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8. For the assessment years 1958-59 to 1962-63 (the relevant previous years being the immediately preceding financial years), the Income-tax Officer ("ITO", for short) brought to tax the property income derived by the assessed. Rejecting its claim for exemption under s. 4(3)(i)/s. 11 of the 1923/1961 Act. In his view the assessed was a political party and, as its dominant objects were political, they could not be said to be charitable. He relied for this conclusion on the decision in the case Lokamanya Tilak Justice National Trust Fund, In re , and distinguished the cases of All India Spinners' Association [1944] 12 ITR 482 (PC), and Tribune Trust [1938] 7 ITR 415 (PC), relied on for the assessed. He pointed out that in the case of the All India Spinners' Association, the court had to consider an organisation, which, though a creation of the All India Congress Committee, had nothing to do with the political aims of the latter and had purely social objects which were charitable. In the Tribuno case, against, the Privy Council drew a distinction between the case of a trust for conducting a newspaper as a mere vehicle for the promotion of a particular political or fiscal opinion which will not be entitled to exemption under s. 4(3)(i) as a charity and the case where a newspaper in conducted with the object of disseminating news and ventilating opinion on matters of public interest but acquires a particular political complexion in doing so, which would be. In his view, the dominant object of the Sabha was political and all the other aims and objects mentioned were subsidiary to the main political aim.

27. In the present case an objection was raised by the Revenue at an earlier stage that the property of the assessed cannot be said to be held under trust as there was no written or registered trust deed. But this objection is not now pressed, if we may say so, correctly for the purposes of s. 4(3)(i)/s. 11, a trust deed is not necessary. It is sufficient if there is a legal obligation on the part of persons deriving the income to apply it wholly or in part for the charitable purposes. This is now clear from Expln. 1 to s. 13 and was previously clear from s. 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act. Such a legal obligation can be created by the rules and regulations under which the owner of the income functions. This in indeed a proposition well settled by the decision of the Privy Council in All India Spinners Association v. CIT [1944] 12 ITR 482. The second aspect is that, for the purposes of exemption, the assessed should prove either that all its objects are charitable within the meaning of s. 2(15) or that a specific or identifiable part of its income is obligatory applicable for such purposes. It is not sufficient that some of the object are charitable and some noncharitable. In that event, if the trustees have a discretion to apply the income to any of the objects charitable or non-charitable, they could legitimately utilise the income for the non-charitable purposes and so cannot be aid to be under a legal obligation to apply the income wholly or in part for the charitable purposes. In a case where the objects are distributive, each and everyone of the objects must be charitable in order that the trust may be upheld as a valid charity. These propositions are well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Krishna warriar , East India Industries (Madras) P. Ltd. v. CIT and Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfrs. Association . Hence, it is necessary for the present assessed to establish either that all the objects of the Sabha are charitable or, that even though there are some charitable and some non-charitable objects, the executive committee of the Sabha is obliged, by its constitution, to apply a definite portion of its income for such of the purposes as may be aid to be charitable. With these preliminary notions cleared up, we may not proceed to consider the situation in the present case.

"The abolition of religious tests, the disestabilshment of the Church, the secularization of education, the alteration of the law touching religion or marriage, or the observation of the Sabbath. Are purely political objects. Equity has always refused to recognize such objects as charitable. It is true that a gift to an association formed for their attainment may, if the association be unincorporated, be upheld as an absolute gift to its members, or, if the association be incorporated, ass an absolute gift to the corporate body; but a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal. For every one is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and, therefore, cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift. The same considerations apply when there is a trust for the publication of a book. The court will examine the book, and if its objects be charitable in the legal sense it will give effect to the trust as a good charity: Thornton v. Howe [1862] 31 Beav. 14; but if its object be political it will refuse to enforce the trust: De Themmines v. De Bonneval [1828] 5 Russ. 288. If, therefore, there be a trust in the present case it is clearly invalid. The fact, if it be the fact, that one or other of the objects specified in the society's memorandum is charitable would make no difference. There would be no means of discriminating what portion of the gift was intended for a charitable and what portion for a political purpose, and the uncertainty in this respect would be fatal."

41. On behalf of the appellant-trustees it was contended before the Supreme Court that the learned judges of the High Court had erred in considering that there were two objects to be subserved by the trust for the attainment of which it was founded. According to them, there was only a single object and that object was political in nature and consequently not a charitable purpose within the meaning of the law. His next submission was that, even if there were two objects held by the High Court. They were not really independent objects but both of them were dominated by a single purpose which was political in nature. At the base of both the interpretations of the deed lay the submission that the object to be attained by the trust was political and if so it was not charitable. It is this contention that the court had to deal with.