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(ii) (2013) 3 MLJ 513 (Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, Chennai and others vs. Era. Selvam and another) "2. The learned Advocate General appearing for the appellants based on the contentions raised in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions and grounds raised in the writ appeals argued that pamphlets published by the Organisers of the procession and pubic meeting causes great concern for the Police authorities in maintaining peace and tranquility and public order and the conduct of political party, which is organising the same, when such procession and meetings were conducted earlier, there were traffic hazards and law and order problem arose, and bearing the said issues in mind the request to conduct procession was considered and then a show cause notice was issued to the organiser in relation to the procession. The respondents in these writ appeals who filed writ petitions before the learned single Judge submitted explanation to the show cause notice on 10.4.2013 and without waiting for the orders to be passed by the third appellant herein, the petitioners have rushed to this Court by filing the above writ petitions on 11.4.2013 and prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus to hold procession and conduct public meeting. The learned Advocate General relied on the decisions reported in (2004) 4 SCC 684 (State of Karnataka v. Dr.Praveen Bhai Togadia); (2012) 5 SCC 1 (Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re); Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2004 (5) CTC 554 (Rama Muthuramalingam V. DSP, Mannargudi) and two other decisions of learned single Judge of this Court and contended that the authorities have to decide the grant of permission to hold procession and for conducting public meeting based on the ground realities and this Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions and issued directions and the Law Enforcing authorities are the best judges to assess the prevailing situation in the area, where the permission is sought to conduct procession/public meeting. The learned Advocate General further reiterated that the pamphlets published by the organisers causes worry and if the permission sought for are granted, it may cause disturbance in caste clashes as certain areas in the State are still under the grip of caste tension.

29. It is thus evident that public order is a matter within the domain of the State Legislature and the State Executive. That being so, it is not proper for the Judiciary to interfere in matters relating to public order, unless there is violation of some constitutional or statutory provision. There are various considerations for the administration in this matter and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with administrative decisions in this connection. It must be remembered that certain matters are by their very nature such as had better be left to the experts in the field instead of the courts themselves seeking to substitute their own views and perceptions as to what is the best way to deal with the situation. In the present case, this Court should not interfere in a matter which relates to the administration, which is in the best position to know about the public order. What public order problem would arise if speeches are permitted or prohibited in connection with the arrest of Sankarachariyar and other incidental matters? How should the problem be tackled? It is the administration that best knows these problems and their solution. This Court should therefore exercise self-restraint and should not embarrass the administrative authorities in this connection.

43. Having laid down the broad principles, we may now come to the facts of the present case. The order dated 15.11.2004 by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mannargudi has already been quoted above in this judgment. The said order has denied permission for holding a public meeting as prayed for by the appellant. Against that order the appellant filed a writ petition before this Court, which has been disposed off by the learned single Judge by his order dated 23.11.2004. In the impugned order, the learned single Judge permitted the appellant to approach the competent executive authority for seeking permission to hold a public meeting, as prayed for, and directed the said authority to pass appropriate orders within three days of the receipt of the application, provided the appellant-Kazhagam did not create any law and order problem in the locality, nor affect the public peace and tranquility. To this extent the directions of the learned single Judge are unexceptionable. However, in our opinion, the further direction of the learned single Judge in paragraph-10 of his order that the appellant should not speak about the arrest of the Sankarachariyar in the alleged murder case, nor justify the same, nor speak with reference to the investigation connected therewith, were uncalled for and unnecessary. The learned single Judge should have left it entirely to the administrative authorities to decide in their discretion and on the facts of the case, whether speaking about the arrest of the Sankarachariyar or justifying the same or speaking with reference to the investigation connected therewith would create any law and order problem or affect the public order. In our opinion, the entire matter should have been left at the discretion of the administrative authorities, who are best equipped to decide what would disrupt the public order or the law and order situation and what would not. By saying that the appellant should not speak about the arrest of the Sankarachariyar, nor justify the same, nor speak with reference to the investigation connected therewith, the learned single Judge has in fact taken over the task of the administrative authorities, which was not within his domain. It is entirely for the administrative authorities to decide whether speaking about the arrest of the Sankarachariyar or justifying the same or speaking with reference to the investigation would create any law and order or public order problem or not.

44. In the circumstances, we modify the direction contained in paragraph 10 of the impugned order and we leave it entirely to the discretion of the administrative authorities to decide whether permitting the appellant-Kazhagam to hold a public meeting, as prayed for, or whether speaking about the arrest of the Sankarachariyar and justifying the same, or speaking with reference to the investigation connected therewith would create a law and order or public order problem or not. If the administrative authorities feel that it may create a law and order or public order problem, then they may prohibit such activities. With the above observations, this writ appeal is disposed of. No costs."