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V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1. The accused who faces prosecution for offences under Section 306 and 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) comes up before us being aggrieved by the High Court judgment by which his petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed. In that petition the accused/appellant had challenged the First Information Report (FIR) registered as C.R. No. 166 of 2008 at Naranpura Police Station.

2. The said FIR is a long document which has been filed by one Harshida Ben, widow of Deepakbhai Krishnalal Joshi. It is apparent from the said report that she was married to Deepakbhai Krishnalal Joshi serving in Ahmedabad Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. as a driver in the Microwave Project Department. He had undergone a heart bypass surgery in the year 2002 and he was asked by the doctor to avoid lifting heavy weights. She further stated that the appellant, Madan Mohan Singh was working as a D.E.T. and her husband who was driving a Tata Sumo car was working under Madan Mohan Singh (accused herein). She then complained that Madan Mohan Singh used to tell his private errands to her husband and was harassing him. Though Madan Mohan Singh was transferred, yet he kept on continuously using her husband. In the year 2007, Madam Mohan Singh came back on transfer in the Microwave Project as D.E.T. It is alleged that on the day when Madan Mohan Singh joined, he told her husband to keep the keys of the vehicle on the table. However, according to her, her husband did not listen to that and took back the key on account of which Madan Mohan Singh had become angry and had threatened her husband of suspending him. He also rebuked her husband that if he did not listen to him, he would create difficulties for her husband. Madan Mohan Singh said to her husband as how he is still alive inspite of the insults. It is then contended that on 21.2.2008, her husband left at 10'O Clock as per rules with tiffin but did not return back in the evening and, therefore, his search was taken by his son Jatin from his colleagues like Raji Saheb and his absence was reported to the police on 22.2.2008 and 23.2.2008. Ultimately, she came to know that her husband's body was lying in the dead condition in the vehicle No. GJ 1 G 3472 at Kiran Park opposite Gayatri Hospital, New Vadaj. She also suggested further that a telephone call had come from Gujarat High Court informing her that there was a Xerox copy of the suicide note. Lastly, it is stated that during the period between 2003 to 21.2.2008 the Head of the department D.E.T. Project was entrusting his house work to her husband but her husband had not done the work entrusted to him and, therefore, he had bias against her husband and insulted him in front of the staff several times and because of this her husband got depressed and committed suicide.

3. This First Information Report was filed and registered on 17.3.2008 i.e. after the 24 days of the death of her husband. It is this report which is challenged suggesting that even if the whole report is accepted as it is, it did not disclose any offence much less the offences under Sections 306 and 294, IPC. Since, the Gujarat High Court did not agree and dismissed the petition; the appellant is before us now.

4. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate took us through the FIR in which there is reference to a suicide note allegedly written by the deceased, a Xerox copy of which was produced by the complainant. The copy of that suicide note was filed before us. It seems to be a letter dated 4.2.2008 written to the Chief General Manager, Telecom Project. It is a huge complaint in which the incident dated 15.10.2007 was mentioned when allegedly the appellant asked the driver to keep the keys of the vehicle on the table and not to take away them. There is also a complaint against the working style of the Madan Mohan Singh by the driver. There is one significant sentence I was put under mental tension by M.M. Singh. Without any concrete proof and evidence I was put under insulting position due to which I began to feel resentment and insult and I came under depression.

8. It is on this that Shri Tulsi contended that all this is absolutely absurd. If a person writes a suicide note on 4.2.2008, he had no business to send the suicide note to High Court and keep a copy thereof in the house. Learned Senior Counsel said that even if all this is accepted as it is, there is nothing to suggest that the appellant has committed any offence or that any offence could be spelt out from the said suicide note or the FIR much less offence under Sections 306 and 294, IPC. We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in this suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an offence much less under Section 306, IPC. We could not find anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide. In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression. In the so-called suicide note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306, IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107, IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring out the suicide of the concerned person as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306, IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306, IPC either in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note.

11. It was tried to be contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant that at this stage, we should not go into the merits of the FIR or the said suicide note. It is trite law now that where there is some material alleged in the FIR, then such FIR and the ensuing proceedings should not be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is for this reason that we very closely examined the FIR to see whether it amounts to a proper complaint for the offence under Sections 306 and 294(b) IPC. Insofar as Section 294(b) IPC is concerned, we could not find a single word in the FIR or even in the so-called suicide note. Insofar as Section 306 IPC is concerned, even at the cost of repetition, we may say that merely because a person had a grudge against his superior officer and committed suicide on account of that grudge, even honestly feeling that he was wronged, it would still not be a proper allegation for basing the charge under Section 306 IPC. It will still fall short of a proper allegation. It would have to be objectively seen whether the allegations made could reasonably be viewed as proper allegations against the appellant/accused to the effect that he had intended or engineered the suicide of the concerned person by his acts, words etc. When we put the present FIR on this test, it falls short. We have already explained that the baseless and irrelevant allegations could not be used as a basis for prosecution for a serious offence under Section 306 IPC. Similarly, we have already considered Section 294 (b) IPC also. We have not been able to find anything. Under such circumstances, where the FIR itself does not have any material or is not capable of being viewed as having material for offence under Sections 306 and 294(b) IPC, as per the law laid down by this Court in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 Suppl. 1 SCC 335], it would be only proper to quash the FIR and the further proceedings.