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12. Rule 46 deals with the procedure for appeal and sub-rule (2) of the said Rule empowers the appellate authority to conduct an enquiry and after providing an opportunity to the parties of being heard, pass orders in the appeal within a period of thirty days from the receipt of such an appeal. Therefore, on a harmonious reading of Rules 45 and 46, it is crystal clear that the appellate authority is a quasi-judicial functionary functioning independent of any superior hierarchical authority. The State Transport Commissioner is the authority appointed under Sec.213 of the Act, accordingly the head of the Motor Vehicles department and therefore the State Transport Commissioner is the appellate authority under Rule 45 of the CMV Rules.

26. Therefore, it is clear from the said decision that even if on the administrative side a power is conferred on the State Transport Commissioner to issue notifications, circulars and other stipulations, but that cannot extend so as to interfere with the powers conferred on a quasi-judicial functionary.

27. In my view, a quasi-judicial authority functioning under a statute is a part of the extended judicial system from the administrative side of the Government. When orders passed by such authorities are susceptible to judicial review by invoking the powers conferred on this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, such authorities are expected to exercise the power conferred without adverting to any stipulations made in any circulars interdicting the exercise of quasi-judicial power conferred under the Act and Rules. Rule of law encompasses such a situation also and any attempt to inter-meddle with the same, result in miscarriage of justice and erosion in public trust and faith in the legal system. It is true that, if the Trade Certificate holders misuse the same, the authority conferred with power may have to act on the administrative side and he is entitled to take action as contemplated under the Act and Rules. But when the very same authority exercises the power of quasi-judicial nature, he has to exercise the same independent of his administrative power. In that view of the matter, I think a reference to Sec. 2(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is relevant. Sec. 2(8) is an inclusive definition where a dealer is defined as 'inclusive of'. The specific reference to 'dealer' in the said provision is relating to a person or organization dealing with the matters in relation to repair, construction and other activities of a motor vehicle. Therefore, in order to provide life and blood to the term 'dealer' under Rule 35 of the CMV Rules, the Registering Authority is conferred with power to adjudicate, every application independently in order to identify a bonafide dealer, especially when bonafide dealer is not defined under the Act or Rules. Therefore, on that account also, it can be seen that consequent to the issuance of circular, the power conferred on the Registering Authority with respect to a decision as to who is a bonafide dealer has lost its efficacy, by stipulating in the circular that, a sub-dealer is not a dealer of manufacturer. Learned Government Pleader has vehemently contended that there is no cause of action for the writ petition since none of the petitioners have invoked the power of the Registering Authority under Rule 35 of CMV Rules. But however, that by itself is not a ground to non-suit the writ petitioners since the challenge is based on a larger question as to the Constitutional vires of the circular in question. Therefore, the said ground urged by the learned Government Pleader also cannot be sustained under law. It is also a well-recognized principle in law that, no Government Order, notification or circular can replace the statutory rules framed under authority of law.