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3. The defendants have filed the written statement and contested the claim. As the 6th defendant namely, Kailash Chandra Gaur alone has preferred this appeal, I feel it would be sufficient to consider the defence of the 6th defendant alone. It is the case of the 6th defendant that he was one of the Directors of the 1st defendant company and he tendered resignation of his Directorship on 6.7.1984, and the 1st defendant company by its letter dated 6.7.1984 addressed to the plaintiff Bank informed about the resignation of the appellant/6th defendant and requested the Bank to relieve him from all the obligations as a guarantor. The 6th defendant also sent a reminder to the Bank on 15.5.1985, requesting the Bank to relieve him from the guarantorship and the Bank by its letter dated 12.6.1985 had informed the 6th defendant that the matter was taken up with their higher authorities for consideration. That thereafter, the plaintiff Bank had not sent any communication to the 6th defendant and even to the legal notice sent to him, the 6th defendant by his reply dated 10.8.1992, made his position clear that he was not liable for any amount due to the plaintiff Bank. The 6th defendant denied his liability mainly on the ground of his resignation as Director of the company and revocation of guarantee as early as on 6.7.1984.

8. Now the question is whether the guarantee executed by the 6th defendant, which is a continuing guarantee shall remain in force till all the amounts due and payable to the Bank remains unpaid as per Clause 7 of Ex. A-23 and A-24. It is true that the guarantee executed by the 6th defendant is a continuing guarantee as per Clause 7 of the said agreement. A continuing guarantee is a guarantee which extends to a series of transactions, as defined in Section 129 of the Indian Contract Act. But, however, a continuing guarantee can be revoked at any time but only in respect of the future transactions by notice to the creditor as postulated in Section 130 of the Contract Act. Nothing is immortal in this world. All creations are subjected to decay and destruction guarantee is also liable to revocation. As such, continuing guarantee does not mean that it is perpetual and would continue till one's life time or as long as the sun and moon exist. It is, therefore, clear that the continuing guarantee is not a perpetual one and the same is subject to revocation by the surety and the limitation is that would enure only in respect of future transactions and such revocation by a notice to the creditor.

9. It is the case of the appellant that he by his letter dated 8.7.1984, informed the Bank about his resignation from the Directorship of the 1st defendant company on 6.7.1984, and the same was accepted by the Bank. But the said fact is being disputed by the respondent Bank. On going through the documents filed by the appellant and the respondent Bank, the letter dated 8.7.1984 said to have been sent by the appellant to the respondent Bank is marked as Ex. D7 and the same is being disputed by the respondent Bank. The appellant has not chosen to file the acknowledgement for the same and in the absence of the same, we cannot safely accept that the appellant had sent the said letter to the Bank on 8.7.1984. But, however, in the letter dated 15.5.1985 (Ex. D8) addressed to the respondent Bank, the appellant once again informed about his resignation and revocation of guarantee and also mentioned that he had already conveyed the same to the Bank vide his letter dated 8.7.1984, along with the copy of the letter received by the Bank from M/s. Movers Private Ltd, which was also addressed to the Bank to relieve him from his liabilities to which the respondent Bank replied on 12.6.1985 (Ex. D9), wherein they state that they are in receipt of the letter dated 15.5.1985 received by them on 12.6.1985 in which the Bank had informed the appellant that they are taking up the matter with the higher authorities with regard to relieving him from the liability as a guarantor to the 1st defendant company. But there is a rider stating that they will communicate to the appellant in the matter, after hearing from their higher authorities in this regard and further stated that his liability continues to exist as a guarantor. From Exhs. D8 and D9, one thing is made clear that the appellant had already informed about his resignation as a Director and the revocation of his liability and the same was also duly informed to the Bank requesting the Bank to relieve him from the guarantee as the said fact was also reiterated in Ex. D8 and, therefore, the factum of the resignation and revocation of the guarantee by the appellant was also confirmed by the Bank in letter dated 12.6.1985 (Ex. D9). But what all the Bank would say is that relieving the appellant from the liability has got to be considered by their higher authorities and till such time his guarantee continues. It is for the Bank to accept or not to accept, and the guarantor cannot wait till such time and the revocation would take place from the date of notice by the guarantor. In our case, the appellant had sent the letter on 6.7.1984 and the respondent Bank under Ex. D9 had accepted the receipt of the letter dated 15.5.1985 and, therefore, the appellant's liability has come to an end on and from 6.7.1984 itself, irrespective of the fact whether it has been accepted by the respondent Bank or not. The appellant's liability would be till the date of resignation and revocation, which was on 6.7.1984. The liability of the appellant under Exhs. A 23 and A 24 are to the extent of Rs. 76,00,000/- and Rs. 4,70,000/- respectively. The appellant's liability is personal in nature and, therefore, he is liable upto a period of three years on and from 6.7.1984, but whereas, the suit was filed only on 29.7.1992. As such, the claim of the Bank is barred by time. In support of this submission, the appellant relied upon the case of Mrs. Margaret Lalita Samuel v. The Indo Commercial Bank Ltd. , wherein it was held, "We are concerned with the period of Limitation for enforcing the liability of the defendant under the surety bond.... We hold that the suit to enforce the liability is governed by Article 115 of the limitation Act and the cause of action arises when the contract of continuing guarantee is broken," The very same view was taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Bank v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. III (2002) BC 261 (DB) : 2002(2) Bankmann 612 (DB). I am in complete agreement with the above said propositions and hold that the claim against the appellant is barred by time.

13. The learned Advocate for the appellant has further argued that the respondent Bank failed to apply the Clayton's Rule i.e. the 1st respondent Bank failed to put the appellant on notice that, with his resignation and revocation of guarantee, a ruling will be made regarding the liability which existed, on the date of revocation of the guarantee. The Bank also did not reserve any right to adjust the future credits towards subsequent advances. That in the absence of any contract in the contrary, all subsequent credits would go to discharge the earlier debt, which existed prior to the date of revocation and if this doctrine had been adopted and followed, the appellant would not be found liable to any extent. In fact, the Bank has not established whether any liability existed even after applying the Clayton's Rule. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent Bank has applied the Clayton's Rule and, therefore, I hold that the appellant is not liable to pay any amount to the respondent Bank.