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2. Sometime in or about June, 1993 the respondent-employee was appointed as a Peon in one of the college run by the petitioner being K. C. College, Sometime in or about 1995 or thereafter the respondent-employee was transferred to Thadomal Shahani Engineering College, which is also run by the petitioner-Collegiate Board and is one of the Engineering College at Bombay.

3. In the examination conducted in December, 1996, for second year engineering for Semester IV in the faculty of Electronics Engineering, it was found that the marks of one of the students were tampered with and altered from 7 to 17 though the question specified was only of 10 marks. On the basis of the alleged act, the respondent-employee Peon was suspended on 4th July, 1997 pending enquiry by the petitioner No. 2 on the ground of serious misconduct under Chap. V- Conduct, Discipline and Appeals of the Standard Code Rules, 1984. The charge levelled against the respondent No. 1 was of falsification or tampering with paper or record of the University or College and committing any act involving moral turpitude. On 7th February, 1998 the charge-sheet was issued for the aforesaid misconduct under Rule 42(a), Rule 41 (3), Rule 41(10), Rule 42(c), Rule 42(m) and Rule 42(R) of the Standard Code Rules, 1994. The enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer and concluded. Ultimately, on the basis of the said enquiry a show cause notice was issued to the respondent-employee on 15th February, 1999 to show cause why the proposed punishment should not be imposed against respondent-employee. By letter dated 5th May, 1999, the service of the respondent-employee was terminated.

5. The petitioner states that pursuant thereto the said enquiry was conducted afresh and on conclusion of the same a show cause notice was issued to respondent No. 1 on 22th September, 2000 which was replied by the respondent-employee on 9th October, 2000 and ultimately a fresh termination order was passed by the newly constituted disciplinary authority on 3rd November, 2000. By the said order, the services of the petitioner were terminated.

6. The respondent No. I thereafter moved the College Tribunal under the provisions of Maharashtra Non-Agricultural Universities and Affiliated Colleges, Standards Code Rules, 1984 by filing an appeal which is numbered as Appeal No. 22 of 1999. The said appeal was heard by the College Tribunal on merits. The College Tribunal in its order & judgment dated 11th July, 2002, which is impugned in the present two writ petitions has held that the impugned order of termination dated 3rd November, 2000 is liable to be quashed and set aside and that the petitioner shall pay to the respondent-employee full back wages that are due to him w.e.f. 1st July, 1999 to 3rd November, 2000 minus the subsistence allowance already paid. It was further directed that in view of the fact that the finding is given by Tribunal that the respondent No. 1 need not be reinstated, it was directed that the petitioner shall pay to the respondent-employee 75% of the six month's emoluments excluding transport allowance. The aforesaid amount has been directed to be paid within 90 days. The aforesaid findings are given by the learned Tribunal by inter alia holding that the evidence on record which has been assessed and considered by the College Tribunal to take action of dismissal against the respondent No. 1.

9. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-employee inter alia contended before me that the order passed by the College Tribunal is invalid and baseless for three reasons. Firstly, it is contended that once it has been found that the termination is illegal by virtue of non-compliance of Rule 51(2) of the Maharashtra Non-Agricultural Universities and Affiliated Colleges, Standard Code Rules, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the said Standard Code) then in that event it is not open for the Tribunal to refuse to reinstate the respondent No. 1 in the said job. According to him, once the termination is found illegal, reinstatement and back wages must flow naturally out of the said order. It is further contended by the respondent-employee that the finding of the Tribunal that there is sufficient material on record to uphold the dismissal order passed by the College is erroneous and is required to be interfered with and such finding is arrived at by the Tribunal without going into the merits of the case at all. He further contended that there were number of grounds raised in the memo of appeal before the Tribunal, and it has not gone into all the grounds which were agitated before the said Tribunal. He also contended that the Tribunal has considered the argument and material in respect of the validity of the enquiry in merely one paragraph and such approach of the Tribunal is not just and proper.

(b) Such a Committee shall submit its report and recommendations to the Board of Examinations which shall take disciplinary action in the matter as it deems fit.

Relying upon the aforesaid provisions, the learned Counsel has contended that the enquiry conducted by the college ought to have been conducted by (.he University or the Board of Examiners of the University under aforesaid act and the provision of Standard Code has no application. Firstly, this point was never raised before the Enquiry Officer nor it has been raised before the College Tribunal and therefore the College Tribunal has rightly not considered the same. Apart from the fact that on this ground alone, the respondent No. 1 is not entitled to raise the said issue in this petition, I find otherwise also there is no merit in this contention. The provisions of Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 and particularly reliance placed on Section 32(6} did not pertain to or apply in cases of conducting of the departmental enquiry by the college for misconduct of its employees. The power given under Section 32(6) with the Universities or Board of Examiners under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 is independent. This power can be exercised by a University if any malpractices are found by the University in conducting their exams. This power do not in any manner affect the power of college authority to conduct the departmental enquiry under Standard Code if the college authority has found that there is misconduct on the part of the employee in their college. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1-employee has thereafter relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar and Anr. v. Management of Vishwa Bharata Seva Samiti and Anr. and has contended that the Standard Code is a subordinate legislation to the provision of Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 and once there is a provision that enquiry under Section 31 and Section 32(6) of the said Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 than the Code will not be applicable. I do not see any conflict between the provisions of Section 31 and Section 32(6) with that of the Standard Code. The provisions of Section 31 and Section 32(6) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 empowers the University to conduct disciplinary proceedings in the cases of misconduct in the course of University examination whereas the Standard Code gives the College the independent power to conduct its own enquiry as there is a master-servant relationship between the petitioner-college and the respondent No. 1-employee. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1-employee particularly based on reliance upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar, (supra). Apart therefrom, I also find that the issue of validity of an enquiry was a subject matter between the parties in an earlier round of litigation which culminated in an order of Chandrachud, J. which has been referred to hereinabove. The learned Judge has infact set aside the enquiry which was conducted under the Standard Code on the ground that the principal being one of the witnesses should not have been the disciplinary authority in present case. It was not the case of the respondent No. 1-employee either before this Court in an earlier round of litigation or before the College Tribunal under the impugned order that the Standard Code did not apply to his case and that enquiry ought to be conducted under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I find no merits in any of the contentions raised in the present petition by the respondent No. 1-employee.