Court in S. S. Rathore. In Mohammad Nooh, the Apex Court in paragraph 12 and 13 of the report held as follows :--

13. Before yet another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and Ors. (supra). Mohammad Nooh was relied upon by the Respondent. In para 7 of the Report, the Apex Court observed :--

"7. The main reliance however of the respondent both in the High Court and before us is on the decision in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 = AIR 1958 SC 86. That was a case where a public servant was dismissed on April 20, 1948 before the Constitution had come into force, his appeal from the order of dismissal was dismissed in May 1949 which was also before the Constitution came into force. His revision against the order in appeal was dismissed on April 22, 1950, when the Constitution had come into force, and the question that arose in that case was whether the dismissed public servant could take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution because the revisional order had been passed after the Constitution came into force. In that case, this Court certainly held that the order of dismissal passed on April 20, 1948, could not be said to have merged in the orders in appeal and in revision. It was pointed out that the order of dismissal was operative of its own strength as from April 20, 1948 and the public servant stood dismissed as from that date and therefore it was a case of dismissal before the Constitution came into force and the public servant could not take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution in view of the fact that his dismissal had taken place before the Constitution had come into force. As was pointed out in Madan Gopal Rungta's case , Mohammad Nooh's case, 1958 SCR 595 = AIR 1958 SC 86, was a special case, which stands on its own facts. The question there was whether a writ under Article 226 could be issued in respect of a dismissal which was effective from 1948. The relief that was being sought was against an order of dismissal which came into existence before the Constitution came into force and remained effective all along even after the dismissal of the appeal and the revision from that order. It was in those special circumstances that this Court held that the dismissal had taken place in 1948 and it could not be the subject-matter of consideration under Article 226 of the Constitution, for that would be giving retrospective effect to the Article. The argument based on the principle of merger was repelled by this Court in that case on two grounds, namely, (i) that the principle of merger applicable to decrees of Courts would not be applicable to departmental tribunals, and (ii) that the original order would be operative on its own strength and did not gain greater efficacy by the subsequent order of dismissal of the appeal or revision. In effect, this means that even if the principle of merger were applicable to an order of dismissal like the one in Mohammad Nooh's case, 1958 SCR 595 = AIR 1958 SC 86, the fact would still remain that the dismissal was before the Constitution came into force and therefore the person dismissed could not take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution, so far as that dismissal was concerned. That case was not concerned with the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court where the original authority is within such territorial jurisdiction while the appellate authority is not and must therefore be confined to the special facts with which it was dealing. We have therefore no hesitation in holding consistently with the view taken by this Court in Musaliar's case as well as in Amritlal Bhogilal's case, , that the order of the original authority must be held to have merged in the order of the appellate authority in a case like the present and it is only the order of the appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is disposed of. Therefore, if the appellate authority is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which is within its jurisdiction so long as it cannot issue a writ to the appellate authority. It is not in dispute in this case that no writ could be issued to the appellate authority and in the circumstances the High Court could issue no writ even to the original authority. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition with costs."

14. The seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court in S.S. Rathore while considering Mohammad Nooh in para 14 of the Report held :

"14. The distinction adopted in Mohammad Nooh's case AIR 1958 SC 86 between a Court and a tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is one without any legal justification. Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in Courts are being exercised under the law by tribunals and other constituted authorities. In fact, in respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the Court is now barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in tribunals and authorities. That being the position, we see no justification for the distinction between Courts and tribunals in regard to the principle of merger. On the authority of the precedents indicated, it must be held that the order of dismissal made by the Collector did merge into the order of the Divisional Commissioner when the appellant's appeal was dismissed on 31-8-1966."

15. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by Severn Judge Bench of the Apex Court, the legal position is well crystalised that the doctrine of merger is equally applicable to the tribunals and authorities having powers of adjudication and in discharge of quasi-judicial functions. The view to the contrary is no longer good law. Mohammad Nooh's case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been considered and explained by two Constitution Benches of the Apex Court in Madan Gopal Rungta and Collector of Customs and the seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court in S.S. Rathore and we need not say anything further except reiterating that Mohammad Nooh's case was a case of special kind, turned on its facts and confined to that case alone.