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(It must be observed that in Pandey's M.P. Local Acts, the expression "the authority competent to hear appeals" has been misprinted as "the competent authority to hear appeals").

9. Clause (ii) of Section 41 of the Ceiling Act provides for an appeal from an order passed by a competent authority, where such authority is not a Revenue Officer. Such an appeal lies direct to the Board of Revenue.

10. Under Section 41 of the Ceiling Act, an appeal is provided 'against every order of a Revenue Officer or competent authority under this Act, or the rules made thereunder." This section is comprehensive enough. However, the expression "every order" in the section necessarily means an order which affects a right or liability of the appellant. It does not include interlocutory orders which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799, their Lordships considered an analogous provision contained in Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which is in these words:--

11. There is no provision in the Ceiling Act for a second appeal. Section 41 of the Ceiling Act provides for only one appeal. But it would not be right to say that such an appeal lies under Section 44 of the Revenue Code. No doubt, in Section 41 (i) of the Ceiling Act, there is a mention of Section 44 (1) of the Revenue Code, but that is only for economy of words. Instead of reproducing in Section 41 (i) the enumeration of authorities competent to hear appeals, the Legislature thought it sufficient to refer to Section 44 (1) of the Revenue Code. Truly speaking, an appeal lies under Section 41 (i) of the Ceiling Act itself, and not under Section 44 of the Revenue Code. Nor is it an appeal from an order "under the Land Revenue Code", or the rules made thereunder.

46. A reading of Section 41 of the Ceiling Act will go to show that it provides for an appeal against the orders of a revenue officer or a competent authority passed under the Act or the rules made thereunder and it also indicates the authorities who are competent to hear the appeals under that section. It has already been seen that a competent authority is either a Sub-Divisional Officer or a Collector or, if the land of a holder is situate in more than one district, any officer appointed by the State Government under Section 2 (e) (iii). In cases falling under Section 2 (e) (iii) the State Government may appoint a revenue officer or any other offices or authority to be the competent authority. The competent authority may, therefore, be either a revenue officer or any other officer appointed by the State Government. If the competent authority is not a revenue officer, the forum of appeal against the orders of such authority is the Board of Revenue. But if the competent authority is a revenue officer, appeals against the orders of such authority lie to the authority competent to hear appeals under Section 44 (1) of the Land Revenue Code from an order passed by a revenue officer of the same rank under the said Code. Now, the Board of Revenue and other revenue authorities functioning under Section 44 (1) of the Land Revenue Code have been cm-powered to hoar appeals under Section 41 of the Ceiling Act, not as persona designata but as regular appellate authorities which are constituted and function under the Land Revenue Code . As defined in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, which definition has been approved by the Supreme Court, persona designata or means "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character"; (Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 606 at pp. 608, 609; Ramchandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1888 at p. 1889). Tested on this definition, the appellate authorities constituted under the Land Revenue Code while deciding an appeal under Section 41 of the Ceiling Act cannot be said to function as persona designata. For the same reason, revisional authorities under Section 42 of the Ceiling Act are not persona designata but regular revenue authorities constituted under the Land Revenue Code. Indeed, the learned Deputy Advocate General does not dispute this legal position.

For these reasons we are of opinion that orders passed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Ceiling Act are subject to such further appeal or revision as may be open under general provisions of the Land Revenue Code.

49. The next question is as to what are the appeals and revisions which are open under the Land Revenue Code against the orders passed by a revenue authority under Sections 41 and 42 of the Ceiling Act.

For examining this question we have to turn to the provisions in Chapter V of the Land Revenue Code. Section 44 in that Chapter, which we have already extracted, provides for appeals. The section is divided into two sub-sections. The first subsection provides for a first appeal "from every original order under this Code or the rules made thereunder." This sub-section is, therefore, limited to appeals against original orders passed in exercise of the powers conferred by the Code or the rules made thereunder. The second sub-section which deals with second appeals is more general. It provides for a second appeal from "any order passed in first appeal" by certain categories of officers. These words are wide enough to include any appellate order, whether passed under the first sub-section or under any other enactment. The conditions that give rise to a right of second appeal under the second sub-section are: first, that the order sought to be appealed against must be an order passed in first appeal; and secondly, that the order must hove been passed by Sub-Divisional Officer, or Collector, or the Settlement Officer, or the Commissioner. But the order appealed against may be an order passed in first appeal under the first sub-section or any other enactment which will include the Ceiling Act. This construction is supported by the definition of the word "order" given in Section 56, which is the last section in Chapter V of the Code. By this section orders passed under any other enactments for the time being in force are brought in expressly within the meaning of the word "order". This definition must apply for construing the word "order" in the second sub-section of Section 44. In our opinion, therefore, an order passed in appeal under Section 41 of the Ceiling Act by one of the officers mentioned in the second sub-section of Section 44 of the Land Revenue Code will be appealable under that provision.