Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

16. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarized in 1985 by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) Al. ER. 935, (commonly known.as CCSU case) as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community, Lord Diplock observed in this case as follows:-

"....... Judicial review has I think, developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That, is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds, I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community. "

20. In State of N.C.T. of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo 2005 AIR SCW 1987 the Supreme Court in paragraphs 16 and 18 held as follows:-

"16 ..One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is 'illegality' the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety."

..

18. The Court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient."

23 The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, in fact he had not contravened any of the terms and conditions in respect of the basement, the ground floor, services floor or the first floor. These are essentially questions of fact. Upon an inspection having been made, the petitioner was clearly found to be using the said floors against the terms and conditions set out by NOIDA. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner to which he submitted a reply making only a bald denial. Indeed if the ground floor was being used as a parking place, the petitioner could have substantiated his case by placing the receipts/documents/photographs in support of his contention but the petitioner did not do so and only made a bald denial. Similar is the position with the other floors. Even in this petition the petitioner has merely stated in paragraph-XXII that it has been using all the floors of the building only in accordance with the permissible limits as mentioned in Clauses (X) and (XII) of the lease deed dated 8th August, 1990. No material has been placed before us to take a contrary view. We are, therefore, unable to hold that there was any manifest error in the exercise of administrative power or the exercise of such power was manifestly arbitrary. There is no illegality or procedural impropriety and the finding of fact recorded in the impugned order that the petitioner was utilizing the various floors contrary to the use provided for in the lease deed cannot said to be perverse.