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S. A. de Smith in his Constitutional and Administrative Law. second edition, deals with abuse of discretionary powers at pages 589 onwards After referring to Padfield's case. (1968) 1 All ER 694 he has said:

"............a wide executive discretion was subject to judicial standards. The case shows unambiguously that English administrative law does recognise the principle that the French call detournement de pouvoir, or abuse of administrative power; and that misuse of power may be inferred from inadequate reasons or, indeed, so the Law Lords observed obiter, from the absence of any reason given in rebuttal when an aggrieved person has established a prima fade case".

13. Then the further question arises on what grounds he can seek the quashing, of the order of the Advocate-General. The order with which we are concerned, Ext. P-3, we have extracted at the beginning of the judgment. It is not contended that the petitioner had not been heard before the order was passed. It is not even suggested that the Advocate-General violated the principles of natural justice by taking extraneous matters into consideration or relied on materials which had not been made known to the petitioner. The only contention that has been urged before us is that the Advocate-General was obliged to apply his mind fairly and dispassionately to the questions that arose for consideration, and that his order being at least in certain circumstances amenable to judicial review must be a speaking order, giving the reasons for the refusal. The Supreme Court has ruled on numerous occasions that the orders in quasi-judicial proceedings must be speaking orders. AIR 1966 SC 671; AIR 1967 SC 1606; AIR 1969 SC 1297; AIR 1970 SC 1302 and AIR 1971 SC 862. It is also an equally well established principle that an authority who decides a matter which can affect the parties must apply his mind fairly and with the care and attention that is required to the questions involved. The House of Lords in Padfield's case (1968) 1 All ER 694 had to consider this aspect. The Minister had given reasons for refusing to refer the complaint to the committee. When the legality of the decision was questioned, he argued that he had been under no duty to give reasons and that the fact that he had done so should not put him in a worse position. The House of Lords rejected this argument that his decision would not have been open to question if he had not given reasons. Lord Upjohn observed:

15. These principles we think must apply to a case where the Advocate-General refuses consent. From what we have stated earlier, a consent can be refused for all or one of many reasons; (1) the persons approaching the Advocate-General may not have sufficient interest (2) their motives may not be pure (3) they may not be solvent (4) there may be no breach of trust and (5) direction of the Court may not be deemed necessary. The applicants can legitimately claim that they should be told for what reason or reasons the consent had been refused. If the refusal is for one of the first three reasons mentioned above, the Advocate-General himself can file a suit if he was satisfied that there was a breach of trust or that a direction was necessary, or any two other persons who do not suffer from any of those disqualifications may approach the Advocate-General afresh for consent. If the reason for refusal of consent is not known to be for one of the first three reasons, it is not likely, that any one else would approach the Advocate-General and it is most unlikely that the Advocate-General would file a suit himself, for the refusal of consent in such cases can only be because the Advocate-General was not prima facie satisfied that there was any breach of trust or that a direction was necessary. When the persons who approach the Advocate-General come before the Court and complain that they are personally aggrieved the Court is certainly entitled to know why the consent had been refused by the Advocate-General. The matter of refusal of consent therefore clearly stands on a footing quite different from a case where consent had been granted by the Advocate General. The Court must be satisfied in all cases of refusal that the mind of the Advocate-General had been fairly and dispassionately applied to the relevant facts before him The only way of knowing it is by reading the order in the light of the facts and materials that were before him. So, the order must indicate that mind had been applied to those facts and materials. Where those facts and materials indicate a prima facie case, the order should show why they were not accepted and the. consent was refused. In this particular case, the prior dissensions in the trust, the clamour for management, the methods adopted for getting the position of trustees, or manoeuvreing to get into that position, and the allegations of breach of trust of a serious nature all indicate prima facie that all was not well with the affairs of the trust. So the order should have been a speaking order and reasons for refusal should have been discernible from it, If no reasons at alt are seen, as in this case, we can only term the order as the Supreme Court did in AIR 1972 SC 2083, as an arbitrary one. The order does not indicate anything. But for the fact that the Full Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1962 Ker 90 might have influenced the Advocate-General in not giving reasons, the ruling in the House of Lords in Padfield's case (1968) 1 All ER 694 would have been attracted. Applying the principles of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 2083 and in AIR 1971 SC 1599 and of the House of Lords in Padfield's case (1968) 1 All ER 694, we have to set aside the order, Ext, P-3.