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(12) Besides, under the old law, it appears, that a wakf would become void for uncertainty. As stated in para 179 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law "the objects of a wakf must be indicated with reasonable certainty; if they are not, the wakf will be void for uncertainty." If we turn to section 10 of the Act on the other hand, it lays down that notwithstanding any law, custom or usage, a public trust shall not be void, only on the ground that the persons or objects for the benefit of whom or which it is created are unascertained or unascertainable. In other words, it creates a certain distinction between the law in that respect as it stood prior to 1950, and thereafter, with the coming in force of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. A special machinery is provided for making inquiries with regard to any such trust properties and apart from any person being entitled to make any such application, even the Assistant or Deputy Charity Commissioner as the case may be, is authoirsed in law to make inquiries in respect of such properties suo motu and that again changes the whole aspect of the applicability of law to trust properties. When such is the position, it can be easily said that the law that governed the properties in dispute in 1928 was fairly different from the one that we have with the coming in force of the Public Trusts Act, 1950 under which the present proceeding stands governed. Any decision, therefore, arrived at in that suit of 1928 cannot stand as a permanent bar to the same from being re-agitated after the coming in force of the Act. The person who filed the application are not the same who were parties in the earlier suit though no doubt they would be covered by reason of the fact that it was a suit of a representative character under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this view of the matter, the principles of res judicata would not operate in respect of the proceeding, before the Deputy Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner. The learned Deputy Charity Commissioner as also the learned Charity Commissioner were, therefore, right in holding that there was no bar by reason of the principles of res judicata arising out of the decision in the earlier litigation decided in a suit filed at Surat. The decision of the learned District Judge is, therefore, not correct in that aspect of the matter and I, therefore, disagree with him. Since there would be no bar by reason of the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata, the matter shall have to be proceeded further by the trial Court in accordance with law.