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23. Parliament, it manifests from the provisions of Section 427(2) CrPC, was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved out an exception to the general rule to clearly recognise that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively. The provisions of Section 427(2) CrPC apart, in Ranjit Singh case [Ranjit Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, (1991) 4 SCC 304 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 965] , this Court has in terms held that since life sentence implies imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the convict, consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life. That logic, in our view, must extend to Section 31 CrPC also no matter Section 31 does not in terms make a provision analogous to Section 427(2) of the Code. The provision must, in our opinion, be so interpreted as to prevent any anomaly or irrationality. So interpreted Section 31(1) CrPC must mean that sentences awarded by the court for several offences committed by the prisoner shall run consecutively (unless the court directs otherwise) except where such sentences include imprisonment for life which can and must run concurrently. We are also inclined to hold that if more than one life sentences are awarded to the prisoner, the same would get superimposed over each other. This will imply that in case the prisoner is granted the benefit of any remission or commutation qua one such sentence, the benefit of such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other.

27. In Duryodhan Rout case [Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 306] the prisoner was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 376(2)(f) and 201 IPC and sentenced to death for the offence of murder and rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(f). Imprisonment for a period of one year was additionally awarded under Section 201 IPC with a direction that the sentences would run consecutively. In appeal, the High Court altered [State v. Duryodhan Rout, 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 321 : 2008 Cri LJ 2876] the sentence of death to imprisonment for life while leaving the remaining sentences untouched. The petitioner then approached this Court to argue that the sentences ought to run concurrently and not consecutively as directed by the courts below. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak case [Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440 : AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 736] and several other subsequent decisions on the subject this Court held that the sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the remainder of the life of the prisoner. The Court further held that Section 31 CrPC would not permit consecutive running of life sentence and the term sentence since the aggregate punishment of the petitioner would go beyond the outer limit of 14 years stipulated in the proviso to Section 31(2) CrPC. The Court observed: (Duryodhan Rout case [Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 306] , SCC p. 794, para 29) "29. Section 31 CrPC relates to sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person is sentenced of conviction of several offences, including one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31(2) shall come into play and no consecutive sentence can be imposed."

29. To the extent Duryodhan Rout case [Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 306] relies upon proviso to sub-section (2) to support the conclusion that a direction for consecutive running of sentences is impermissible, it does not state the law correctly, even when the conclusion that life imprisonment means for the full span of one's life and consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded is otherwise sound and acceptable.

30. In Kamalanantha v. State of T.N. [Kamalanantha v. State of T.N., (2005) 5 SCC 194 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1121] , the prisoners were convicted amongst others for the offences under Sections 376, 302, 354 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the offences under Sections 376 and 302 IPC and various terms of imprisonment for other offences with the direction that the sentences awarded shall run consecutively. One of the issues that was raised in support of the appeal was that the courts below were not justified in awarding consecutive life sentences. That contention was rejected by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in the following words: (SCC p. 229, para 76) "76. The contention of Mr Jethmalani that the term "imprisonment" enjoined in Section 31 CrPC does not include imprisonment for life is unacceptable. The term "imprisonment" is not defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 31 of the Code falls under Chapter III of the Code which deals with power of courts. Section 28 of the Code empowers the High Court to pass any sentence authorised by law. Similarly, the Sessions Judge and Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, except the sentence of death which shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. In our opinion the term "imprisonment" would include the sentence of imprisonment for life."

35. We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension of this case argued before us, namely, whether the court can direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively. That aspect was argued keeping in view the fact that the appellants have been sentenced to imprisonment for different terms apart from being awarded imprisonment for life. The trial court's direction affirmed by the High Court is that the said term sentences shall run consecutively. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that even this part of the direction is not legally sound, for once the prisoner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the term sentence awarded to him must run concurrently. We do not, however, think so. The power of the court to direct the order in which sentences will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in Section 31 CrPC. The court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in tune with Section 31 CrPC. The converse however may not be true for if the court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply that the term sentence would run concurrently. That is because once the prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any further sentence. Whether or not the direction of the court below calls for any modification or alteration is a matter with which we are not concerned. The regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to deal with that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs.