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24. Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with issue held that since Section 27(3) of the Arms Act had been declared ultra vires by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in judgment rendered in (2012) 3 SCC 346 State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, the conviction of the petitioner in respect of the said offence could not be taken into account. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court while relying upon Muthuramalingam's case held that sentences in respect of offences under Section 395 IPC and Section 25(1A) and 27(3) of the Arms Act which were to run concurrently could not be reckoned for considering the proposal for premature release as he had already undergone the same. The relevant extract from the said judgment reads herein-under :-

25. The interpretation that can be discerned from above referred exposition is qua "reckoning of sentences" where such sentences are to run concurrently. It has been clarified that a lifer can't be disentitled for being considered merely on accout of other sentences imposed on him. There is no such observation to the effect of multiple offences gets absolutely washed off upon undergoing sentence and is not a consideration while considering eligibility for premature release. Hon'ble the Supreme Court, while making aforesaid observations relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble Constitution Bench of Supreme Court rendered in Muthuramalingam's case (supra), the relevant extract from which reads as under :-

(emphasis supplied)

26. The interpretation by Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam's case (supra), has highlighted the principle enshrined in provisions of Section 427(2) Cr.P.C., to the effect that the term sentences imposed alongwith life sentences are essentially to run concurrently. The said principle cannot be interpreted to mean that while considering the case of the petitioner for his premature release, the offences for which the sentences has already been undergone is to be overlooked. Rather, interestingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthuramalingam's case (supra), held that where multiple life sentences have been awarded, the same would run concurrently but they would be 'superimposed over each other in such a manner' that remission or commutation granted by competent authority in one such sentence, would not ipso facto result in remission of sentence awarded to the prisoner qua to the other.

27. The Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthuramalingam's case (supra) has further clarified in Para 16 that premature release cannot be claimed as a matter of right and is to be granted by the State Government after considering all the relevant factors, as reproduced below :-

CRWP-356-2017 (O&M) ( 18 ) 2023:PHHC:074741 "16. The petitioner would, however, rely on the unreported decision of this Court in Ram Sewak (supra), to contend that this Court may direct the authorities to release the petitioner forthwith and that there is no point in directing further consideration by the State as the petitioner had already undergone over 30 years of sentence and with remission, over 36 years. The order passed by this Court in Ram Sewak (supra), is obviously in the facts of that case. As a matter of fact, it is well settled by now that grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative to be exercised by the competent authority and it is not for the Court to supplant that procedure. Indeed, grant of premature release is not a matter of privilege but is the power coupled with duty conferred on the appropriate Government in terms of sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C., 1973 to be exercised by the competent authority after taking into account all the relevant factors, such as it would not undermine the nature of crime committed and the impact of the remission that may be the concern of the society as well as the concern of the State Government."