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1. These are two First Appeals, one by the husband, being First Appeal No. 107 of 1979 from a decree dated 23rd Nov., 1978 for recovery of Rs. 20,000/- as dower in Suit No. 100 of 1975 of the court of the Civil Judge, Budaun, and the other by the wife be-ins First Appeal No. 498 of 1981 from a decree dated 23rd Nov., 1978 for restitution of conjugal rights passed by the court of the Civil Judge, Budaun in Suit No. 435 of 1973. This latter appeal was originally filed in the court of the District Judge, Budaun. but was withdrawn by this Court and connected with the former appeal.

9. Confronted with this position Mr, Janardan Sahai, learned counsel for the wife, contended that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, even if it were allowed to stand could not be enforced unless the wife's demand for payment of her prompt dower was satisfied. On this Mr. Raieshji Verma objected that after consummation of a marriage non payment of dower, even though exigible, cannot be pleaded in defence to an action for restitution of conjugal rights, and relied upon for the proposition on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Rabia Khatoon v. Mohd. Mukh-tar Ahmad (AIR 1966 All 548). Mr. Janardan Sahai countered by saying that he is not putting forth the demand for dower as a defence to an action for restitution of conjugal rights. The wife already has a decree in her favour for recovery of her prompt dower, The husband was not paying it and in equity the court ought to have made the satisfaction of the decree for recovery of dower as a condition for enforcement of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights In Smt. Rabia Khatoon's case (supra) also although non payment of the dower was not admitted as a proper defence in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights which was decreed yet the decree was made conditional upon payment of the amount of prompt dower by the husband to the wife.

10. Under the circumstances, it would be equitable, iust and proper to impose a condition, that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights would not be executable unless the decree for recovery of the prompt dower was satisfied. This, however, brings me to the question whether the decree for recovery of dower is sustainable.

11. One of the grounds of objection against the decree was that the suit was time barred. Apart from the facts found by the trial court for holding that the claim was not barred by limitation. I have been referred to the judgment of this Court in Naeem Begum v. Alam Ali Khan, (1979 All LJ 771) wherein it was held that Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 expressly saves a suit for recovery of dower which is brought under the Muslim Law of marriage and divorce, from the law of limitation.

13. In the result, both these appeals are liable to be dismissed, subject however, to the modification in the decree for restitution of conjugal rights that was passed by the Civil Judge. Budaun, in Suit No. 435 of 1973 originally of the court of Munsif, Bisauli, to the effect that the decree shall not be executable and shall not be executed until such time as the decree for recovery of dower passed in Suit No. 100 of 1975 of the court of the Civil Judge, Budaun, is fully satisfied. In the circumstances, I would however, direct that the husband Sayed Ahman Khan shall pay the costs of the wife in both the First Appeal in this Court.