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2. Dawan Singh, in his written statement, denied that he had used any abusive language and averred that he had, in reply to a question asked by the Court, made a statement explaining why he had ceased to eat with Mahip Singh, and why there consequently was enmity between Mahip Singh and himself.

3. The Munsif recorded the deposition of each of the parties.

4. Mahip Singh stated: 'The defendant abused me whereby I was dishonoured among the members of my brotherhood. As I was considered before the defendant abused me, so am I now also considered; no loss has occurred in this respect. He abused me, imputing bad conduct to my mother. At the time of giving evidence on a question asked by the then Munsif, the defendant gave abuse to me. On the deposition being concluded the Munsif asked Dawan Singh the question, 'What is the reason that so respectable a man (as the witness Mahip Singh) came to tell a lie,' and thereupon Dawan Singh uttered abuse. He said: 'Mahip Singh ke ma bap men farq hai; isse wajeh se Khana pina nahin hai."

33. Upon this ground of law alone the Munsif, without entering into the merits of the case or taking any evidence in it other than the statements of the parties, dismissed the suit; but upon appeal the learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court, reversing that order, has remanded the case for trial under Section 562 of the Civil Procedure Code. The view taken by the learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court seems to be based upon two propositions, one being that the abusive language used by the defendant was in itself actionable without proof of special or actual damage; and the other that the defendant could not be held to be privileged in making the statement which he did make. In remanding the case, the learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court was inclined to hold that the abusive language used by the defendant towards the plaintiff was uttered after the defendant's deposition had already been taken in the Court, and the learned Judge goes on to say: "The privilege of a witness lasts so long only as he has been deposing on oath in the witness-box, but not after it.

34. Holding this view, the learned Judge was of opinion that this particular point as to whether or not the use of abusive language above mentioned was made under circumstances of privilege had not been duly dealt with by the first Court on evidence, as no evidence on the issue had duly been taken. And the remand proceeds upon that hypothesis.

35. What we have to determine in this case are two important questions of law:

36. The first is whether abusive language which aims at insulting a person is not per se actionable in tort under the law of British India (when the language is such that it causes injury to the feelings of the person towards whom it is used), without proof of any special or actual damage.

61. Seventhly, that the rule of English law as to the privilege or protection of a witness in regard to defamatory statements made in the witness-box is based upon a public policy which is equally applicable to insulting and abusive language used by such witness.

62. Eighthly, that such statements when made in the witness-box are privileged and protected, even though made maliciously and falsely, so long as they are relevant to the inquiry, or have reference to the inquiry in the broadest sense of the phrase.