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26. It is not as if, as already indicated, the prosecution had been launched only in respect of offences falling within the purview of section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, but it had been launched also for the offences falling under other sections of the Indian Penal Code as well as under certain sections of the Income-tax Act. It would have been easy to find an answer if the prosecution had been launched only for the offences falling within the purview of the section, when a complaint emanates from the court in regard to those offences. The answer, in such a situation, would be that the prosecution, as launched without a proper complaint under section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code from that court, shall stand vitiated. But that is not the situation here. Would it mean that, in case where, in the course of the same transaction, certain other distinct offences not falling within the purview of section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code had been committed, in addition to the offences falling within the purview of that section and complaint in regard to those offences had been filed without a complaint from the court under the provisions of section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, such a complaint would be thrown out lock, stock and barrel in the sense of vitiating the prosecution in its entirety or would the complaint so filed become invalid only in respect of those offences falling under the purview of the embargo created by section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

It could not be denied that the accused could be tried of charges under sections 182 and 500, Indian Penal Code, separately on same facts provided the public servant as well as the person defamed made complaints. If that is so, there is no reason why one cannot be tried independently of the other so long as the requirements of each are satisfied. Harris C.J., while delivering the Full Bench decision in question, examined all the earlier cases of the Calcutta High Court and observed that, where, upon the facts, the commission of several offences is disclosed, some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complaint to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because, to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of sections 195 to 199, Criminal Procedure Code. Sections 195 to 199 deal with the requisites for the prosecution of certain specified offences and the provisions of those sections must be limited to prosecutions for the offences actually indicated. If it was the intention of the Legislature to make sanctions or complaints in a certain form necessary for the prosecution of all offences disclosed by facts which would give rise to any of the offences specifically indicated in the sections, the Legislature could have said so but it did not.

29. In Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa, , their Lordships happened to consider the effect of prosecution under two distinct offences falling under sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code on the same facts without sanction under section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, and stated thus (paragraphs 5 and 6 at page 1778) :

"(5) We pass on to consider the next contention of the appellants that the conviction of the appellants under section 353, IPC, is illegal because there is a contravention of section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which requires a complaint in writing by the process server or the A.S.I. It was submitted that the charge under section 353, IPC, is based upon the same facts as the charge under section 186, IPC, and no cognizance could be taken of the offence under section 186, IPC, unless there was a complaint in writing as required by section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was argued that the conviction under section 353, IPC, is tantamount, in the circumstances of this case, to circumvention of the requirement of section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the conviction of the appellants under section 353, IPC, by the High Court was therefore, vitiated in law. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under section 353, IPC, is based are the same as those constituting the charge under section 186, IPC, but it cannot be ignored that sections 186 and 353, IPC, relate to two distinct offences and, while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, IPC, is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge if his public functions but under section 353, IPC, the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The characteristics of the two offences are also different. Section 186 occurs in chapter X of the IPC, dealing with contempt of the lawful authority of public servants, while section 353 occurs in Chapter XVI, regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well-established that section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section. In Satish Chandra Chakravarthi v. Ramdayal De, 24 Cal WN, AIR 1921 Cal 1, it was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that, where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under section 211, IPC, which is an offence against public justice and the other under section 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court for taking cognizance of that offence. It was said that the two offences, being fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of. That they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that the former is made non-compoundable while the latter remains compoundable. In one, for the initiation of the proceedings, the Legislature requires the sanction of the court under section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, while, in the other, cognizance can be taken of the offence on the mere complaint of the person defamed. It is pointed out in the Full Bench case that, where, upon the fact, the commission of several offense is disclosed some of which requiring sanction and others not, it is open to the complaint to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction because, to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of section 195 to 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The decision of the Calcutta case has been quoted with approval by this court in Basir-ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal in which it was held that, if the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, from seeking redress for the offence committed against him.

In the present case, therefore, we are of the opinion that section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, does not bar the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under section 353 of the Indian Penal Code though it is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution under section 186, IPC."

30. In Narayana Ayyar v. G. Veerappa Pillai [1950] MWN (Crl.) 282, a Full Bench of this court, after elaborate consideration of the entire case law then available in the process of examination of the scope of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, held that, where an alleged offence falls both under sections 193 and 500, IPC, a complaint by the court under 195(1), Criminal Procedure Code, is not necessary to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence under section 500, IPC, alone.