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"(xviii) the collection of any information or statistics in respect of raw silk or any product of silk;

(xix) the manner in which raw silk shall be graded and marketed;

(xx) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.

In the context of these provisions the short argument which has been pressed before us was dealt with by the High Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 which can be conveniently set out:

13. The first question to be examined in this context is, whether the amending legislations are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. It was urged that silk industry is a controlled industry declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest under Entry 52 of List 1. By section 2 of the Central Silk Boards Act, 1948. Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the Public interest that the Union should take under its control the silk industry. Again, by Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the first Schedule to the Act. Item 23(4) of the first Schedule thereunder specifies "textile (including those dyed, printed or otherwise processed) made wholly or part of silk, including silk yarn and hosiery". Having regard to these provisions and Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, the State Legislature, as urged for the petitioners, has no power to enact the impugned Acts:

14. It seems to us that this argument is bereft of substance. It is now well settled by a series of pronouncements of the Supreme Court commencing with Tika Ramji and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. page 676 down to the decision in Ganga Sagar Corporation Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. page 286 that merely because an industry is controlled industry as declared by Parliament under Entry 52 in List I, the State is not deprived of its legitimate power to legislate within its own sphere in respect of such industry.

(ii) the process of manufacture or production; and

(iii)the distribution of the products of the industry.

Legislation in regard to raw materials would be permissible under Entry 27 of List 2, notwithstanding a declaration of the industry under Entry 52 to be one within the purview of parliamentary legislation. The process of manufacture or production can be legislated on by States under Entry 24 of List 2 so long as the industry is not a controlled industry within the meaning of Entry 7 or Entry 52 of List I. So far as the third aspect viz. the distribution of the products of the industry are concerned, the State Legislature would be quite competent to legislate thereto in regard thereto under Entry 27 of List II. However, when the industry is also a controlled industry legislation in regard to the products of the industry would be permissible by both the Central and the State Legislatures by virtue of Entry 33 of List 3. This in short is the decision of the High Court based, as already pointed out on a series of decisions of this Court. Observations by this Court to a like effect in Calcutta Gas Co. (P) Ltd. v. State, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 1 may also be seen. We entirely agree with this view.

We are of the opinion that it is unnecessary, for the purposes of the present case, to consider the contentions raised in the I. T. C. case (supra). That was a case in which the State enactment was held to be competent by the High Court on the narrow ground that the central legislation covered only virginia tobacco and did not deal with the industry in so far as it related to other varieties of tobacco. On a consideration of the provision of the Act, this Court came to the conclusion that this interpretation of the Act was not correct and that the central legislation did purport to regulate and control 'the entire tobacco industry. In the light of this conclusion the court declared the State law to be incompetent, having regard to the provisions of Entry 52 of List I and the declaration in the Indian Tobacco Act under that provision. In the present case, however, the matter is on a totally different footing. It is true that the Central Silk Board Act purports to control the raw silk industry in the territory of India. But, as pointed out by the High Court in the light of the earlier decisions of this Court therein referred to the control of the industry vested in Parliament was only restricted to the aspect of production and manufacture of silk yarn or silk. It did not obviously take in the earlier stages of the industry, namely, the supply of raw materials. For instance, as already pointed out, even in regard to the silk industry, the reeling, production, development and distribution of silkworm seeds and cocoons was regulated by Act 5 of 1960. These items can be perhaps legitimately described as the raw materials of the silk industry. The control being vested in Parliament under Entry 52 of silk industry did not in view of the earlier ruling of this Court affect the control over these raw materials. This is perhaps the reason why the industry did not challenge the provisions of the 1959 Act, when it was originally enacted, on the ground that is now being put forward. The present legislation, as a result of the amendments, controls the supply and distribution of the goods produced by the industry. As rightly pointed out by the High Court this is the third aspect of the industry which falls outside the purview of the control postulated under Entry