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(i) Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting; (ii) Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Design; (iii) Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Operation; (iv) Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants. Those Codes are intended to establish the objectives and to set the minimum requirements that have been fulfilled to provide assurance that nuclear power plants will be sited, designed, constructed and operated without undue risk to personnel, public and environment. The Code of Practice for Nuclear Power Plant Siting provides appropriate criteria and outlines the procedures to be applied to assess the suitability of a site for the location of nuclear power plant taking into account, the operational requirements and accidental conditions. The same has to be prepared following the criteria laid down by DAE for selection of site and the relevant IAEA documents under the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme specially the Code of Practice for Nuclear Power Plant Siting and similar documents from various leading countries. The Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting was issued by the AERB on March 9, 1990. The Code encompasses site-related characteristics, natural events and man-induced events specific to the site which will have a bearing on the safety of the plant and the radiological impact on the environment and population due to the location of NPP at the site. The Code also lays down appropriate criteria and outlines the procedures for assessing the suitability of a site taking into account the operational requirements and accident conditions. The Code also indicates the extent of site-related information required to be obtained and also defines site-related design bases. Certain man-induced events like war, acts of sabotage which can cause large scale damage to the plant safety systems, however, are beyond the scope of 1990 Code, in other words, the Code prescribes minimum requirements in siting considerations for limiting the radiological impact. The main aim is protection of man and his environment. The Code outlined the requirements for limiting doses to man.
i) External Events
ii) Design
iii) Severe Accident Management and Recovery (Onsite)
iv) National Organisations
v) Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post-Accident Management (Offiste)
vi) International Cooperation
71. The Government of India also submitted a National report in May 2012 on the actions taken for Indian NPPs, subsequent to Fukushima Nuclear Accident to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in the Second Extraordinary Meeting of contracting parties, held in August 2012 at Vienna.
|Sr. |Recommendations |Status |Completion | |No. | | |Schedule | |3. |Mobile self-powered |Two fire tenders with |April 2013 | | |pumping equipment for |diesel operated pump is | | | |emergency use. |available at site. | | | | |To augment the capacity, | | | | |two additional fire | | | | |tenders are being | | | | |procured and made | | | | |available. Chassis has | | | | |been procured and | | | | |fabrication of the fire | | | | |tender is in progress. | | |4. |Facility for monitoring|Present design of KKNPP |April 2013 | | |safety parameters using|envisages 24 hour battery| | | |portable power packs. |bank for monitoring | | | | |parameters and 2 hour | | | | |battery bank for valve | | | | |operation during an event| | | | |of station blackout. | | | | |In order to extent the | | | | |duration of the | | | | |monitoring for not less | | | | |than 7 days, portable DG | | | | |sets will be connected to| | | | |the instruments for | | | | |monitoring safety | | | | |parameters. One portable| | | | |DG set is readily | | | | |available for use at | | | | |site. | | | | |Portable measuring | | | | |devices are also | | | | |available at site for | | | | |local monitoring. | | |6. |Primary Containment to |Based on design margins |Long Term. | | |be assessed for |available, it has been |Under progress. | | |Ultimate Load Bearing |assessed that for primary| | | |Capacity (ULBC). |containment, Ultimate | | | | |Load Baring Capacity | | | | |(ULBC) is at least 1.5 | | | | |times Design Basis | | | | |Accident (DBA) value. | | | | |Detailed analysis for | | | | |Ultimate Load Bearing | | | | |Capacity (ULBC) will be | | | | |carried out | | | | |progressively. | | |8. |Ensuring that highly |The required analysis |Long term. | | |active water used for |covering dose estimation,|Under progress. | | |cooling the core |equipment qualification | | | |catcher vessel under |assessment of containing | | | |Beyond Design basis |pressure is being carried| | | |Accident (BDBA) is |out. | | | |contained inside the | | | | |primary containment. | | | |12. |Adequacy of |All the important |April 2013 | | |instrumentation for |parameters of the reactor|(Adequacy of | | |monitoring plant status|such as neutron flux, |instrumentation | | |during Design basis |pressure above the core, |ensured. | | |Accident (BDBA) |containment pressure, |Provision to | | | |Hydrogen concentration, |extend power | | | |reactor coolant level, |supply to these | | | |radiation levels in |instruments will| | | |containment, coolant |be implemented | | | |temperatures in hot and |under item 4 | | | |cold legs, level of fuel |above.) | | | |pool, and accumulators | | | | |etc. will be monitored | | | | |during Design basis | | | | |Accident (BDBA). | | | | |Please refer item – 4 | | | | |also. | | |17. |Provision of additional|One portable DG set is |April 2013. | | |backup power supply |readily available for use| | | |sources for performing |at site. | | | |essential safety |Another mobile Diesel | | | |functions, like air |Generator (DG) set is | | | |cooled Diesel Generator|being made available for | | | |(DG) located at a high |redundancy. | | | |elevation, should be | | | | |considered. | | |
i) An accident taking place in any nuclear facility of the nuclear fuel cycle including the nuclear reactor, or in a facility using radioactive sources, leading to a large-scale release of radioactivity in the environment.
ii) A ‘criticality’ accident in a nuclear fuel cycle facility where an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction takes place inadvertently, leading to bursts of neutrons and gamma radiations.
iii) An accident during the transportation of radioactive material.