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30. From all these, it is evident that there was no valid First Information Statement as contemplated under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. in this case, till 8 p.m. on 22.02.2004. It seems that PW7 had prepared a statement of his own as Ext.P1 and obtained the signature of PW1 in it by about 8 p.m. on 22.02.2004 at her house. PW7 has no case that the police had any business at the house of PW1, during the night on 22.02.2004. The case forwarded by the learned Senior Counsel that no crime was registered, as averred by the police in this case, seems to be correct.

Failure of the prosecution to provide any explanation much less a plausible one shows that the investigating agency had no clue about the perpetrators of the crime at the time when it reached the spot or soon thereafter nor did anyone claim to have seen the assailants, for otherwise there was no reason why they could not be named and an FIR registered immediately."

38. The learned Public Prosecutor has made strenuous attempts to canvass an argument that the FIR in this case cannot be treated as ante-timed even when it is shown that the signature of PW1 was obtained during the night at 8 p.m. even when the FIR is timed as one registered at 9 a.m. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, at the most it can be considered that when the investigating officer could trace out that Ext.P1, on the basis of which the crime was already registered, was not signed, the investigating officer has obtained the signature of PW1 who was the informant at a later point of time and, therefore, it was only an inadvertent error which cannot vitiate the registration of the crime. We are unable to comprehend the said argument because of the fact that in order to form a statement within the meaning of Section 154 Cr.P.C., the statement should be a signed one. Further, as per sub-section 2 to Section 154 Cr.P.C., a copy of such a statement recorded in writing and signed by the informant should be duly served on the informant forthwith. We cannot imagine that PW7, who is an experienced Assistant Sub Inspector of Police who had almost 27 years of service, was unaware of the provisions contained in Section 154 Cr.P.C. The fingers point towards his lapse in not recording the F.I.Statement and in not registering the crime at the earliest. It has come out in evidence that he was present in the hospital even during the night of the incident and it was he who took the deceased to the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam. Therefore, it is his admitted case that he could see PW1 and PW2. He has given a false explanation that he could not obtain the presence of PW1 in order to get the F.I.Statement recorded then and there, as PW1 had accompanied the deceased to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. It is the admitted case of PW1 that she had never accompanied the deceased to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, whereas she along with her mother PW2 continued to be there at the Community Health Centre, Kothamangalam till the next morning as inpatients.

This is not a case wherein PW7 had registered the crime on an extraneous information from somebody or on his own information received by him while he was taking the deceased to the hospital from the courtyard of the house of A1 to A3. Had the crime been registered on the basis of such an extraneous information or on the own information of PW7 which could be gathered legitimately or on the basis of the GD entry of the police station, it could have been said that the absence of signature in Ext.P1 statement is of no consequence at all. In such case, Ext.P1 will have no fault at all as it could not have been treated as the F.I.Statement within the meaning of Section 154 Cr.P.C.

41. The learned Public Prosecutor has relied on the decision in State of M.P. Vs. Mansingh and others [(2003) 10 SCC 414] by pointing out that the Apex Court has held that the evidence of witness cannot be discarded merely because of the fact that the statement of that witness recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. does not contain the signature of that witness. We are in respectful agreement with that proposition. The procedure under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is a part of judicial proceedings. In that case, such statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. are relevant and admissible under two provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Firstly, it is a public document within the meaning of Section 74(iii) of the Indian Evidence Act. Secondly, the presumption under Section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act is available to such a document. The same cannot be equated with a F.I.Statement recorded by the police under Section 154 Cr.P.C.