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Showing contexts for: collateral attack in P.S. Menon vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 2 April, 1969Matching Fragments
In relation to the contention that there was no properly constituted Public Service Commission in the State of Travancore-Cochin, it is urged that the Public Service Commission that has been functioning in the State had been validly appointed, and an alternative contention has also been raised by the first respondent, the State of Kerala and the respondents 6 and 8 that in these proceedings for the issue of writ of quo warranto as against respondents 4 to 21, no point can be raised about the validity of the con-j stitution of the Public Service Commission or the appointment of the members of the Commission as this will amount to a collateral attack on the Public Service Commission and its members who were admittedly discharging the functions of the Public Service Commission purporting to have been duly constituted.
It is also urged that the provisions contained in the rules framed on 3-10-1953 are against the terms of Article 234 as they have not been framed after consultation with the Public Service Commission. We do not consider that we should deal with this question in this case or with the question as to whether the Public Service Commission had been duly constituted for we are of the view that there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution in the matter of appointment of respondents 4 to 21 as contended by the first respondent and respondents 6 and 8 and that the petitioners are not entitled to question the validity or otherwise of the constitution of the Public Service Commission and the appointment of its members as this will amount to a collateral attack on the constitution of the Public Service Commission and the appointment of its members.
This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the Public and individuals in-volved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law. But although these officers are not officers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid. (See American Jurisprudence, Volume 43, Section 470 underj the heading De Facto Officers). Apart from this, the petitioner cannot in this writ petition be permitted to raise the point that there has been no properly constituted Public Service Commission and no properly appointed members thereof as this will amount to a collateral, attack on the Public Service Commission and its members. The second prayer in this petition is for the issue of a writ of quo warranto against respondents 4 to 21. The other prayers are incidental to this relief. There is thus no direct attack against the members of the Public Service Commission. Even if there was a direct attack by the petitioner as a citizen the acts of the Public Service Commission have to be protected on the basis of the de facto doctrine at this distance of time. The consultation made with the members of the Public Service Commission who actually functioned before 3-10-63 when rules were framed under Article 234 of the Constitution and at the time of the framing of the rules under Article 234 of the Constitution must therefore be taken to be consultations with the Public Service Commission duly constituted. The principle that there can be no collateral attack has been dealt with by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the decision in Parameswaran Pillai Bhaskaran Pillai v. State Prosecutor, reported in AIR 1951 Trav Co 45. After an elaborate survey of the law of the subject it was held:
"The right ,of a de facto Judge to hold his office is not open to question nor is his jurisdiction subject to attack in a collateral proceeding. . . .To raise the competency of the Chief Justice to hear and decide certain appeals when they were taken up for hearing or in the proceeding for leave to anpeal to the Supreme Court against that judgment, or in the appeal before the Supreme Court would amount to collateral attack."
The particular case arose on an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court and one of the grounds raised in that application was that the Chief Justice of the High Court was not validly appointed. This contention was negatived. The principle of the decision must apply to the facts of this case as well. No decision was cited before us which has taken a different view.