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319). It is pointed out that the trial is not likely to take place in the near future and it is quite inappropriate to keep the petitioner in custody till the trial is over. He therefore prays for grant of bail.

4. Learned Public Prosecutor very vehemently opposed the petition. It was pointed out by her that the petitioner, having turned an approver and granted pardon by the JFCM court, cannot be released on bail in view of Section 306(4) Cr.P.C. That is a mandatory provision and that being one of the conditions under which pardon was granted cannot be waived by any court. Even the inherent power available to this court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to get over the interdiction imposed by Section 306 (4) Cr.P.C., which is intended to protect an accused, who had turned as approver. Learned Public Prosecutor distinguishes the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner by pointing out that that was a case where pardon was granted under Section 307 Cr.P.C. by the Special Court which is infact Sessions Court and in such cases, the prohibition under Section 306(4) Cr.P.C. may not strictly apply. Under such circumstances invoking the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. that this court had granted bail in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is therefore contended that the bail application is only to be dismissed.

10. While Section 306 Cr.P.C. deals with a case of tendering of pardon by the chief Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate, or Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Section 307 Cr.P.C. deals with a situation where pardon is tendered to a person after his case is committed, but before the judgment is pronounced. That necessarily means the provision applies to Sessions trial.

11. In the decision reported in Shammi Firoz's case (supra), on which heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this court considered the scope, and ambit of Section 307 Cr.P.C. since the pardon in the said case was tendered by the Special Court acting as the Sessions Court. This court observed in the said decision that once pardon is tendered to an accused, he ceases to be an accused and therefore Section 439 Cr.P.C. does not apply and this court under its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can grant bail. This court has also occasion to observe that having tendered pardon under Section 307 Cr.P.C., the prohibition under Section 306(4) Cr.P.C. does not apply.

12. There is a clear distinction between the power that is exercised under Sections 306 and 307 Cr.P.C. While power conferred under Section 306 Cr.P.C. is exercised before the committal of the case, Section 307 Cr.P.C. comes into play only after the committal is made to a court for trial of the offence. The consequences of the person who is tendered pardon in not complying with the condition of pardon has already been referred to.

13. In the case on hand, it is conceded that the petitioner was tendered pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. by the court which took cognizance of the offence and not by the court to which the case is committed.

20. It therefore follows that even though the Sessions Court has not referred to these aspects, the Sessions court was justified in refusing to grant bail to the petitioner.

21. In the light of the clear interdiction and prohibition under Section 306(4) Cr.P.C., it is not possible to entertain the contention that once tendered pardon, the person ceases to be an accused and thereafter under Section 482 Cr.P.C., bail can be granted cannot be countenanced. At least in the case covered by Section 306 Cr.P.C., where pardon is tendered by either the CJM or Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class in the circumstances already made mention of, the interdiction under Section 306(4) Cr.P.C. clearly applies and the court is precluded from releasing the petitioner from custody except possibly by Apex Court exercising its plenary powers.