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22. In view of the above, notwithstanding that there is no agreement between the parties to refer disputes to arbitration by the MSEFC or to any Arbitration Centre or institution rendering alternate dispute resolution services, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the MSME Act would apply and a party to a dispute as referred to in Section 17 of the MSME Act could refer the same for conciliation to MSEFC and failing such conciliation, MSEFC could refer the same to arbitration in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the MSME Act.

23. Clearly, recourse to an ad hoc arbitration is not available once provisions of the MSME Act are invoked and to that extent the provisions of the MSME Act would override any provisions of the agreement between the parties or the A&C Act. However, once the disputes are referred to arbitration in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the MSME Act, the arbitration would proceed in the same manner as it would have pursuant to an agreement under Section 7 of the A&C Act. Thus, by virtue of the MSME Act, it is imputed that the parties had agreed to refer disputes for arbitration to MSEFC or to any institution rendering dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the MSEFC. It is obvious that the arbitration would proceed in accordance with the procedure followed by the MSEFC or the Centre/Institution for alternative dispute resolution services, as the case may be. There is no scope to further truncate the arbitral proceedings contrary to the A&C Act or the applicable rules of arbitration before the MSEFC or the Centre/Institution for alternative dispute resolution services, as the case may be.

25. It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that provisions of a statute must be construed harmoniously and must be consistent with the scheme of the statute. In Sultana Begum v. Premchand Jain: (1997) 1 SCC 373, the Supreme Court had observed that it is the duty of the courts to avoid "a head on clash" between two sections of the same Act and "whenever it is possible to do so, to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise". In Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd: (1962) AIR SC 1543, Justice Gajendragadkar had observed that "sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as interdependent; an attempt should be made to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy". The rule of harmonious construction thus requires that the expression "every reference" as mentioned in the opening sentence of Sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the MSME Act must be construed to mean reference(s) to MSEFC. The heading of Section 18 is also indicative of the reference as contemplated under Section 18 - that is, a reference to MSEFC of any dispute with regard to any amount due under Section 17 of the MSME Act, that is, an amount due from the buyer of goods supplied or the services rendered, by a supplier.

26. This Court also finds it difficult to accept that provisions of Sub- section (5) of Section 18 of the MSME Act can be construed to mean that the mandate of MSEFC to decide the reference would stand terminated on the expiry of ninety days. Sub-section (5) merely directs that the reference must be decided within ninety days. It does not expressly provide for the consequence of failure to decide the reference within the said period. The assumption that there would be an automatic termination of MSEFC's mandate if it fails to decide within a period of ninety days is neither borne out by the language of Sub-section (5) nor can be drawn as an inference from the scheme of Section 18 of the MSME Act. The entire object of Section 18 is to provide a dispute resolution mechanism for resolution of any disputes with regard to amounts due under Section 17 of the MSME Act. To that end, consistent with the said scheme, Sub-section (5) provides that a reference must be decided within a period of ninety days. Thus, MSEFC must ensure that the conciliation proceedings, as conducted by itself, are concluded within the said period. However, if the said Conciliation is not concluded within a period of ninety days, it does not mean that its mandate stands terminated and the parties must be relegated to other remedies.