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11. Incidentally, the defendant appears to have raised in the written statement a plea regarding the nature and extent of the super structure also. While the plaintiff’s case is that the super structure as it existed on the date of the lease deed had been let out to the defendant and the defendant had made structural changes without any authorisation, the defendant’s case is that the super structure was constructed by her at her own cost pursuant to some oral agreement between the parties. It is unnecessary for us to delve deep into that aspect of the dispute, for the nature and extent of superstructure or the legality of the changes allegedly made by the defendant is not relevant to the determination of the question whether the existence of tenancy is admitted by the defendant. At any rate, nature and extent of structure whether modified or even re- constructed by the defendant is a matter that can not alter the nature of the possession which the defendant holds in terms of the agreement executed by her. The relationship of the landlord and the tenant remains unaffected even if the tenant has with or without the consent of the landlord made structural changes in the property. Indeed if the tenancy was protected by the rent law and making of structural changes was a ground for eviction recognised by such law, it may have been necessary to examine whether the structure was altered and if so with or without the consent of the parties. That is not the position in the present case. The tenancy in question is not protected under the Rent Control Act having regard to the fact that the rate of rent is more than Rs. 3500/- per month. It is, therefore, of little significance whether any structural change was made by the defendant and if so whether the same was authorised or otherwise. The essence of the matter is that the relationship of the landlord and the tenant is clearly admitted. That is the most significant aspect to be examined by the Court in a suit for possession especially when the plaintiff seeks a decree on the basis of admissions.

12. That brings us to the second question, namely, whether the tenancy stands terminated either by lapse of time or by a notice served upon the defendant. The defendant-tenant did not have the benefit of a secure term under a registered lease deed. The result was that the tenancy was only a month to month tenancy that could be terminated upon service of a notice in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff’s case in para 6 of the plaint was that a notice was served upon the tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act pointing out that the defendant- tenant had made substantial structural changes in the premises and had not complied with the terms of the lease agreement. The notice was duly served upon the tenant to which the tenant has not replied. Para 6 reads as under:

“That since the defendant had carried out substantial structural changes and further did not comply with the covenants of the lease agreement the plaintiff was compelled to serve a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The said notice was duly served upon the defendant and no reply to the said notice has been received by the plaintiff or its counsel.”

13. In reply, the defendant has not denied the service of a notice upon the defendant. Instead para 6 is entirely dedicated to the defendant’s claim that the whole structure standing on the site today has been constructed by her out of her own money. The defendant has not chosen to deny even impliedly leave alone specifically that notice dated 17th March 2003 was not served upon her. In para 6 of the preliminary objections raised in the written statement she has simply disputed the validity of the notice on the ground that that the same is not in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Para 6, reads as under: