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3. The plaintiff claimed that the properties in respect of which the title deeds stood in the donor's name were her stridhanam properties and that she was accordingly competent to make a gift thereof. The first defendant who was the contesting defendant pleaded that though the title to these properties stood in Seetha Bai Animal's name, they had all been purchased with the funds belonging to Jagannadha Rao, benami in her name. A plea of limitation was also raised. The question of benami formed the subject of the first issue and the question of limitation of the second issue.

5. In dealing with the question of benami, we may mention at the outset that it has not been suggested that Jagannadha Rao had any creditors from whom he desired to screen these properties. It is obvious from the written statement that the first defendant was hard put to it to suggest a motive for a benami transaction. It is true that Jagannadha Rao took the first defendant's husband in adoption in 1884, and some of the letters exhibited in the case show that as a young boy he was not easily persuaded to come and live "with his adoptive parents and preferred to go back to the place where he had theretofore been living. These letters relate to a period when the first defendant's husband was 8 or 9 years old and it would be too much to suggest that at that time such conduct brought about any differences between Jagannadha Rao and the adopted son with reference to which the necessity for resorting to benami transactions could be explained. In paragraph 3 of the written statement it is stated that Jagannadha Rao took such precautions as he liked in order to avoid among other things the possibility of the adopted son quarrelling with him and squandering the properties and in order to ensure the obedient conduct of the adopted son to his dictates and to avoid the possibility of the members of his natural family instigating the adopted son to act adversely to the interests of the adoptive father. In the course of the evidence one or two further reasons have been suggested, such as, a desire on Jagannadha Rao's part to keep apart some properties for the benefit of any aurasa son that he still expected might be born to him or a desire to ensure that the adopted son would behave respectfully towards Sita Bai Amma by making it appear that she was the owner of some properties. We find it hard to believe that any of these motives would have led to a benami transaction rather than to a real transaction in favour of the wife.

6. The principal argument of Mr. Govindarajachari before us ¦on behalf of the appellant was that as the attempt on the plaintiff's side to establish that these properties were acquired with the lady's funds had failed, it must be held that they were purchased by Jagannadha Rao with funds belonging to the joint family of himself and his adopted son, and that as sufficient provision for her maintenance had been made by Ex. B and also by the provision in the adoption deed itself in the possible contingency of differences between her and the adopted son, there was nothing to rebut the presumption arising under the law that the purchases made in the wife's name with family funds were only made for the benefit of the family. It seems to us that this argument puts the effect of the evidence much too high and that the legal implications therein contained are not altogether tenable. It appears from the documentary evidence as well as from the admissions made by the first defendant herself and by D.W. 13, that Seetha Bai Amma did have some monies of her own and some money-lending transactions of her own. It is, however, not possible to fix the amount that she was thus in possession of. The evidence also establishes that at least after 1886, she must have been entitled to an annual income of between Rs. 100 and Rs. 200 from the properties set apart for her under Ex. B, while the collection of that income was being made by Jagannadha Rao himself. In such circumstances, the mere fact that the plaintiff or his witnesses do not now find it possible to connect any of the sale-deeds relating to the suit properties with a particular item of asset belonging to the lady does not necessarily lead to the inference that the purchases should have been made with family funds by Jagannadha Rao. Some of the transactions under which the suit properties were acquired were for comparatively small prices. The only substantial acquisition was under Ex. D in 1896, the consideration therefor being made up of the amount which accrued due on a usufructuary mortgage of 1887 for a sum of Rs. 2,250 and a cash payment of Rs. 700. In the light of the circumstances stated above, there is nothing that necessarily suggests that the Rs. 700 paid in cash., at the time of Ex. D must have been Jagannadha Rao's money and could have been the lady's. As regards the Rs. 2,250 advanced on the usufructuary mortgage in 1887, we have no evidence suggesting whether it could have been the lady's money or Jagannadha Rao's money. The position therefore at best only comes to this: here is a lady, the wife of a comparatively well-to-do man with an income of more than Rs. 1,500 per annum, the lady herself having some means of her own, though the amount thereof is not known. The husband had not intelligible motive for entering into any benami transaction. He gets documents executed in the name with a distinct statement that the monies paid for the purchase constituted the stridhanam property of the lady. In relation to the properties thus acquired, he takes registered lease deeds in the lady's name and also gets a power-of-attorney executed by that lady appointing her own agent to attend to her affairs. It does not appear that during all the time that Jagannadha Rao was alive, he ever took a single lease deed in his name in respect of these properties; except as regards one house which was leased to the Postal Department. There is nti doubt evidence that the realisation of the income from these properties was attended to by Jagannadha Rao or his men, but that would have been equally the case even if these properties belonged to the lady and not to Jagannadha Rao. It is admitted that in respect of a mortgage under which money Fas due to this lady long prior to the adoption and in respect of the properties settled on this lady by Ex. B, the interest or income used to be realised by Jagannadha Rao or his men.

7. It is clear from the adoption deed and from Ex. B that Jagannadha Rao was alive to the possibility of the relations between his wife and the adopted son turning out to be unfriendly and it is nothing strange if in those circumstances a man in that position desired to put the lady in a position of some independence without depending upon the adopted son or being obliged to sue him for maintenance or for a share in terms of Ex. I. It is also significant that even during the period when he was taking sale-deeds in his wife's name in respect of the suit properties, he was entering into other transactions of sale and mortgage in his own name, thus showing that he had no reason at that time to make it appear that he had no properties of his own other than the ancestral properties. Having regard to these circumstances we think the learned Subordinate Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that the sale-deeds relating to the suit properties were not taken in Seetha Bai Animal's name benami for her husband or for the family. The onus lies in the first instance on the defendant who pleads that these transactions are benami. The mere suspicion that the purchases might not have wholly been made with the lady's money will certainly not suffice to establish that the purchases were benami, nor even the suspicion that monies belonging to Jagatinadha Rao, whether in a similar measure or a larger measure, must have also contributed to these purchases. Even in cases where there is positive evidence that money had been contributed by the husband and not by the wife, that circumstance is not conclusive in favour of the benami character of the transaction, though it is an important criterion. It is true that in the Indian Law the English rule as to presumption of advancement has not been adopted, but Section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act as well as the observations of the Judicial Committee in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh (1915) 29 M.L.J. 335: L.R. 42 I.A. 202: I.L.R. 37 All. 557 at 564 and 565 (P.C.) recognise that money may have been contributed by another towards a purchase with the intention of giving a beneficial interest to the person in whose name the purchase is made. The relationship of husband and wife between the person who contributes the money and the person in whose name the sale is taken will be a very important factor in determining whether the transaction was really meant for the benefit of the wife or not. The observations in Sanjivaroya Pillai v. Balambiki Ammal (1907) 17 M.L.J. 339 are not opposed to this view because there was evidence in that case to suggest that the transfers were taken in the wife's name with a view to screen the property from creditors. In Rahiman Beebi v. Khathoon Bee (1916) 4 L.W. 193 and Thulasi Ammal v. The Official Receiver Coimbatore (1934) 67 M.L.T. 541 reference has been made to the terms of Section 82 of the Trusts Act and an attempt has been made to read the observations of the Judicial Committee in earlier cases consistently with the provisions of that section. The observations of their Lordships in Ismail Mussajee Mookerdum v. Hafiz Boo (1906) 16 M.L.J. 166: L.R. 33 I.A. 86: I.L.R. 33 Cal. 773 at 784 (P.C.) and of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Thulasi Ammal v. The Official Receiver, Coimbatore (1934) 67 M.L.T. 541 also show that where the motive alleged for a benami transaction itself suggests that the purpose in view could be served only by a genuine transfer and not by a mere benami transaction, the more reasonable inference is that the transfer was intended to be operative as a transfer of the beneficial interest and not as a mere benami transaction.