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4. Let me now take up discussion with regard to the first point raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner qua the charge under Section 364-A IPC. In this regard it must be noted that before the learned additional Sessions Judge, the petitioner had taken the plea that no offence under Section 364-A IPC was made out on the basis of the allegations contained in the prosecution case. It was specifically submitted that there was no "demand of ransom" but, even if it assumed that a demand was made, it was not made to "any other person" as mentioned in Section 364-A IPC. Considering this submission raised on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that the present case is not one which is solely based on the allegation of demand of ransom for the person abducted. He was of the view that as per the allegation the complainant had been threatened to be killed by the present petitioner, who, in conspiracy with other co-accused, had got him abducted and had threatened him. The threats as per the allegation, did not stop on the day of the alleged abduction but continued even thereafter. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned additional Sessions Judge's observation that, in case the person kidnapped or abducted is threatened with hurt or death or even if there is an apprehension to that effect, the offence can be said to have been committed, is contrary to the statutory provisions as well as the judicial pronouncements inasmuch as there must be a demand of ransom. The learned Additional Sessions Judge had also come to the view, after examining the provisions of Section 364-A IPC, that compelling the other person to pay ransom was only one of the ingredients of the section and was not the only essential ingredient. The learned Additional Sessions Judge remarked:

As such, demand of ransom is only one of the ingredients of Section 364-A IPC and is not the primary ingredient. In case the person kidnapped or abducted is threatened with hurt or death or even if the accused by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that the abducted or kidnapped person may be put to death or hurt, the offence under Section 364-A IPC can be said to have been made out.

5. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that this conclusion of the learned additional Sessions Judge is clearly erroneous inasmuch as without the demand of ransom the provisions of Section 364-A IPC cannot be invoked. I am in agreement with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this conclusion of the learned additional Sessions Judge is not in consonance with the law on the point. But, this does not mean that the petitioner has not been correctly charged under Section 364-A IPC. This will become clear shortly.

9. However, we need not enter into semantics or debates with regard to the extent and scope of Section 364-A IPC because the Supreme Court in the case of Malleshi v. State of Karnataka has examined this provision in some detail. There is also the decision of a division bench of this Court in the case of Netra Pal v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2001 CRI LJ 1669 (DEL). In Netra Pal (supra) a division bench of this Court was of the view that the essential ingredient to attract the provisions of Section 364-A is that there has to be a demand by the kidnapper on the complainant or any of his relations asking for the payment of ransom. And, this demand must not remain with the kidnapper but must be communicated. In that case, the facts were that one master Tanu Johri was kidnapped by the accused who had wrongfully confined him. It was established on record that the accused then took master Tanu to his village at Bilgari. It was also proved in evidence that the letter, purported to be the ransom claim for Rs. 50,000/-was recovered from the possession of the accused when he was apprehended. The point for consideration in that case was whether this letter recovered from the accused would constitute a demand "to pay a ransom". The division bench held that the letter remained in the pocket of the kidnapper and was never communicated and therefore did not constitute a demand to pay a ransom. In paragraph 8 of the said decision the division bench observed as under:

8. As already pointed out above to attract the provisions of Section 364-A, IPC, prosecution has to prove that the accused kidnapped or abducted the child, kept him under detention after such kidnapping and that the kidnapping was for ransom. So far as kidnapping and detention is concerned those have been established in the facts of this case. But by mere recovery of letter Ex.P-1 purported to have been written by the accused indicating a demand of Rs. 50,000/- by itself, to our mind, would not be covered under the expression "to pay a ransom". For the purpose of getting paid a ransom a demand has to be made and communicated. Unless the price of retrieval or rescue is made the question to pay a ransom would not arise. Therefore, the essential ingredient to attract the provisions of Section 364-A is that there has to be a demand by the kidnapper on the complainant or any of his relations asking for the payment of ransom. "To pay" means to set in motion the demand for payment. Demand cannot be by keeping the letter in one's pocket. It has to be communicated to the person from whom the demand to pay is made. Unless that is done prosecution cannot succeed in covering its case under Section 364-A. In the case in hand neither the demand was raised on the family of the kidnapped boy nor communicated. Therefore, mere writing a letter and keeping it in his pocket would not tantamount to be a demand to pay ransom.