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4] Petitioner - Mahesh Gajanan Tapase has also questioned the permission granted on 14/10/2017 in the form of prior approval pursuant to the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) of the MCOCA, so also final permission granted under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the MCOCA.

WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc 5] While inviting attention of this court to the prior approval order dated 14/10/2017 made under the signature of the competent authority i.e. Special Inspector General of Police, Kolhapur Range, Kolhapur, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners would urge that, so as to form an opinion against the Petitioners that they are involved in the offence punishable under the provisions of MCOCA, the authority has relied on in all five offences registered with Satara City Police Station viz. (i) C.R. No. 240/2011 for the Offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149, 427 of IPC, (ii) C.R. No.270/2012 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 452, 323, 506, 353, 332 of IPC r/w Section 37(1)(3)/135 of the Maharashtra Police Act, (iii) C.R. No. 699/2014 for the offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 148, 149 and 323 of IPC, (iv) C.R. No.837/2014 for the offences punisbale under Section 395, 120B, 452, 324, 427 323, 504, 506 of IPC r/w Section 37(1)(3)/135 of the Maharashtra Police Act and (v) C.R. No.737/2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 395, 384, 506 of IPC r/w Section 39 of the Maharashtra Money Lenders Act, 1946. While inviting attention of this court to the FIR in each of the aforesaid cases, the submissions are, except the last WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc offence which has resulted in the registration of crime being C.R. 737/2017, rest of the offences are political in nature. 6] As observed hereinabove, Mr. Mundargi would rely on the copies of FIR and other material in respect of the crime referred therein so as to substantiate his claim. According to him, perusal of the said material prima facie would reflect that the authority, while passing the order under Section 23(1)(a) and 23(2), has not applied its mind, as could be inferred from the material available on record for invoking the provisions of MCOCA. He would further add that, acts defined under the provisions of Sections 2(1)(d) "continuing unlawful activity", 2(1)(e) "organised crime" and 2(1)(f) "organised crime syndicate" cannot be inferred from the language and the material on record. He would urge that as far as C.R. No.270/2012 is concerned, Petitioner - Mahesh Gajanan Tapase who was a Vice President of Rashtravadi Youth Congress has been claimed to have committed the said offence, which has political colour. He would further urge that for offences registered under C.R. No.240/2011, maximum punishment is of two years and as such, same cannot be taken into account for invoking the provisions of MCOCA. Further WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc submissions are, C.R. No.699/2014 has a complete political colour, whereas C.R. No.837/2014 pertains to extortion and dacoity wherein no evidence is available, as the Applicant/Petitioner was granted pre- arrest bail in the said matter. He would then urge that there is no material to infer that the Petitioner - Mahesh Gajanan Tapase is connected with any criminal activity prohibited by law and has committed cognizable offence, which is punishable with imprisonment for three years or more. According to him, it is also not demonstrated in the charge-sheet that the Petitioner - Mahesh Gajanan Tapase singly or jointly, as a member of the orgnised crime syndicate, has carried out such violent activity which is criminal in nature and in relation to which for last 10 years more than one charge-sheet is submitted. According to him, it cannot be inferred that the offences alleged against the Petitioner - Mahesh Gajanan Tapase were for pecuniary gain. He would also draw support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. Sate of Maharashtra and Another1, so as to claim that the Petitioners are involved only in the offences under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and other penal statutes. Even if for commission of such 1 (2005) 5 SCC 294 WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc offences punishment provided is more than three years, unless it is established that the Petitioners have committed crime after committing unlawful activity in an organised way through forming syndicate, mens rea for invoking the provisions of MCOCA cannot be inferred. Mr. Mundargi would also draw support from the judgment in the case of State of Maharasthra vs. Rahul Ramchandra Taru 2 so as to claim that for bringing the alleged act within the ambit of MCOCA, it is necessary to demonstrate that there was continuing unlawful activity as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of MCOCA. He would also claim that mere registration of offences under IPC which are cognizable and punishable with imprisonment of more than three years, is not a only requirement. He would also claim that such offences in which accused is acquitted cannot be relied on as is observed in the aforesaid judgment. By inviting attention of this Court to the order of the Supreme Court dated 16/3/2012, it is claimed that the aforesaid view is approved by the Supreme Court. The learned Counsel would also rely on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharasthra vs. Shiva @ Shivaji Ramaji Sonawane & Ors 3 in support of the aforesaid proposition.

2 2011 0 ALLMR (Cri) 2100 3 2015 ALL MR (Cri) 3310 (S.C.) WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc 7] While countering the submissions referred to above, Mrs. Pai, learned APP, would urge that the judgment in the matter of Rahul Ramchandra Taru (supra) was explained in the matter of Sachin Bansilal Ghaiwal vs. State of Maharashtra4. By inviting attention of this Court to para 20 and 21 of the said judgment, her submissions are, the intention of makers of the statue is required to be appreciated by construing intent behind making of such statute. According to her, provisions of statute are required to be construed to make it effective and workable. Such construction which reduces the statute to futility be avoided. She would further urge that judgment in the matter of Rahul Ramchandra Taru (supra) is in the facts of the said case. She would claim that FIR C.R. No. 737/2017 provides for an offence which is punishable for more than three years, as provisions of Section 395 of IPC provides for punishment for more than three years. According to her, for other offences which are referred to, punishment is for more than three years and the offences are committed by the accused in an organised way by forming a syndicate for pecuniary gain. She would further try to embark on the nature of the offences committed and 4 2014 CRI L.J. 4217 WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc allegations against the Petitioners. By inviting attention of this Court to the order of prior approval granted under Section 23(1)(a) of MCOCA, all relevant material required for the same was taken into consideration and the requirement under Section 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f) of the MCOCA was satisfied. It is pointed out that the name of the Petitioners, role and nature of offences committed by each of the Accused is taken into account. As such, she sought dismissal. 8] Considered the rival submissions.

"34. It can, thus, clearly be seen that the purpose behind enacting MCOCA was to curb the activities of the organised crime syndicates or gangs. The perusal of the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons and Preface, in our considered view, does not lead to any narrower meaning that MCOCA has been enacted only for the purpose of curbing activities which involve pecuniary gains or WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc undue economic advantages. The mischief which is sought to be cured by enactment of MCOCA is to curb and control menace of organized crime. The law has been enacted with the hope that the elements spread by the organised crime in the Society can be controlled to a great extent and for minimizing the fear spread in the society. If a narrower meaning as sought to be placed is accepted, it will frustrate the object rather than curing the mischief for which the Act has been enacted".

15] As far as contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the offences alleged to have been committed are not for pecuniary gain but are regular offences under the provisions of IPC and as such the very test of commission of offence for pecuniary gain is not satisfied is concerned, same is also liable to be rejected. Reading of FIR with material collected during investigation in each of the Crime referred to in the order of grant of prior approval demonstrates that the offences, as has been claimed to have been registered with political motive cannot be so inferred. There are specific attributions against the accused persons of commission of offence and their conduct in commission of offence is not in the backdrop of any political scenario WP-2433-19 with WP-4925.19.doc but is an independent act of commission of offence. Involvement of the accused therein prima facie speaks of committing such violent act which is not permissible in law and which is in the form of organised crime committed in calculated and organised manner. The offence committed by organised crime syndicate cannot be inferred from very first offence but it is after consideration of more than one charge-sheet in last 10 years. It could be noticed that there is prima facie material on record which speaks of the criminal act of the Petitioners who have committed offences in organised way. Material on record is required to be appreciated cumulatively, as there is more than one charge- sheet and contents in such charge-sheets are required to be appreciated while invoking the provisions of MCOCA, as has been done in this case. The charge-sheet which is placed on record and statements of witnesses speak of prima facie involvement of the accused persons in commission of crime in organised way through syndicate. That being so, order of invoking provisions of MCOCA for granting prior approval/sanction under Section 23(1)(a) of MCOCA is very much justified.