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4. Heard Mr. Milon Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Amarnath Sen, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Sarthak Nayak, learned counsel for the CBI.

5. Mr. Mukherjee would argue that the materials on record even accepted on their face value are not enough to impute any criminal liability on the petitioners, inasmuch as there is absolutely nothing to show that the petitioner No.1 Company was ever engaged in any chit fund business. It had entered into an agreement with M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. in ordinary course of its business without having any knowledge that the money invested by the said Company was tainted being collected as deposits from general public through different schemes. Mr. Mukherjee would further contend that the fact of investment of Rs.2.50 crores made by M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. in the petitioner No.1 Company was duly recorded in its books of accounts which were produced before the Investigating Officer during investigation. Therefore, submission of charge sheet under various provisions of the PCMCS Act is entirely misconceived. Mr. Mukherjee would further submit that in so far as the order of the Court below in issuing NBW against petitioner No.3 is concerned, the same is also bad in law for the reason that the petitioner No.3 had fully cooperated with the investigation at all times and there is nothing to show that he had not done so. Several notices were issued under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. to the Petitioner No.1 Company which petitioner No.2 responded by submitting all relevant documents. He even appeared before the I.O. and his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was also recorded. Petitioner No.3 had also appeared before the Investigating Officer on 10.05.2016 but he could not do so pursuant to notice dated 26.06.2020 as he was in U.S.A. and travel restrictions were in place because of Covid-19 pandemic. Nevertheless he had duly complied with the notice by sending the documents asked for not only on that occasion but also thereafter. Thus, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be held that petitioner No.3 had not cooperated with the investigation. Mr. Mukherjee therefore, submits that the Investigating Officer has not produced any material whatsoever to show that the petitioner No.3 had not cooperated with the investigation. Mr. Mukherjee further argues that even otherwise, the Court below could not have directly issued NBW without being satisfied that the same was justified on the facts of the case instead of mechanically accepting the version of the I.O. as noted in the charge sheet. To buttress his contentions as above, Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1; Siddhartha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 676; Aman Preet Singh vs. C.B.I., reported in AIR, 2021 SC 4154; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51; and Samshad Alam vs. Assistant Director E.D. (CRLMC No. 2220 of 2023)

On merits of the case, Mr. Nayak would argue that there being clear proof of collection of huge funds by M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. over a long period of time by floating different schemes to allure the gullible depositors, it cannot be believed for a moment that the petitioner No.1 Company had no knowledge of its activities. Further, it is also difficult to believe that despite entering into a business transaction to the tune of Rs. 10 crores for a township project with M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd., the petitioner No.1 Company and its Directors would be oblivious of its nature of business and reputation in the market. Therefore, acceptance of a sum of Rs.2.50 crores by the petitioner No.1 Company from M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. has to prima facie be treated as an acceptance of a portion of the ill-gotten money of the said Company. Mr. Nayak would further argue that the contentions raised by the petitioners are such as can only be examined during trial as the same forms their defence in the case. Therefore, according to Mr. Nayak, no case for interference by this Court is made out at the threshold.

Regarding Merits.

11. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel argued at length in his attempt to persuade the Court that the simple act of accepting deposit of Rs.2.50 Crores by the Petitioner No.1 Company from M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. cannot by itself be viewed with suspicion to such extent as to implicate it and its Directors in the case, particularly when there is nothing to show that it had ever indulged in any chit fund business or had any role to play in such business allegedly carried out by M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. The bonafides of the petitioner No.1 Company can be further seen from the fact that acceptance of the deposit of Rs. 2.50 crores has not been concealed by it but duly endorsed in its books of accounts. The petitioner No.1- Company has further proved its bonafides by depositing Rs.1.50 crores in the Court below during pendency of this case being permitted by this Court, which is in addition to the amount of Rs.1.50 crores already secured by the CBI freezing the account. Thus, the entire financial liability, if at all of the petitioner Company has been squared off.

12. The principles relating to quashing of proceedings by invoking power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. have been laid down by Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which has been subsequently followed by numerous pronouncements of the Apex Court and different High Courts of the country. Without delving into the details of such guidelines it would suffice to note that this Court would exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to give effect to any provision of the Code and to secure ends of justice. On going through the arguments advanced by Mr. Mukherjee, this Court feels persuaded to rather accept the contentions put forth by Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for CBI that what is essentially being raised at this stage is nothing but the defence of the accused. It is trite that cognizance of offence in a criminal case can be taken if prima facie material exists to show commission of the offence. Similarly, charge can be framed against the offenders if on the materials collected by prosecution a grave suspicion arises that the accused persons may have committed the alleged offence. In the case at hand there is prima facie evidence that M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. had indulged in illegal collection deposits from depositors though several schemes floated by it. It is also prima facie borne out from the record that said Company had committed to invest Rs. 10 crores in a project undertaken by the petitioner Company, out of which a sum of Rs. 2.50 crores was paid. This, by itself shows a tangible link between M/s. Tower Infotech Ltd. and the petitioner No.1-Company, which is enough to sustain a criminal proceeding. It must be kept in mind that it was on the direction of the Apex Court that investigation of the present case as also the cases involving 43 other companies was transferred to the CBI for investigation.