Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

We may, therefore, for the purpose of this case, notice the relevant provisions of Section 299 and Section 300. Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done -

Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done -

Intention

(a) with the intention of causing death ; or (1) with the intention of causing death ; or

(b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or Knowledge

Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan, submitted that only one injury was inflicted by the appellant. A similar question came up for consideration recently in Shajahan & Ors. v State of Kerala & Anr. [2007 (3) SCALE 618] wherein it was held that number of injuries is not decisive. How and in what manner injuries have been caused would be a relevant factor.

Reliance has been placed by Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan on Raj Pal and Others v State of Haryana [(2006) 9 SCC 678]. In that case, it was held;

"17. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special fraity of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words "likely to cause death" occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probability as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury .... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.